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THE LOGIC OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

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THE THEOLOGY OF THE REAL

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMONWEALTH

THE LOGIC OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

An Answer to
Professor Eddington by

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PREFACE

I AM MORE than conscious of the shortcomings of this essay, and can only hope that it will be judged as an attempt in the right direction rather than as a professed achievement. An actual exposition of anything approaching a logic of spiritual thought is almost out of the question, because an objective science of spiritual truth, though in process of formation, is hardly as yet a securely established fact, and for such, as well as for more personal reasons, it is only as an experimental study that I have ventured to accept the challenge of Professor Eddington.

R. G. M.

July, 1929

CONTENTS

		PAGE
	PREFACE	5
	SUMMARY	9
	PROFESSOR EDDINGTON'S QUESTION	11
CHAPTER I.	RELIGION AND LOGIC	13
II.	THE OBSERVATION OF SPIRITUAL FACT	26
III.	MYTH AND TRUTH	42
IV.	SYMBOLS, CONCEPTS, AND DEFINITIONS	56
V.	INFERENCE	78
VI.	EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION	94
VII.	METAPHYSICAL VERIFICATION	105
VIII.	PRACTICAL VERIFICATION	127
IX.	THEOLOGY WITHOUT A GOD	148
	APPENDIX	161

SUMMARY

I.—A CULTURE having its sacred elements and scope for the religious attitude and for the manifold activities which spring from it will be immeasurably richer in potentialities than a purely rationalistic one. The conception of spiritual truth, therefore, a truth of a higher order than any that can be won from the observation of Nature, will be one of exceptional value and significance for civilization *if* it can be shown to be warrantable. But it can be shown to be warrantable only if it can be seen to result from a defensible system of inference. Epistemological difficulties.

II.—The basis of sound inference is accurate observation, but the observation of spiritual facts is rendered difficult, not only by the mixed and masked character of the data themselves and the bias of the individual observer, but also by the cultural traditions current at the time, which prescribe what kind of facts shall be readily visible. Hence checks upon mal-observation are required. Among these is classification with a view to observation by type. The data fall roughly into five very diverse classes which cannot be generalized about as though they were all epistemologically identical.

III.—The close connexion of religion with mythology leads to an examination of the possibility of different kinds of truth. Rational and experiential truth. The knowledge of things, the knowledge of persons, the knowledge of gods, the knowledge of God. Anautic consciousness. Personification. Alexander's view. Freud's. Analysis of the legend of the Ascension as an example of the function of the myth.

IV.—The varying content of religious terms. Concepts. Verbal tokens. Senses of the term "symbol". Silberer. Jung. As if. As though. Either—or. Analysis. Definition. Examples of doctrines illustrating the principles of analysis and definition: the terms Holy Spirit, God, Christ, Resurrection, Real Presence.

V.—Religious, like scientific, thought advances by a double process of hypothesis and verification. Religious intuitions are of the nature of an insight springing from a certain specific mental attitude evoked by facts rather than logical inferences drawn directly from these facts, and yet they often approximate to the form of inferences. Nine formulæ of intuitive inference more or less common may be noticed. The ground of spiritual induction. Deductions from the idea of God. Example: The doctrine of immortality.

VI.—Verification may come from empirical generalizations. The applicability of ordinary logic to religion. The factual element in religion. Religious experience. Example: The doctrine of prayer.

VII.—Whether or not the possibility of metaphysical elaboration constitutes a verification of intuition must depend upon the kind of metaphysics employed. Three types of theological metaphysics may be contrasted. Among the problems to which such questions lead us are those of the Latent Self, and of Higher Realms of being and their locus. The bearing of the theory of the Earth-soul upon some of these questions.

VIII.—Verification as control. An experimental study of theology as a practical science. An examination of the extent to which the experience of conversion and inward transformation are within human control.

IX.—The specific character of religion seems to be lost sight of in all proposed substitutes for theism. Religion is a lifting up of the heart and mind in adoration and self-oblation to some infinite, immeasureably exalted object. Is it possible to have a special science of this highly specific libido-trend and its epistemological implications independently of any presuppositions as to a personal God?

PROFESSOR EDDINGTON'S QUESTION

"GRANTED THAT physical science has limited its scope so as to leave a background which we are at liberty to, or even invited to, fill with a reality of spiritual import, we have yet to face the most difficult criticism from science. 'Here', says science, 'I have left a domain in which I shall not interfere. I grant that you have some kind of avenue to it through the self-knowledge of consciousness, so that it is not necessarily a domain of pure agnosticism. But how are you going to deal with this domain? *Have you any system of inference from mystic experience comparable to the system by which science develops a knowledge of the outside world?* I do not insist on your employing my methods, which I acknowledge is inapplicable; but you ought to have some defensible method. The alleged basis of experience may possibly be valid; but have I any reason to regard it as anything more than muddle-headed romancing?' "

PROFESSOR EDDINGTON
in *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 339.

(*Italics not in the original.*)

THE LOGIC OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

CHAPTER I

RELIGION AND LOGIC

THE CONCEPT OF spiritual truth forces the idea of a possible logic of religious thought upon us, for truth means thought in accordance with principles that ensure its validity. When, however, one seeks to grapple with those principles they prove terribly elusive; one is always tending to lose hold either of the concept of truth or of one's sense of the essential nature of religion. Yet to reject off-hand a conception so well justified in many ways as that of spiritual truth without having first explored the possibility of it very carefully would be a crime against civilization and against humanity. For the concept is one which, if justified rationally, as well as morally and psychologically, is one of the richest in potentialities for our race. How far the elusiveness of the subject is due to its inherent nature and how far to defective habits of thought on our own part we are as yet not in a position to judge.

Religion to-day stands apart, outside the system of general culture, in a world of its own, the reality of which is, for increasing numbers of people, becoming more and more dubious. For the means whereby an assurance of objective reality is won is an inductive logic based upon verifiable facts, whereas religion has no means of distinguishing fact from fancy except itself; its own faith, its own purity of intention, is all the

assurance it has that the claims to which it surrenders are the claims of the highest truth and that the images passing through the crystal of its thought are symbols of a higher reality than sense can grasp. This is inevitable so far as actual religion is concerned; religion would not be religion were it otherwise. But theology and religion are not the same thing; theology claims to be a science, the science of the intelligible truth of religion, and as such it should be able to exhibit its credentials as a science in the form of defensible canons of inference from ascertainable fact. Is such a science possible?

There are as many possible sciences as there are spheres of real or supposed existence in which an interest is taken. Just as our interest in the material world, in life, and in our own minds has given us the sciences of physics, biology, and psychology, so any realm of alleged existence whatever has its potential science because it is quite possible to apply intellect to the problems which it presents. Are we interested in ghostly appearances or in the spirits of the dead? If so, and if what we desire is truth, the knowledge of reality, whether it harmonize with our own predilections or not, there must be a science of psychical research, because it is possible to apply the principles of scientific investigation to the case of psychical phenomena. In the same way it is possible to attempt the conversion of astrology, or any other apparent absurdity, into a science. It is not the sphere, but the method of dealing with it, which distinguishes science from superstition. A medical theory, for instance, which rested upon self-advertisement, blind tradition, disregard of negative instances or concomitant circumstances, professional prestige, financial interests, and methods of medical education which discouraged independent thought, would not be science merely because medicine is supposed to be a science. It is the alleged existence of some general class or order of facts,

together with the impartial and logical attitude of a truth-loving mind in the investigation of it, which makes the science, however little the investigators may have succeeded in reaching agreement or in obtaining recognition of their labours from the general culture of the age.

Nevertheless some kinds of things are more worthy of being made the subject-matter of sciences than are others. The more significant from the standpoint of a general world-view any order of facts appears to be the more would a true philosopher wish to see it made the subject of scientific investigation. We do not know the length and depth and height of the mysterious universe of which we are a part. We do not know how many-sided it is, or what amazing qualities or events it may not bring forth when the right conditions for them are provided. A science which opened up fresh avenues of understanding and appreciation of it would be a science worthy of study. All depends primarily upon whether there is some realm of possible existence and experience which could form the subject-matter of such a science.

Surely the existence of the religious consciousness, together with the claims which it advances—to be a mediator of truth inaccessible to the natural intellect—constitutes just such a field of investigation for a possible science. If there is to be no such study as theology within the ambit of our general culture that culture will remain deliberately one-sided and defective. Religion asserts, in effect, that the universe possesses sides, or aspects, to which man's senses, man's instincts, and man's intellect are unadapted, and which are thus lost upon the natural man, but that some measure of contact with, and apprehension of, these higher aspects of reality are possible through spiritual religion, and only through religion. These claims, taken in conjunction with all the phenomena of religious experience, create a problem of

spiritual truth which we cannot rationally evade. Yet, at any rate in this country, there is no systematized body of rationally assured results, even in the form of provisional conclusions, such as constitutes any natural science. In all the natural sciences there is continuity and progress. The achievements of one investigator become the basis for those of his successors. Each worker knows what problems are awaiting solution and what attempts have been made to deal with them. When conclusions have to be reconsidered such reconsideration is itself the outcome of work on the basis of those conclusions. In spite of individual differences of opinion the science moves forward as a single co-operative whole. The science itself seems to carry the workers. But how different is the case of theology! Here, as a general rule, every fresh work represents the personal reactions of some individual; it is not, as in science, a carrying on of the work of former investigators by a fresh hand.

Part of the reason for this lies in the fact that there is no formulated logic of theological thought—a fact with which Höffding taunts the theologians. Without a logic the objectivity and universal standpoint essential to rational thought are hardly possible. Moreover, the logic of the Spiritual Life must rest upon something analogous to a critically inductive basis. I state this fact briefly and dogmatically because it is what general culture demands of theology, and the standpoint of this demand is presupposed throughout. Thus our text speaks of inference from mystical experience as the alleged basis of religious thinking. Deductions, so called, from authoritative Biblical texts or communal tradition belong to Confessional Dogmatics and do not provide that logic which is desiderated.

At the same time (to refer once more to our text) it is acknowledged that the method of physical science,

unmodified, is inapplicable in religious thinking. The logic of a science is that system of principles of thought which leads most surely to the discovery of the particular truth which that science investigates. The logic of the sciences is specific, and depends, in part, upon the special conditions peculiar to each. Thus the logic of theology is not formal logic, or the logic of the natural sciences, applied to religious subjects; it is the exposition of whatever special methods and principles may be best adapted to the elucidation of specifically religious truth. And that truth depends upon conditions of which formal logic and natural science alike need take no heed.

The most obvious of these conditions is the fact that the apprehension of spiritual reality is dependent upon feeling and will. A rationalist and a fundamentalist will alike admit that belief, or disbelief, in God is not wholly determinable by ordinary logic. For what the logic of the natural sciences has to do with is the existence of phenomenon A and its relation to phenomenon B, in virtue of the facts that both, if existent at all, are parts of one and the same system of Nature, and that the character and laws of that system are sufficiently well known to make inferences from one phenomenon to another possible. Belief or disbelief in God is not an inference of this kind; it is a personal reaction to something which does not present itself as part of the system of Nature. And personal reactions are, in any case, not bound either by Barbara Celarent or by Concomitant Variations. And although these reactions are religious, or irreligious, rather than theological, yet it is the function of theology to investigate their justification. It obviously cannot do this without begging the main question if it attempts to work upon the basis of ordinary logic. "We cannot and must not", says Bosanquet, "exclude from the form of Knowledge its modifications according to 'matter', and its nature as existing only in 'matter'. In fact, the peculiar

'form' of *everything* depends in some degree on its 'matter'."

What the study of religious truth is in most immediate need of is not an epistemology of first principles but a procedure which will work. Men learnt how to study Nature scientifically before a logic of the sciences could be developed. First came study, then the discovery how to study successfully, then the analysis of the principles of success in the form of a methodology. When once science was a thoroughly successful going concern it became an object of philosophical interest. When it had become clear that its knowledge really was knowledge and that its working principles really did work, questions could be raised as to the ultimate nature of that knowledge and those principles. But the knowledge had to be there before its principles could be analysed. So must it be in the case of religious thought. What we require first is a methodology of spiritual inference resulting in a body of conclusions, however rough and uncertain, representing the maximum of inherent rationality in genuinely religious thinking so far attainable. Theology must aim at the production of a system of thought possessing the recognizable texture of knowledge, to wit, a basis in experience, rational methods of inference, coherence in the results so obtained, and practical utility as a means of controlling Nature. The part of Nature to be controlled in this case is, of course, human nature. If the experience upon which religious thought rests is a genuine experience of reality knowledge based upon it may be expected to afford this means of practical control of spiritual forces, and herein will lie the principal proof of its substantial truth. The expectation may be disappointed. The reality encountered in religious experience may prove to be rather unaccountable; or it may not be in normal and effective contact with human nature; or the intricacies and hidden character of every individual soul

—hidden even from itself—may make a practical application of spiritual knowledge to particular cases uncertain. But the uncertainty of the knowledge itself will increase with the uncertainty of its application; in the main we shall expect it to hold true, that if a doctrine is true it can be verified by its application to life.

There is an inclination on the part of some writers to lay great stress upon those features in natural science which most resemble those of religion—its dependence upon faith and authority, the alogical character of its ultimate major premisses, or the passional quality of its thinking, all pretences to the contrary notwithstanding. All this is doubtless true, and if the conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that, since science has nevertheless achieved the character and status of assured knowledge in spite of the alogicality of its first principles, so may theology, by similar means in the form of a sound methodology, hope to progress—well and good. But there is some danger lest a concentration of attention, in the interests of apologetics, upon resemblances, or identity, of the first principles of science and of religious thought should blind us to the fact that science is able to make those principles work, whereas theology is not. I do not, of course, mean that the study of axioms, postulates, intuitions, and mental attitudes as determinants of religious thought can be neglected, but that it must not be employed to enable us to evade the demand of general culture: "You ought to have some defensible method." Theology needs its logic, not for fighting purposes, but for the sake of clearer thinking.

Here I must apologize for the repeated use, in the absence of any adequate alternative, of the unpleasant term "culture". I am not employing it in the English sense of "culture and refinement", but in the German sense of civilization as the product and embodiment of rational thought and of the interests esteemed by public

opinion and tradition. There is such a thing as a comprehensive appreciation of what constitutes civilization and of the laws in accordance with which it is progressing. This attitude of mind, together with all that it has produced and approved, is Kultur. General culture at the present day implies a certain general sense, however vague, of the methods and habits of scientific thought and of the general world-view to which it is tending to give rise. General culture cannot be called to account: securus judicat orbis terrarum. Just as rights are not rights at all until they are recognized by society, so knowledge does not count as knowledge until it is recognized by the cultural tradition of the day. And just as morality is socially approved conduct, so truth—i.e. that which the word "truth" usually refers to—is culturally approved ideas. It is only when general culture assigns to any system of ideas the status of truth that it comes to be fully in being.

It is before this court that theology has to prove that she possesses a defensible system of inference. But theology is there on behalf of her client, religion, whom she must call as witness. General Culture asks: "What is your system of inference?" Religion, however, has no system. It infers the goodness of God from anything and everything. The difficulty of proving a defensible method of inference lies, not only in the irresponsibility of such reasoning, but still more in the fact that religion is primarily a mental attitude and not a fixed system of ideas at all. Destroy one temple of God—one system of beliefs—and in three days the Spirit will build another, provided that the attitude of faith and self-surrender survives.

It is, then, not the validity of the inference actually drawn by the religious spirit that is in question, for it is admitted that faith as such is incommensurate with logic; that it tends to confuse different kinds of knowledge; and that its inferences are often, to say the least, untenable.

Nor are we directly concerned with the historical creed of any particular religion, church, or school of thought. The primary issue is not even as to the truth of theism, but as regards the validity, or inherent soundness, of the religious attitude itself. And the inferences in whose validity we are here interested are those upon which the justification of that attitude logically rests. The truth which religion seeks is the knowledge and inward realization of that order of things upon which it is itself grounded. Whatever inferences may logically be necessary for the maintenance and development of real, genuine religion—it is these which constitute the real problem. Once fully established, the spirit of religion is immediately conscious of its own inherent rightness, of the intrinsic superiority of Spirit to Nature, of the greater depth and reality of a life of faith as compared with a life that walks by sight or calculation. But this state of vision and conviction is not an ultimate datum; it results (when present at all) from right mental conditions and presupposes a sufficient measure of intellectual satisfaction. This is especially true in the case of those most influenced by general culture. They need to be rationally convinced. They will have the very truest truth that mind can grasp; religion is to be for them the road to reality; what they read and what they think out for themselves must be based upon solid fact and sound methodology.

Here we must briefly refer to an initial objection—the objection, namely, that the whole idea of theology rests upon an impossible theory of knowledge. Theology sallies forth

> To follow knowledge like a sinking star
> Beyond the utmost bound of human thought.

Such enterprises are open to epistemological objections. To this protest it may be retorted that it is the standpoint

of that protest itself which rests upon a false theory of knowledge. Instead of waiting for hypotheses to be submitted to its scrutiny it attempts to legislate in advance for all possible future hypotheses; it does so from the standpoint of an obsolete analysis of knowledge; and it does so in the form of a universal negative—always a dubious thing. This means that, as a sheer, arbitrary decree, our cultural tradition decides that the universe shall be deemed to contain only such material as it can deal with by methods already systematized and approved. What is not accessible to such methods shall be accounted non-existent.

The form which the argument against the possibility of the attainment of religious truth generally takes is roughly as follows: To know A (e.g. the properties of some chemical compound) conditions x and y are essential; a knowledge of B (say mathematics) depends upon z; but neither x nor y nor z can be realized in the case of religious truth; therefore religious truth is impossible. Or more briefly: All knowledge except religious knowledge depends upon certain mental functions; therefore religious apprehension, which is said to rest upon other kinds of mental processes, must be illusory. The argument is obviously inconclusive. Instead of laying down general conditions of knowledge in advance of all detailed inquiry every phase of alleged or apparent cognition ought to be separately examined. The chief difficulty as regards the investigation (except with prepossessions so hostile that negative conclusions are virtually postulated) of what claims to be religious truth lies not so much in any self-evident impossibilities in the case as in the fact that we have not as yet, in any science, or co-operative inquiry, an instrument of sufficient delicacy for dealing with it.

Epistemological sceptics cannot possibly *know* that the symbolism of religious thought is in no sense veridical,

or that it contains no reference to anything beyond what is at present recognized as part of the order of Nature. At first they asserted, without proof, that all knowledge is knowledge of objects of sense-perception. When, in erring reason's spite, telepathy, dream-meanings, and other strange fowl began to demonstrate their own existence, the limits of scientific propriety had to be extended. But those limits are still more or less arbitrary, and the only method whereby the bounds of reality can be surmised is the failure of the best logic to make sense of its investigations in any given direction. Certain directions of the apparent and imaginable world have been proved real by the application to them of certain methods of research. Those directions are called "Nature", and those methods "Science". The latter are, indeed, those methods which are adapted to the specific character of that plane, order, dimension, or direction of existence which we call Nature, but may not necessarily be equally adapted to all. They include certain restrictions upon the free movement of thought. Not only is admittedly transcendental agency, such as that of God, excluded upon principle, but also such things as minds, forces, and substance, likewise disappear, until, to the plain man's surprise, nothing seems permitted to exist at all, but only to subsist as a function of some other function, a process of some other process. Nor may one indulge one's curiosity by asking why the major happenings in the universe take place. We must not ask why it should have this or that nisus, why new qualities should emerge in it, what the next surprise is likely to be like, and heaps of other whats and whys that an innocent gnostic would like to ask. We must simply accept, in natural piety, the fact that when things get a bit complicated new qualities, which admit of no explanation, make their appearance. But this veto only means that, *for the purpose of modern science*, or positivistic speculation, all such questions and concepts must

be on principle ruled out of order. These vetoes and restrictions upon thought are a means to a particular end, namely the building up of a certain kind of knowledge, or knowledge of a particular order of facts, and have no justification beyond this special aim.

Considerations such as these may perhaps suggest the idea of a science of residual aspects of reality. In order to make the universe more manageable for thought it has to be neatly divided up into departments, each with a set of methodological rules and regulations for the investigation of it. May not some of the more elusive elements in it prove unamenable to these methods until they have first been brought into relation to human life through principles of quite a different order—in fact, through religion? In that case a science of a rather special nature would be required for the study of residual factors which have slipped through the meshes of the natural sciences. (By "residual factors" I mean characteristics of things or events which are over and above what the scientific explanations of them do explain.) The mere suggestion that in such cases some unknown antecedent must have been present does not take us very far. We might discover fresh causal factors indefinitely and yet fail to see what they amounted to. But a colligation of residual phenomena under some point of view similar to that afforded by religion might reveal outlines which would justify a new and deeper world-view.

I have approached the subject of the study of the import and metaphysical validity of religious ideas from a somewhat unnatural point of view in order to preserve contact with the standpoint of general thought, and especially with philosophic realism. I am not primarily concerned with the religious interest, but with the unity, the inspiration, and spiritual character of civilization. For surely, unless religious thought can become legitimated as an organic part of culture, evil will accrue both to

civilization and to religion. But it is not only the practical interests of civilization which impel us to a consideration of the problems of religion; a study of the possible truth and cosmic significance of the higher products of the religious consciousness is a necessity for a philosophic world-view. Philosophy, in framing its conception of the universe, must take account of every order of facts within it. To this end the metaphysician avails himself of the conclusions reached by the sciences. Of these there are four which might be called the cardinal sciences, because the subject-matter of each is one of the main divisions of the Apparently Real. To employ Dr. Broad's term, each refers to some differentiating attribute of the Existent. There is physics for the world of matter, biology for life, psychology for the realm of mind. The fourth main sphere of being is that of the higher emergent which, according to Dr. Alexander, comes after normal mentality, or which stands above Nature as the realm of Spirit. This last attribute of reality is almost as much a given fact as the other three, and a rational study of it is logically called for. The possibility of such a science depends upon its ability to adhere to a satisfactory method of logical procedure.

CHAPTER II

THE OBSERVATION OF SPIRITUAL FACT

THERE ARE PROBABLY many who think that an accurate observation of facts is of less importance for right thinking in religious matters than it is in natural science. It is thought that religion has to do with general ideas, and that no stress can be laid upon individual cases; not very much depends, it is therefore thought, upon the observation of particular instances, which are in any case too obscure to admit of a very minute examination; for the particulars consist of what goes on in the obscure depths of this or that person's soul; we must therefore be content with the observation of broad tendencies and with noting illuminating phenomena here and there.

The virtual impossibility of certainty with regard to the inner life of the individual may be admitted. We may find in consequence that we have to argue from certain demonstrable types rather than from particular persons. But at the same time the importance of accurate observation of the religious psychology of the individual is very great indeed. For superficial observation leads to hasty generalization, hasty generalization to a begging of the main question, and this in turn to an entirely distorted world-view. It is almost too obvious for mention that eloquence about religion may be mistaken for the possession of very much more and very much deeper religion than the eloquent person has really got. If an uncritical person who was very susceptible to the influence of stirring language and personal antipathies were to frame a philosophy based upon the observation of

particular instances the result would be an unduly highly coloured universe. Divine agencies would be manifest in every eloquent preacher whose views coincided substantially with his or her own, the powers of hell in everything which at all conflicted with them. And all this, that person would say, could be proved by experience and observation. But this kind of defective observation is not very serious, because it does not indicate a defect in the accepted principles of civilization; the defect is merely personal. The opposite kind of faulty observation is failure to see spiritual fact that is really there. This is a much more insidious source of error, and for three reasons. In the first place, it is much harder to discover and to correct. If one's initial prepossession be positive, predisposing one to observe traces of the supernatural somewhat too freely, there remains a long series of difficult problems to be faced before conviction as to the reality of the supernatural can be assured. And if the religious position is, after all, illusory the attempt to elaborate a religious world-view based upon the critical observation of what is not there will soon break down. Hard facts will prove too strong for prepossession. But if one's initial tendency be negative one will be predisposed to have eyes only for the lower, naturalistic element in the world, and that will always be there. There may or may not be a spiritual and supernatural side of the universe, but there *must* be a naturalistic side which would still supply plenty of evidence for naturalistic views even if religious belief were true after all.

Secondly, reduction is mentally easy, whereas faith, the builder up of new mental compounds, requires a considerable supply of psychic energy—more, in fact, than is generally available. And so belief, under modern conditions, tends to run down, to disintegrate. Thinking follows the natural tendency of intellect, which is along the lines of parsimony and minimum effort. And this

general tendency affects our powers of observation. The biographies of the present day often illustrate this fact; the biographer can see the human weaknesses in his subject clearly enough; the spiritual factor is less firmly grasped.

Thirdly and chiefly: naturalism is so in line with the cultural tendencies of the day that it becomes an unconscious postulate, so that even if supernatural phenomena were as plentiful as leaves in autumn, we should still fail to observe them. We are blind to the supernatural on principle; we cannot see it, however much it may be there. This is, I think, not so much a personal defect as a characteristic of modern culture itself. If you are caught by the spirit of culture you will have to observe what the culture of the age has eyes for. There are two explanations commonly given for the failure of people to see that there can be any truth in religion. One is that religion, like music, depends upon a certain sensibility; if one lacks that sensibility one can no more see the spirituality of religion, even at its best, than an entirely unmusical person can feel the beauty of music. The other is that true vision follows upon, and does not precede, the willingness to surrender the heart to God, and ordinarily one is not prepared to do anything of the kind. This fact is akin to the principle that it is only the pure in heart, only those whose appetites and interests do not run too strongly after earthly things of any kind, who can see. I do not dispute these observations, though they are rather dangerous to the humility of religious folk, nor do I subscribe to them. I think it is more useful to point out that if religious thinking is to be critical and inductive it must rest upon observation; that, in that case, one must have cultural permission to observe the supernatural if it should happen to be there in the facts observed, a permission by no means freely granted; that naturalism is a postulate before it is a theory; that it

is rooted in the law of inertia and the nature of intellect, and so is bound to think in line with the tendencies of the day, which proscribe the very word "supernatural" (has not the reader inwardly protested against the interchangeable use of the terms "spiritual", "supernatural", and "religious" in the preceding pages?); and that a naturalistic and reductive view of religion is sure to find plenty of real evidence in observable facts, because, whatever the truth or falsity of the religious standpoint, there is always the natural history of the phenomena to be observed. In saying this I do not mean to imply that the religious position would be found to be substantially true after all, if only we could observe spiritual facts more clearly; that opinion falls outside the scope of logic. What I suggest is that the observation of spiritual fact is very seriously handicapped in more ways than one, and that the very possibility of it must depend upon measures to safeguard the exercise of it. Three of these will be noticed presently—the use of introspection; the determination of type as a basis of induction; and the rule of right initial attitude. Unless some such precautions are taken all questions will be begged in favour of a reductive naturalism.[1]

All knowable events take place within the system of nature. However miraculous, providential, and wrought of God they may be, they nevertheless happen in the

[1] It is instructive to note the use of the term "truth" to *mean* reductive naturalism in the publications of militant Rationalism. Horror will be expressed at the gross disloyalty to "truth" on the part of educated religious writers. "The author cannot help knowing the truth, but he deliberately tries to deceive both himself and his readers. It is too shocking for words. I could hardly have believed it possible." Something to this effect occurs again and again in the pages of at least one rationalistic publication. It sounds at first like boundless uncharitableness, but the true explanation is probably the fact that the writers have so identified the idea of truth with naturalistic theory that they cannot even imagine a person who could be acquainted with the latter and yet sincerely hold the opposite view to be true. The attitude is on all fours, mutatis mutandis, with that of the believer who can account for agnosticism or atheism only on the assumption of the agnostic's "intellectual pride" or moral "materialism". Both attitudes illustrate the difficulty of unbiased observation in the field of religion.

form of movements or modifications of the things of which nature consists, and in accordance with the laws and properties of them. It is not a logical necessity, but it seems to be a fact, that the incipient emergence of the supernatural does not wholly inhibit natural reactions. Even the events which result from the operation of the supernatural (if there be a supernatural) will have their natural aspects as constituents of the world in space and time. A naturalistic account of religious experience must therefore be possible. It may not amount to a sufficient explanation, but it will be true so far as it goes. And when the events concerned take place within a human mind a psychological account of them must necessarily be possible, given sufficient knowledge of the event and of the laws of mind. Events in the life of the soul must happen somehow or other; one has but to observe the order of their happening, and forthwith there presents itself to one a naturalistic view of it. Let, for instance, the gift of grace be never so objectively and metaphysically real, the experience of it will present itself to consciousness as a series of mental phenomena of which some psychological explanation will almost automatically suggest itself—e.g. the transference of energy, rendered possible through such and such causes, from one complex of mental elements to another. In this way a reduction of the supernatural to the natural, of acts of God to mental or physiological processes, is inevitable. And since it is one side of the truth it is, so far forth, desirable. It must, in fact, be a function of theology itself to carry out this reduction. So long as the psychology, or other descriptive analysis, is incidental to a bona fide pursuit of a possible truth higher than any of which natural science can take account, we may regard such studies as a genuine branch of theology. Apart from this ulterior motive, however, Reductive Theology is just simply science.

In consequence it is inevitably influenced by the trend

of all rational thought towards terms of least significance. All rational explanation and analysis, whether in the sphere of religion or in any other of the higher levels of existence, is an explaining away, a belittling. Science is the systematized habit of regarding the remarkable on the analogy of the ordinary. It strips things of their specific glory, their individuality, their magic, their revelation-attributes, and turns them all into mere specimens. Nothing is wonderful, mysterious, or of intrinsic worth. Mind is nothing but a biological function operating in the service of survival and reproduction. Morality is nothing but social fear. Religion is nothing but mental regression, morbid sexuality, collective excitement, mere survival of primitive habits of thought, priestcraft, dope for discontented workmen, or whatever else the favoured analogy may be. Even when there is no suggestion of depravity the scientific mind must find some comparatively non-significant social or psychological fact to which to reduce religion, because science is essentially reduction. Even when science, or a philosophy keeping very close to the lead given by science, does insist upon novelty, uniqueness and the like, it does so by reducing the novelty to some such commonplace fact as complexity of structure, or to some other relation of elements to one another.

This tendency of rational thought towards terms of least significance has in recent years displayed itself in theology as a trend towards atheism. Proof of this assertion may be found in the columns of the American *Journal of Religion*, while among books published in this country there is Lake's *Religion of Yesterday and To-morrow*. There is here no animus against religion—far from it. But there is also no particular governing conception which would make the atheism logically inevitable. It is just a case of reduction on the loose, simply because rational thought must reduce everything it can lay its

hands on to something ordinary and mundane. If the subject under discussion be religion, religion must be reduced to something not religion; if it be God, the idea of God must similarly be reduced, and if you have no particular hypothesis to exploit you can at any rate reduce God to the penumbra of consciousness, to the idea of beauty or goodness in the abstract, or whatever other idea may happen to be widely current at the moment.

Thus the stress which formerly existed between religion and science now exists within the limits of religion itself. Truth has always been an interest upon which the higher religions have laid very great stress, but they have, as a rule, assumed that the way to truth lay through faith in a creed. It is now seen that the pursuit of truth is a function of the intellect, and that intellect by its very nature must strive towards a reduction of things to their lowest terms. Its whole effect is to simplify, whereas that of faith is to magnify selected facts and to invest them with portentousness. Thus there must always remain this stress within the religious sphere so long as intellect is intellect and faith is faith. The stress is all the greater inasmuch as the religious consciousness insists that faith, its dominant factor, is cognitive, while intellect, for its part, claims sole competency in the ascertainment of truth. It is a simple matter for a secular philosopher to deal with such a situation as this. He assigns truth to the intellect as its province and declares that faith must be content to be politely recognized as an art, or trustfulness, or personal taste, or a confused apprehension of civic ideals—anything, in short, so long as it is understood that faith is not cognitive of a reality inaccessible to the intellect. But when theology accepts this position, and therewith throws itself open to the full force of the reductive tendency inherent in intellect, it dissolves its own subject-matter.

And so we come back to the importance, for theology, of correct observation before we hasten to theorize. Although correct observation is not easy, theological logic must insist upon the necessity of it. The chief difficulty is due to the fact that our estimate of the motives of others depends upon interpretations of them; they are not directly open to our observation. For this reason I suggest that introspection is absolutely necessary in the psychology of religion. One need not be deeply religious or possessed of sensibilities exceptionally delicate—at any rate for observing the elementary data of the religious consciousness. But one must at least occasionally have experienced the religious attitude in order to know what one is talking about. And if one has ever done so it is open to introspective observation that the religious attitude is the very antithesis of an abandonment of oneself to pleasure-thinking; that the idea of God is like nothing that ever enters into phantasy; and that the various mental stimulants, symbols, æsthetic pleasures and personal hopes with which the core of religion tends to be surrounded are of a secondary nature.

It is with a view to facilitating correct observation of the data of theology that I have suggested a five-fold division of contemporary religious types. The division proposed is not a psychological one; the types are not psychological types properly speaking, such as those which various psychologists have proposed. They are rather apparent grades than types. The various manifestations of religion admit, I think, of being graded relatively to the degree of higher element seemingly present in them. This "higher" is that which cannot he resolved into natural instinct and social tabu. There is in it (if it exist at all) something other than psychology has yet discovered. We may conceive it as specificity, as supernaturalness, as Spirit, as numen, or how we may,

provided that it helps us in the investigation of transcendental truth, of spiritual validity, of the laws of the transformation of souls. Of such grades five may usefully be distinguished. The lowest grade is that of conventional religion, which is merely a mode of behaviour outwardly simulating that of religion (for instance, a person goes to church because it is the custom of his social circle to do so, or in order to please his wife, who goes in order to see dresses). The next, or D, grade is the religion of sentimentality. In this, natural motives and interests seek expression in religious ideas without essential change in themselves. In grade C a higher and a lower are in conflict. The higher is believed in as the ultimate authority behind moral law and traditional creed; it is struggled for; it is reverenced; it is obeyed; but it is not felt, objectified, experienced. Grade A represents a thoroughgoing mysticism at its best and purest; the supreme example of it is the personal religion of Jesus Christ. Whereas for grade C religion is almost entirely regulative, for grade A it is constitutive. Between these two comes the intimate, partially regulative, partially constitutive, religion of instinctually normal persons of grade B. Within the limits of each of these grades there may be many different psychological types, such as Höffding describes, but with these we are not concerned. A rationalist reduces all religion which is not actually pathological to that of grades D and E, and even the advocates of religion would admit that elements of these were quite commonly to be found in the higher types, but would maintain that there was much else beside. How can one validly infer either the one thing or the other? Omitting, for the sake of brevity, any further reference in this place to grade A and grade D, there remain religion at its normal best and middle-type religion, which we might grade as qualities B and C. In C the higher elements, only latent in D, become

emergent; the lower take a secondary place and begin to assume a symbolical character; the lowest increasingly cease to find expression through religion and are more and more felt to be in antagonism with it. It is a religion of ideals, of principles, and of conflict—conflict with oneself and conflict with whatever may oppose the principles we have espoused. Religion is now primarily ethical, but it possesses also the beginnings of the supernatural, more specifically religious, elements which are more prominent in B. There are several varieties of C; there is the more idealistic type, the more devout type, and many others, but all are alike in being religions of principle, idea, and to some extent feeling, rather than of actual religious experience. To outward appearance, a man of B type is just an ordinary person; he may be known to be a religious man, but only intimate friends will know that his religion is more than a religion of C degree. He still possesses a natural system of instincts, and although Nature is in him subordinate to Spirit it still asserts itself and still provides his vehicle of self-expression in relation to the world—i.e. society generally. He is a far more competent and efficient person than he would otherwise have been. Brother Lawrence, for instance, was able to manage the business of purchasing and transporting wine, for which he had no natural capacity, very efficiently. Yet there was nothing outwardly to show that it was not natural ability which enabled him to carry out irksome duties satisfactorily. Similarly there are the testimonies of numberless other persons who were "enabled" to do what they could not otherwise have done, and yet with nothing to show that it was not natural gifts that enabled them to do it. Personality is greatly enhanced; it becomes bigger, stronger, more unified, more weighty. New capacities for love develop; weaknesses disappear. Theological animosities die away. How far this has always been true of the B type

I do not try to guess; at the present day it seems to be strikingly true. The militant, drum-beating, Protestant, the contemptuously superior Catholic, the strong denominationalist, with his cherished grievances against some other denomination, are all C folk. Internal conflict finds vent in outward strife. More than any other group the B people are those that are quiet in the land. As a rule definite religious experiences, in some cases more striking, in others less so, occur in their lives. This, indeed, almost follows from the fact that religion is for them a state of being "led"—i.e. ordered about, driven, or checked with regard to particular actions—by the Spirit of God. By way of example I will quote one testimony: "I came very simply to Christ, someone else praying with me and for me. I was not conscious of his presence, I just presented a request to him for his Holy Spirit. I received the Holy Spirit, and became conscious of the presence of the Lord Jesus Christ. And from that moment I have had with me a great friend. He knows all about me, he knows all that is wrong with me, but still he is there. I am conscious of his holy presence, and, what is more, I am conscious that he does rejoice when I pray and worship. I am conscious too that he does receive the prayers. He often checks me when I am about to ask for something not in accordance with his holy will. . . . I talk to him more freely than I talk to anyone else, and I receive his response as freely—practically as freely—as from anyone else, in that I have consciousness of his approval or disapproval."

Surely there is some operative power or principle in such people that is more than a mere matter of personal peculiarities. Prima facie at least, the indwelling presence of which my friend a d so many others are so conscious is a supra-individual entity somehow connected with the highest principle of cosmic creation. Yet this power which seems—especially in its capacity to create, to calm, and to unify personality—to be so much in harmony with

reality, so constitutive of reality, so expressive of reality, appears to be bound up inextricably with myths, legends, and doctrines which will not bear rational scrutiny. B-folk—and all those rare creatures, the A spirits, have belonged to the B-folk before they were A's—have almost always been fed by a faith shot with illusion. Wonderful inward changes and clarification of soul, felt intercourse with God, divine guidance and leading, providences, and the usufruct of a love, joy, peace, practical wisdom, and power which they do not recognize as their own—such is the experience only of those who can sincerely and honestly accept the mythology current in the religious community to which they may belong.

This brings us to the apparent paradox of spiritual truth. The paradox is this, that there are two sets of facts, one of which goes to prove that religion is a product of illusion, the other that it is something exceptionally real, exceptionally true; and that the latter seems to be strangely dependent upon the former. I do not mean that what the world regards as illusion turns out to be truth, but that the apprehension of what really is the highest truth is possible only through the abandonment of oneself to what really are illusions. One hesitates to believe that in the last analysis this can really be the case, but at our present stage of thought myth and truth are so closely interwoven, so mutually interfused, that the paradox is pragmatically true. No honest and civilized man can abandon himself to what he knows to be illusions; at our present stage of thought, therefore, thousands of honest and civilized people are shut out from the highest truth. The self-abandonment and self-surrender needful thereto must be a surrender *to* something, and there is nothing there to receive the surrender except a myth. At least, whatever may be there is at present visible only as a myth. When we try to separate the kernel from the husk the vitamins of the Spirit seem to be found in

the latter rather than in the former, in the superstitious rather than in the rational cosmology or approved ethics which may be refined out of them. Beliefs may change from age to age in this community, Christian or non-Christian, or in that. But a believing attitude of mind, almost sheer credulity, relatively to the traditions of one's own religious circle or community, seems to characterize the souls of type B almost invariably.

The purpose of this rough classification of the principal grades of religion found among ourselves to-day is entirely one of method. If we use the word "religion" we ought to know what sort of facts we are referring to. Freud appears to identify all religion with type D, regarding A, B, and C as disguised forms of what is at heart still D. D undoubtedly exists; are A, B, and C mere refinements of it, or are they, on the other hand, adjustments to reality in some ways closer and more deep-going than Freud's own "reality-thinking" itself? If fragments of D are found to be underlying, or embedded in, the higher strata A, B, and C, what is the significance of that discovery? It does not follow that A, B, and C are merely modified forms of D. It is possible that D may be a condition necessary for the emergence of C, and CD a necessary condition for the emergence of B, without any actual identity of essential nature among all the varying types.

The great difference between type B and type D might be described as a difference in point of reality-character—that is to say, in point of adaptation to given fact. Given fact may be of various kinds, namely, social environment, spiritual environment, and psychic structure. Religion of the B order tends very strongly to social service and is thus on the whole well adapted to its social environment. The charge of ultra-conservatism, levelled against all religion indiscriminately in the past, does not seem to be

true of the B type religion of the present day. But this is a matter which may vary greatly in different times and different places, and nothing much of metaphysical importance turns on the question whether religion is socially and culturally well adapted in England to-day or whether it is not.

The expression "spiritual environment" means, in effect, God viewed as the medium in which the soul has its being. The spiritual environment is inward as contrasted with the external environment afforded by Nature and society, but it is "objective" as contrasted with the contents of the individual psyche. The hypothesis of religion is that the soul is enveloped by, or present to, a divine, all pervasive Will or Spirit, which is a Not-ourselves (and so provides an environment to which the soul can be adapted) as well as being within us and, at least potentially, one with us. In so far as the spiritual environment exists, and in so far as religion enables the soul to meet its demands and to become harmonized to it, such religion possesses objective reality-character. But it is not known whether the soul's inward environment truly exists or whether it does not. To the religious consciousness it becomes known in varying degrees of immediacy and assurance, but to the outside observer it can only be a matter of inference from the nature of religion itself. Is religion at its best the kind of thing that it would be if the soul really were enveloped by, or present to, a divine Will and Spirit, and interaction between the two really took place?

Apart from the question of adaptation to something objectively existent, anything possesses reality-character in so far as it is true to type and is what it appears, or professes, to be. When religion is true to type as a mental attitude specifically different alike from phantasy, from art, from civic interests, from morality, from philosophy, and from everything else which does not itself

presuppose religion, then it possesses subjective reality-character. The fact that religion needs other interests, such as philanthropy, morality, art, and so on, wherein to find expression would not rob it of its subjective reality and individuality so long as the mental attitude underlying and inspiring those activities were a specifically religious one. In that case it would still possess subjective reality-character even if its belief in the objective reality of its spiritual environment should be illusory. Belief in the reality of that environment appears to be necessary to the subjective reality and specificity of religion; accuracy, at any rate in the details of its beliefs, does not. It is a question for the logic of religion to consider how far an inference can be drawn from the subjective reality-character of a religious type to the actuality of its spiritual environment and to the accuracy of its interpretation of that environment as the presence of a divine being.

More generally speaking, we may say that a person's religion may be judged to possess reality-character when it both transforms and enhances personality, when it promotes practical wisdom and ability in the fulfilment of duty, when the Supernatural responds in answer to prayer both spiritually and materially, when actual guidance and control from Above become matters of common experience, when it lifts feelings and interest out of self into the sphere of the universal and out of the more purely material into that of the spiritual, when it carries its own intuitive guarantee of reality, and when, on such a basis, it opens up an inner world common to all those in whom the spirit of True Religion is alive. And the strange thing is that it is just where we most find these marks of spiritual reality that we most find also a literal belief in traditional stories which, we know quite well, are not literally true. It is not until we have recognized the existence and reality-character of what I

have above called the B type of religion and its organic connexion with the myth that the problem of symbolical, or mythological, truth can be properly appreciated. How can religious thought possess, at one and the same time, the character of reality and the character of illusion?

CHAPTER III

MYTH AND TRUTH

SEEN FROM WITHOUT, all religion is a mass of mythology and superstition. That mythology, those superstitions, are certainly in part, and may wholly be, illusions, and yet, as we have seen, they seem to be so strangely invested with reality-character that they may possibly possess some special kind of truth of their own. This possibility invites us to a critical appreciation of mythological religion as a means to truth. I do not mean an appreciation in terms of alien values, such as that offered by Sir James Frazer in *Psyche's Task*, i.e. in terms of social, moral, civic utility. Nor do I mean an interest in the myth on account of its value for psychology. Its significance for us lies in its function as a means to the attainment of truth and of right relations with the universe. It represents at once a special kind of knowledge and a special kind of instinctual reaction. We will take each of these in turn.

What does it mean when we speak of "knowing" a god? What is a god? A god is the complement to some particular chosen kind of life, a system of interests. Flumina amem silvasque inglorius! He who so chooses deos novit agrestes. He experiences the gods of Nature; in loving the rivers and the woods he loves the river-gods and the nymphs of the forest. Once granted an acceptance of the idea of such beings, a man may come to "know" them by making their sphere of interests his own. He loves what they love. His feeling for Nature, his joy in Nature, his sense of the life of Nature around constitutes a knowledge of the gods of Nature.

But the gods of Nature are only half-gods. A god is that which evokes religious—specifically religious—emotion. Not, as some would have it, that religion is emotion evoked by a god. The specific quality is everything. Pan and the sister nymphs and the Old Man of the Woods may evoke feeling, but in that feeling there is not enough of the sense of the Holy and so the idea of them is not that of real gods. None of the Greek or Roman deities were really divine. A true God can be known only upon the level of common *superhuman* interests. But how can we come to know that God if he is as much a myth for us as the gods of Greece and Rome?

A method of getting into touch with religious insight which offers us some prospects of partial success is that of identifying ourselves in feeling with the religion of others, together with the recognition that it is in some ways higher and deeper than anything of our own. (If we cannot so recognize it we have probably, with unconscious intention, selected a specimen of D or E religion for this mental operation.) The upward look is essential to religion; if there is no God visible to us we must share someone else's upward look. We must go where it abounds and identify ourselves with it in sympathetic appreciation and volitional concurrence. This is the principle of Traditionalism, of Authority, of Infallibility, of Fundamentalism, of the precept "crede ut intelligas". "Crede" means "identify yourself with the mental world of your religious community". It is an affective and volitional act prior to belief itself. This principle holds good even when the beliefs of which the mental world of one's religious community consists are largely erroneous. Hence the idea of a double truth and the attitude taken up by Catholic Modernists like Tyrrell. From the standpoint of logical method it means that we recognize the need for the pursuit of spiritual truth through error. We may call this method of approach

"Mythological Theology". We provisionally recognize the existence of a practical and symbolical knowledge of truths on the part of others which neither their intellect nor our own has been able to reach, and we seek, as it were, to exploit that field of truth mediately through the souls of others.

This implies a certain conception of truth other than that which we ordinarily employ. The ordinary meaning of the word "truth" is "the correspondence of thought with fact (and of speech with knowledge)". How we know whether or not an idea corresponds with reality is another matter; that is a question as to the criterion of truth, not as to the content of the idea or meaning of the word "truth". Such standards as sense-perception, consistency, coherence, workableness, reliable authority, and so on, are criteria—not constituents of the meaning or content of the idea of truth. The faculty which we employ in applying the criteria of truth to particular cases is reason, and the rules of its procedure in so doing is logic—the logic alike of the natural sciences and, in the main, of common life. A piece of knowledge consists of ideas so related to one another that they are judged to correspond with reality, conceived as something which exists whether we think about it or not, but judged to exist only because ideas about it may thus be rationally synthesized. Such truth is generally called "scientific truth", "historical truth", or "literal truth". Myths and legends, such as the legend of the Star of Bethlehem, do not possess historical truth.

The type of mind which is most dependent for its knowledge upon scientific truth is that of the psychologically self-centred man. I am not using the word in an ethical sense. Such a man may be generous, honest, amiable in his behaviour, and high principled. He may live a useful life and may be kind as well as conscientious in all his dealings. But he is emotionally shut up within

himself. What he does he does on principle and what he thinks he thinks for logical reasons. He may have adopted honesty, agreeable manners, a useful purpose in the world, and practical benevolence as his rules of life. But he is not in emotional touch with others. Other persons are for him visible occasions for rational thought and for action in accordance with his own principles and habits. Consequently he is never in inward contact with his environment. It is transmitted to him at second hand in the form of percepts and ideas of his own through his intellect. And so, knowing the world only in terms of himself, not of itself, he acquires a state of psychic insulation which cuts him off from immediate contact with the world, which he only knows through his reason. Truth, for him, is that which, within the limits imposed by the nature of reason itself, can be logically proved. That is how he habitually thinks of truth, whatever formal definition of it he may prefer. "The correspondence of thought with things" is a good description of truth such as this because the term "correspondence" expresses an element of duality which in such a case is really there. The knower is one entity, the thing he knows something about is another. In the knowing mind there is an idea which is somehow the correlate of something alien, remote, inapprehensible, and known only through tokens of it in the shape of ideas. A purely rational man's knowledge of other persons is, at bottom, ejective—that is to say, it is based upon his knowledge of himself; he projects his own feelings and self-consciousness into others. But since he is alive to the mistakes he is liable to make in this way he reduces this process of projection to a minimum and relies, so far as possible, upon behaviouristic inferences from an external standpoint. Such a man is a windowless monad.

But there is another sense in which the word "truth" is used, namely the "experience, enjoyment, or subjective

realization of reality". Possibly Keats meant this; "Beauty is Truth" would then mean "Beauty is subjective realization of objective reality". (If so, every horror vividly realized is beautiful.) Two men may have an equally full and accurate knowledge of some period of history, yet one may take a keen interest in it, live it all all over again in sympathetic imagination, talk about it and sink himself in it, while the second has mentally pigeon-holed the fact that such and such events took place and thinks no more about them until a knowledge of them is required for practical purposes. The former possesses those events more intimately than does the second man. Similarly, one man may realize a present situation more profoundly than another. In all such cases a reality not oneself enters into a soul, becomes part of it and a means to its realization both of itself and of its environment. This appreciation of fact is not usually called truth, but when, conversely, truth is spoken of this sometimes seems to be its meaning. Truth, in this sense of the word, may be called "Experiential truth". (Empirical truth is truth *based upon* experience; experiential truth *consists* of experience. Empirical truth is rational; experiential truth is non-rational, though it may presuppose rational truth.)

Now let us suppose that God, the All-father, maker of heaven and earth, truly exists and that the human soul is capable of entering into effective relations with him, but that science has not the means to discover him. He could nevertheless be known if anyone so reacted to the idea of him that those relations became actualized. Such inward realization of God would be a case of experiential truth. Knowledge of this kind consists, not in a correct relation of the elements of which it consists to one another, but in the right attitude of the knowing mind towards the thing or person known. Any set of ideas which enable one mind to apprehend and react to another which would

not otherwise be known at all possesses ipso facto a certain validity, justification, reality-value, or truth, even if those ideas are logically doubtful in the extreme. Thus a husband and wife might have a thorough practical knowledge of one another, mentally possess one another, and so react to one another as to create a common life for themselves that represented the highest degree of reality open to either of them. And yet this creative relationship might be based, in part, upon an idealization both of one another's springs of conduct and of their own. If they knew all that Freud and Adler could teach them about those springs of conduct they might not be able to bear the discovery. With the loss of their illusions they might (in this particular imaginary case) lose their power of seeing any real good either in themselves or in one another, and so would miss both an experience and an understanding of human possibilities which they might otherwise have had. Other cases also in which overbelief and overvaluation seem to condition a more intimate knowledge or a fuller experience can be thought of.

All personal knowledge is based upon non-rational apprehension, and there is an element of illusion in it from the very first. We get to know the existence of other minds by means of reciprocal instinctive action and response. Long before a baby is aware of its own existence it responds to its mother's smile and finds that its mother responds to its own. It apprehends its social environment by means of what Alexander, who has shown that our knowledge of others springs from the experience of reciprocal instinctive response, calls "the emotion of sociality". The apprehension takes place entirely without any correspondence of thought with things in the infant's mind. When its mind begins to develop it proceeds to idealize its parents—i.e. to mythologize about them—and to identify itself in feeling with them. Its imaginative activity is not primarily

phantasy (i.e. wish-fulfilling pleasure-thinking), but a means to a cognitive idealization whereby it apprehends the continuous reality of its parents and their wonderful, transcendent character.

Consciousness of this type might be called "anautic", because where it prevails the object is not known through the subject's knowledge of itself. Other personalities are grasped and understood without recourse to projection and analogical inference. The mind has not yet become insulated; the individual is not yet really a separate individual—is not yet monadized. An ideal household is not only a collection of persons; it is also a piece of supra-personal, undifferentiatedly collective life—an organism with a specific character of its own. The members of it both actualize it and know it through taking up family-attitudes and acquiring family-dispositions. The soul of the child, so far as it is still unself-centred, or anautic, responds sensitively and directly to the life surrounding it. It does so first of all by the help of identifying itself with its mother and with its father as it imagines them. Later it identifies itself with its place in the household as the ideal, or typical, child, reacting to each situation as that situation demands and finding that the surrounding life in the form of mother, nursemaid or brother reacts similarly to it. Later on, as self gradually acquires priority, the child becomes an individual and knows other individuals through analogy with itself, projecting its own feelings and motives into them, and later still through rational inference. But so far as anautic consciousness persists a system of mental attitudes and dispositions, developed through the agency of imagination and self-identification, can be a means of cognizing persons and personal relations.[1]

[1] With other aspects of child-psychology and family life we are not concerned, since it is only in the epistemological bearings of anautic consciousness that we are here interested. There is an element of mystery about this fact of knowledge through mental attitude, but not more than there is in the fact of cognition

Before proceeding further we must note an objection. Professor Alexander declares that a knowledge of God of this kind cannot be reached, because reciprocal response through overt external actions is a necessary condition of such knowledge, and the universe does not so respond, the strength and sustainment found through prayer not amounting to a specific response of the kind required. It might be replied that at sufficiently high levels of experience the universe does respond to prayer and does guide and control by means definite particular acts, according to the evidence of many; at any rate we cannot say that it does not, until we have seen what a Factual scrutiny of the matter has to say. Further, that the overt acts of God need not be "external", sharply isolated from the texture of life, or melodramatic in character, if the social instinct of the religious man is satisfied with responses of a more inward and less spectacular nature. Professor Alexander demands the fulfilment of certain psychological conditions—the satisfaction of a certain instinct. If in the presence of another (i.e. the religious) tendency that instinct is satisfied with the kind of response it meets with, Professor Alexander's conditions are fulfilled. And thirdly, the religious consciousness, interpreting its own experience, attributes to God, not only response, but also "prevenience", or initiative.

We will assume, then, that a knowledge of God of this kind is possible, provided that the sensory stimulus necessary to the instinctive reactions required is forthcoming. This stimulus can be, to some extent, provided by mythology. Mythology is a kind of expanded anthropomorphism: it renders the object of religion visible to the imagination and endows it with instincts and with the behaviour to which our own instincts can respond.

through sense-perception and ideation. I imagine that all cognition is based upon a primitive clairvoyance which in turn presupposes the transcendental, universal clairvoyance of a world-soul, and that the organs and processes of knowledge possess what James called a "transmissive function".

But this knowing of God implies a mental process peculiar to small children and primitive man, so that it is conceivable that God may be, in the words of the Upanishad, "unknown by the learned, by the unlearned known"—a real God really known, but only through the non-rational reactions of personification and personal relationship.

What is called "personification" is originally rather an absence of depersonification. What is known anautically is living spirit. But some objects won't respond, and one gradually finds that they are dead, lifeless—mere things, objects which can only be known practically and scientifically, not personally. In religion the anautic standpoint persists. Religion involves an impulse to draw nearer to its object, to come into its presence, to greet it, to seek union with it, to annul the obstructing walls of separate individuality which divide us and the object into two, whereas we are really one life, but at the same time to interact with it, and what a soul interacts with is a soul, a person. Freud, speaking of religion, declares that "it is, in point of fact, natural to man to personify everything that he wishes to comprehend". But he adds, "in order that later he may control it". "We can feel at home in the face of the supernatural . . . (when) we can have recourse to the same methods against these violent supermen of the beyond that we made use of in our own community; we can try . . . to appease them, to bribe them."[1] Surely this is a most misleading analysis if it is supposed to apply to the higher forms of religion. If it is a true account of thought at that stage of human culture at which agriculture, science, magic, and religion were as yet undifferentiated the passage only illustrates the need for a classification of instances before one generalizes. As an account of the tendency to personification present in B religion Freud's analysis is absurd. This tendency does

[1] *The Future of an Illusion*, Eng. Trans., pp. 38, 39, 29.

not spring from a desire to control or appease; it is psychologically prior to any such motive and need not necessarily involve it.

Christian myths and legends appear to be outcomes of anautic, personal thinking of this kind. They are a product of relatively undifferentiated function, and thus may form a link between different functions. They are not simply elaborated ideas. It would be just as true to say that they were mental attitudes and dispositions potted in ideas. They possess a practical value in that they lead to life and experience of a certain specific kind, but they are also cognitive in the way that infants' imagination is cognitive of existents and not *only* regulative or indicative of lines of conduct. When we come to consider the central legends of Christianity this mediatory function as between emotional disposition, moral action, and apprehension of personal relations becomes very clear. So far as religion is rightly conceived as a personal relation it presupposes a certain mental endowment as its organ. A man must have good capacities for love, gratitude, aspiration, self-surrender, insight, and the like, *before* he can enter into the spirit of a religion which rests upon such things. No amount of morality, free-will, cries for grace and strength, or admiration for such qualities will give them to him if he has not got the psychic constitution on the foundation of which alone they can be developed. The existence of that order of cosmic relations in virtue of which there is a God and Father of all and a heavenly family of those who have discovered his fatherhood can only be apprehended anautically by disposition, attitude, and imagination. And the summary of all these is contained in the Christian legend. The stories of Eden, of Jacob's Ladder, of the Burning Bush, of the Pillar of Fire, or of the Rending of the Veil, are all crammed, not merely with meaning, but with potential life. The stuff that is lived out in the lives of saints and of

earnest Christian men and women is tied together and made transmissible by means of such myths as these.

We may take as an example of a Christian legend the story of the Ascension of Jesus into heaven. Its content so overshadows its literal meaning—the proposition that a certain body once moved in the direction of some fixed star—that to isolate the latter is to caricature it, in spite of the fact that it is assumed to be true. If we try to analyse that content the first constituent idea that we strike upon is the triumph of Jesus and the joy of the Christian community in that triumph. The doctrine seems, in fact, to be a kind of cheer. Wherein that triumph consists one does not ask; anyhow it was a great triumph. The Ascension is also the assurance of God's own valuation of our Leader and his cause—his cause which is our cause too. The world may say what it likes; God has shown which side *he* is on. Therewith the term "Ascended", applied to Our Lord, is also a love-predicate. Over and above the ideas of triumph and of divine vindication the doctrine moreover expresses the believer's love for, and worship of, his glorious Master. Belief in it is itself an act of love and worship. Yet more, the legend of the Ascension helps to carry the Christ-idea as a whole. All that this means—for one disciple, it may be, primarily atonement, for another example, for another teaching—goes to give content to, and in return to receive body from, any given legend, such as that of the Ascension. Further, this doctrine is of the nature of a reassurance. On earth the soul often feels shut off from the felt presence of God—from its heaven, and its experience seems to be an experience of perpetual failure. But be assured, the story teaches us, that it is only for the little while of our earthly life. The soul that came from God returns to God. The experience of Jesus is in some measure typical; some share in his ascension-joy shall be known by all his faithful followers. Then, too, the

Ascension suggests the thought that the soul rises from earth to heaven, from materialism to spirituality. There is an ascension of the heart and mind, and there is some connexion between this and the ascension of Jesus. Perhaps this last point is a little bit of an afterthought, the idea of resurrection having absorbed most of this motif. Still, to some extent it is there.

Now in what sense, if any, can we reasonably call the content of this dogma "truth"? It is a dramatization of some such inner meaning as has just been analysed, and some people, conscious of this dramatic and symbolical character, have supposed that the Ascension was a dramatization of it by God himself in the form of literal historical fact. But God does not dramatize, except through man's own artistic consciousness, and we are assuming that this crudely literal identification of symbolical legend with historical fact is impossible. But the believer in this illusion does enter by means of it into a certain apprehension of, and effective relationship with, Spirit. He grasps the complex of spirit, symbol, and reality in its unity; he sees the glory of it and the cosmic significance of it. He ceases to be mentally earthbound. He gains with Christ a certain sovereignty over the failures, the disappointments and the horrors of life. I do not merely mean that he feels as though he did so; he actually does so to a perceptible, sometimes to a striking, extent. The doctrine thus contains reality inasmuch as a movement of the human libido in a special direction does tend to take place wherever the mythological element in belief in Jesus is operative. Therewith a new kind of life is created, and its reality, as something very different from wish-fulfilment phantasies, becomes an object to be known—known by participation. The reality of the trend *constitutes* the truth of the belief on which it is dependent, for this belief enables a life to be lived which is exceptionally rich in all that constitutes spiritual substance.

This brings with it a greater measure of intuition and spiritual understanding than the intellect can translate into its own terms. Speaking of Elijah, Wellhausen remarks:

> Einsam ragte dieser Prophet, die grandioseste Heldengestalt in der Bibel, über seine Zeit hervor; die Sage konnte sein Bild festhalten, aber nicht die Geschichte. Man hat mehr den unbestimmten Eindruck, mit ihm in ein neues Stadium der Religionsgeschichte zu treten, als dass man ausmachen könnte, worin der Unterschied gegen früher bestand.

To some extent, perhaps, this is true of Jesus himself. "Legend has been able to retain a picture of him; history has not"—or rather, has not done so so well as legend and dogma have done. It is they which have kept him living as a present experience, and as what he essentially was.

Truth is the apprehension, assimilation, and appreciation of a reality which is not ourselves nor wholly our product. We stand in the presence of a Given Fact. It is nothing to us till we have apprehended it with interest and found ourselves in our reactions to it so as to make it part of our life. We have convictions about it, understand it, utilize it, and enjoy it. But if the Given Fact be of a spiritual kind we need a means for objectifying it, visualizing it, and dramatizing it, so that we may react to it as we react to natural and social facts. Such a means is the myth. It becomes a handle whereby the unseen is grasped, a gate through which it is entered, an organ by means of which it functions. So far, then, as myths and legends make spiritual truth empirically true for the believer, so far as they bring it into relation to human feelings and modes of conduct, without which it would remain for us a mere potentiality, to that extent at least they may be true. To one person any given myth may be a vehicle of truth, to another not.

> And truth is this to me, and that to thee;
> And truth, or clothed or naked, let it be.

Note on the Word Libido.

I find it quite impossible to avoid all reference to the Jungian concept of libido. It is too closely connected with many theological questions. The idea is that of something which manifests itself subjectively as interest, involuntary attention, craving, impulse, conation, appetite. Objectively viewed it appears as a measurable quantity, a form of energy which may or may not be convertible into physical energy. No satisfactory term to denote this force has yet been found. It has been called Interest, Craving, Striving, Libido, Hormé, hormic energy, psychic energy. All these borrowed terms suggest too narrow a meaning. The most commonly employed is "libido", but this, in common with all the other alternatives quoted, is open to the objection of seeming to identify the whole into one particular part, or manifestation. It concentrates attention upon one particular element (namely, the sexual) in the subjective aspect of psychic energy. A technical term free from this objection is much needed. I suggest the word "lil" (from the Greek *lilaiomai*).

CHAPTER IV

SYMBOLS, CONCEPTS, AND DEFINITIONS

THE NATURE of religious truth is intimately bound up with the special character of its judgements and of the terms in which those judgements find expression. That character, especially in the case of the symbol, deserves a thorough examination. All, however, that will here be attempted is a brief discrimination of the principal classes of terms which the language of religion employs. These may be distinguished according to the nature of the ideas of which they are the signs. The same term, however, may stand for ideas of the most diverse character, so that what we have to consider is not so much words, or names, as such, as rather the different kinds of meanings which they may possess.

It is evident that an idea may either be well thought out or the reverse. An idea which has been analysed, been related to, and distinguished from, other ideas, and thus been given a precise and definite meaning capable of being stated in a definition, is a concept. A concept is a fully intellectualized idea.

The opposite of a concept is the verbal notion. One's knowledge of the thing denoted by a term may be practically nil, and yet one may learn to repeat it more or less correctly, and possibly entertain a few simple ideas vaguely associated with it. There are people who cultivate the art of using the language of learning without more than just the ghost of an idea attached to it. "How wonderful it is to think of time as the fourth dimension!" "Ah yes, and, do you know, I always think we ought to regard eternity as the fifth—or is it the ninth?—at right

angles to time, you know, and not an extension of it!" These words convey virtually no meaning for me, and yet I have just used them, possibly with a certain modicum of rightness, and even invented the jargon about eternity, which conveys no meaning at all. So likewise in the sphere of religion words may be used not wholly wrongly but without the least knowledge of the facts to which those words refer. Meaning is continually ebbing away from theological terms so that they become mere verbal tokens. Thus the term "justification" may occupy quite a prominent place in a man's principles and yet have no real meaning for him. It may be well for him that it has become obsolete; that is not the point. I am speaking of it as a term—not as a doctrine—by way of illustrating the possibility of almost purely verbal thinking.

Another pair of meanings is covered by the term "symbol", applied to both. We will distinguish them first of all as conscious and unconscious symbols, or as metaphors and true symbols. The one marks an observed resemblance, the other provides an expression for inward life. The point here to note is not the visual imagery, or concrete form, which both kinds of symbols commonly possess, but the psychological difference between the two. In the case of the metaphor-symbol two things are first known separately and then their resemblance is noted and the more concrete or general term employed to signify the more abstract or specialized. Thus the pelican used to be a symbol for Christ, not as a means of grasping the idea of him, which was presupposed, or to enable the worshipper to take up an attitude towards him which he had not already taken up, but simply on account of a supposed similarity between the behaviour of Christ and that of the bird. The reason may then be forgotten and the symbol become a mere ideogram, or traditional picture-token of Christ.

It is more difficult to explain the other meaning of the

term "symbol", although it is of especial importance for theology. Speaking of the symbolism of dreams and similar products Silberer points out that it is often "anagogic" in the sense that it expresses an urge towards a higher, more spiritualized form of inner life. Jung speaks of a "prospective understanding" as served by the use of symbols. "The significance of the symbol", he says, "is not that it is a disguised indication of something that is generally known, but that it is an endeavour to elucidate by analogy what is as yet completely unknown and only in process of formation."[1] But the function of the symbol is not confined to the task of understanding. It is a means for transforming life. "The psychological machine which transforms energy is the symbol. I mean a real symbol and not a sign" [or metaphor]. In the sphere of religion ideas, rites, and ceremonies are symbols. "Symbols are the manifestations and expressions of excess libido. At the same time they are transitions to new activities." The essential nature of these new activities is that they are of a more spiritual, less purely instinctual, character than those of the previous level of life. "When the principle involved [in this process of transformation] is inscrutable—when its purposes as to origin and goal are obscure and yet enforce themselves—then the Spirit is necessarily felt as an independent being, as a kind of higher consciousness, and its inscrutably superior nature can no longer be expressed in the concepts of human reason. Our powers of expression then seek other means: a symbol is created. By a symbol I do not mean an allegory or mere sign, but rather an image that characterizes in the best possible way the dimly discerned nature of the Spirit. A symbol does not define or explain, but points beyond itself to a meaning darkly divined, not to be adequately expressed in any words of our current speech."[2]

[1] *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, Eng. Trans., pp. 338, 468.
[2] *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, Eng. Trans., pp. 50, 96, 97.

A symbol is a myth or doctrine in embryo, and its content is manifested more clearly in the more elaborated form which the legend or dogma presents. We have already studied the legend of the Ascension and found in it a system of attitudes which serve to express and promote that more general higher attitude of the self as a whole which we call Spirit. When the self develops an urge towards a new and higher mode of self-expression the process takes place through the agency of imagery, ideas, actions, and feelings of obligation. So far as these are felt rather than understood they may, presumably, all be called "symbols" in this Jungian sense. This process may, moreover, have a definite truth-value and not merely a practical life-value. It may well represent a process of adaptation to higher phases of objective reality to which the senses are not receptive or the natural instincts responsive. So far as this is a correct description of what takes place a symbol is an organ of a truth that is higher than reason—beyond anything, that is to say, that the intellect has as yet been able to think out.

The use of so common a word as "symbol" to express a meaning so technical is to be regretted. If, with Silberer, we speak of "anagogic symbolism" it must be made clear that we do not mean didactic symbolism, although Silberer's own use of the term may cover this meaning. We need a term to denote a subconsciously created symbol which exercises, for its creator, an anagogic function. Perhaps the expression "anophor" may provisionally serve. A term is wanted because a whole epistemology may conceivably turn upon the reality of the specific difference of this kind of symbols from any other kind.

Yet a third pair of contrasted terms requires a brief notice. Our knowledge of things may be derived from external or from internal perception. Some term seems to

be required to denote the fact that an idea represents a mental state, or sequences of mental states, introspectively observed. For the cogency of any given religious thought may depend upon the extent to which its terms represent introspecta or derive their meaning from without.

As If

The question as to the nature of symbols leads us to the conception of the "as if". There seem to be several distinct doctrines of "as if", the implications of which are very different. All thought is based upon some kind of "as ifs" and "as thoughs". The psychological process of apperception is perception through an "as if". Every hypothesis is framed with the help of an "as if". The Newtonian law of gravitation states that bodies behave as if they pulled one another. Jung has declared that the conclusions reached by analytical psychology must be qualified by an "as if". Vaihinger has given a list of fictions of various kinds; all knowledge, according to him, is simply the most serviceable rule of action, and he declares that truth is "merely the most expedient error", and consists of a mass of "as ifs".

Since, then, the implications of the expression "as if" are of such uncertain range, and since, more particularly, quite different judgements may be implied by it with reference to the comparative status of religious and of secular knowledge, a classification of the possible use of these words in the philosophy of religion may be useful. The various meanings may be divided into two groups which we will distinguish by the difference between "as if" and "as though".

"As if" denotes the character of an attitude and prescribes a rule of action or way of thinking or feeling. It implies an assumption, and that assumption may be either negative or positive. Act, think, feel, as you would

act, think, or feel, if you knew that A were B. The accompanying assumption has reference to the truth of this proposition. Since we are concerned with theological matters we will at once take the proposition "A is B" to mean "God exists", or "God answers prayer", or something similar. The accompanying assumption will then take one of four forms, two of which are negative and two positive. The negative assumption is either that God does not exist, or that, whether he happens to exist or not, at any rate he cannot rationally be thought really to exist, the idea of God being, in any case, irrational and invalid. For all intents and purposes these two forms of the negative assumption come to the same thing. If we are aware that we have no reason for thinking that a thing may possibly exist we dismiss the idea of its existence altogether. Vaihinger's position with regard to the idea of God is simply to subscribe to Forberg's interpretation of Kant, to the effect that, in spite of our atheism, we must act as if a Kingdom of God were in process of realization. "The principle of performing all duties as divine commands is religion", says Kant, in spite of the fact that "God is *not a substance existing outside of me* but merely a moral relation within me."[1]

The positive assumption also takes two forms, an absolute, undoubting, postulate or a tentative assumption. Since, however, both operate in the same way, and since both could be reduced to the formula "Make the assumption as unhesitating as you quite honestly can", the positive assumption, like the negative, can be treated as single. The principle here is that the knowledge of God can be won only in the form of an empirical verification of an assumption which has the character of a postulate, however provisional, rather than of an inference. "You cannot prove it; you can only act as if it were real—real, as you are assured that it is. And those who act as if

[1] Quoted by Vaihinger from Kant's *Posthumous Papers*. Kant's italics.

God were real find comfort, strength, joy, support, and triumph even in death."[1]

If a person is not prepared to make either a positive or a negative assumption the principle of "as if" hardly applies, for it is essentially a device for enabling one the more easily to take up a definite attitude in spite of an intellectual situation that makes it difficult to do so. A certain apparent contradiction between speculative thought and practical thought is presupposed. With a view to a better adjustment to life we adopt a principle of conduct in the form of an assumption that has no valid speculative foundation. (In view of Vaihinger's own biological and irrationalist starting-point, and of his view of the *merely* instrumental nature of truth, it is rather difficult to see what right he has to speculations which conflict with utility. But this is by the way.)

The "as if" doctrine of Kant, Forberg, and Vaihinger is merely an ethical device, and, surely, a very futile one. If one's feelings and one's philosophy are atheistic one's morals will have to be atheistic too; the moral influence of religion abides only so long as devotional and metaphysical religion abides also, or perhaps a few decades longer. Then dies. Even if it were psychologically possible, a morality based upon the pretence to oneself of a belief in sham gods is rather a dubious thing.

But there is another possibility. Pure religion is, before all things, the praise of God in spite of everything that would prompt the natural man in us to rebel, to doubt, or to disregard him. Though he were heedless of human distress, or powerless to help us, and though all rational thought should show that death meant a final end, yet we would praise him. And even though the very existence of anything worthy of our worship were demonstrably a delusion, yet religion would still be a Sursum Corda to

[1] Principal W. F. Lofthouse, *Daily News*, August 8, 1927.

the God who might have been, and the acceptance of our destiny as though at his hands. We should praise him as though he were even though we knew that he was not; otherwise religion itself would have passed away, for religion *is* adoration and self-oblation. Now a certain measure of this spirit may persist after actual belief has passed away. An as-though attitude thus comes about. God exists relatively to it as a symbol for the unknown ground and justification of it which its own self-testimony seems to imply.

(A partial justification for an as-though belief springing from religious feeling itself lies in the laws of mental health. There is nothing psychically more health-giving than a Te Deum or a Gloria in Excelsis. How it lifts one above one's own paltry vexations! When all the earth is worshipping and every unseen power is crying Holy, Holy, Holy, there is no room for petty feelings. When I surrender my heart to God I surrender my ego with all its strivings and appetites and antipathies and will to dominate. So, too, when human society is seen as though in God our greed, our prejudices, our violent partisanships begin to pass away.)

The words "as if" indicate the prescription of an attitude; "as though" the intuition of an object. Some dimly apprehended fact is grasped by the help of symbols or analogies; we are conscious that there is more in the object than we have discriminated and that our ideas of it do not represent a knowledge of what it is in itself so much as what it is relatively to our feeling. The admission of all this is indicated by the words "as though". Speaking of "Symbolic or analogical Fictions" Vaihinger says: "A new intuition is apperceived by means of an ideational construct in which there is a similar relationship." The points to note are that we are dealing now, not, on the one hand, with a rule of conduct, nor, on the other, with sense perception or with ideas, but with intuitions,

or inward impressions, which are interpreted by consciousness by means of analogies. The symbolical nature of the resulting ideas is indicated by an "as though".

The object apprehended by intuition may conceivably be one of several things. It may be some being or supernatural entity directly and immediately felt, such as God, a departed spirit, or a devil. Or it may be some objectified feeling or attitude of our own. Or it may be something at once both God and an objectified feeling—that is to say in one aspect of his being God may be a unitary whole, in another a number of particulars, so that the inward object may be at one and the same time a phase of God and an objectified attitude of our own. Or the object intuited may be, not an objectified attitude so much as the correlative of an attitude. The fatherhood of God, for instance, may be apprehended as the correlative of an inward attitude of our own souls. Or this correlative of our own state of mind may be some missing earthly good, such as a lover, symbolized as God and interpreted as him. Or again, what is intuited may be certain capacities or tendencies within us or certain states of our libido. Or it may be a number of these things together. Or a state of some bodily organ. Or something as yet unimagined. And the resulting uncertainty both of origin and of analogy is expressed by an "as though".

Either—Or

A danger to which thought on subjects connected with religion is open is that of false alternatives owing to tacit assumptions. Thus, for instance, if the possibilities of a case are analysed as *a*, *b*, and *c*, the tacit assumption may then be made that the truth lies either in *a* or in *b* or in *c*, whereas it may really belong to *abc*—to all three, that is to say, so far as they are conditioned by one another. Let us suppose that the subject under discussion is the Holy

Spirit. View *a* maintains that the Holy Spirit is a certain comprehensive attitude of the individual mind to which Christianity assigns a special value, an attitude which embraces, or constitutes the ground of, all those "fruits" which are to characterize the Christian life. View *b* declares that the Holy Spirit is not primarily an affair of the individual mind at all but a collective attitude which has attained to a certain substantive existence as an autonomous trend in the soul of the race, the functioning of which in the soul of any given individual is not dependent solely upon the conditions which obtain in that soul and in its external environment. The third view, *c*, affirms that the Holy Spirit is God. There will then be a tendency on the part of theologians to raise the question whether the Holy Spirit is a mental attitude, or a metaphysical hypostasis, or the presence of God. (For the sake of simplification other possibilities are here passed over.)

These "ors" constitute a fallacy. We cannot tacitly assume that there cannot be a God who in one phase or aspect of his nature is personal and in another impersonal; who is both the sum of right attitudes of all individual souls and at the same time a unitary being of whose activity those attitudes are functions; who in one modality is the transcendent ground of all being, and in another a product of evolution. Of course the metaphysical justification of such a concept may be challenged. But when we are considering such a concept as that of the Holy Spirit; when we have seized upon some experiential fact such as "It seems as though there were a holy will within me which is not my own"; and when we have reviewed certain suggested explanations of that fact, we can neither tacitly postulate that these are mutually exclusive alternatives or that any one of them is metaphysically impossible, however strange it may superficially appear to be. The natural man is apt to take a Common-sense nominalism for granted: the real is the individual, and the individual

is what is individual for the consciousness of unreflecting man. The idea that individual souls can be nuclei in a more comprehensive spiritual, or psychic, existent is simply not considered. And so, in the above instance, view *abc* may, in the case of many persons, never be thought of, view *b* be dismissed without consideration, and the choice between *a* and *c* made on grounds of personal predilection. To obviate such hasty judgements theology should insist upon adequate analysis and upon expressed metaphysics. For in theology no metaphysics is equivalent to tacit metaphysics, and tacit metaphysics to numberless illegitimate assumptions.

Analysis

Prior to the investigation of the truth of any doctrine the content of the principal ideas involved should be analysed. By this means not only can much obscurity and unintentional evasiveness be avoided, but possible solutions of difficulties may thus become apparent almost at a glance. Thus let D be an object of religious thought, and let D = E be a traditional doctrine about D. Theology will analyse D into its factors *a*, *b*, and *c*. E will also be analysed in the same way. This analytical treatment will be preliminary to any inquiry as to whether D is really E or not, or in what sense D is E. It may then become obvious on the face of it that the doctrine D = E depends entirely upon *a* and *b*, and that *c* is, perhaps, too doubtful a fact to justify its connexion with E, or, perhaps, that though true or legitimate enough in itself, yet it may be so irrelevant as regards the analysed content of E that the synthesis of the two ideas could only be a source of misunderstanding. Sometimes the result of an attempt to analyse would be the discovery that an idea had no definite meaning at all, or that its meaning must lie in reference to experiences which could be better

summarized or interpreted in other ways. Analysis will not necessarily be vitiated simply because it is not exhaustive, for that which is analysed will not be a doctrine in the abstract but the meaning which an idea has for this or that writer. Thus if an author analyses D into *a* and *c*, demonstrates the actuality of the E character of *a* and the absence of it in *c*, and proceeds to identify D with *a*, his analysis is not valueless simply because he has overlooked *b*. For the propositions $a = e$, $c =$ not e, stand for facts, whereas D and E are words the best use of which can be settled when more clearness as to the facts has been obtained. When an idea is analysable into a number of sub-ideas these latter should, if possible, be grouped and classified.

We may take as our first example, very briefly, the idea of God. When we come to sift out the numerous senses in which the word "God" is used, or rather, the numerous factors which enter into the various current ideas of God, we find them fall roughly into two groups. In the first fall all metaphysical ideas of God, that is to say, all ideas of God conceived in terms of being or causation, such as the All-in-all, the universal mind, the personal creator, the source of the higher values, or as something beyond, or otherwise contrasted with, the world; and many more. The second group spring from religious tradition and experience. Of course the two groups as wholes, as well as the various constituents of each group, tend to flow into one another, and a number of cross-divisions are possible. An idea of God originally developed in the philosophical interest may become an object of devout worship, while conversely cosmic functions may be attributed to what were originally personifications of experience, such as the Holy Ghost. But, in the main, the cultus-group of ideas of God is so radically unlike the philosophical group that they may be regarded as incommensurate with one another. The God of religious

worship and experience is a particular, finite being operating within the universe in accordance with its, or his, specific character in relation to a given non-ego and under a number of limitations. The metaphysical group is fundamentally different from this, both in conception and motivation.

To analyse the two groups into their constituent factors would require at least an entire volume. We have already seen enough to be reminded of Marcion. Marcion, an early Christian theologian, thought that there were two Gods—God the Creator and God the Saviour, and that in character and behaviour they were quite unlike one another. Let us provisionally, as a point of method, assume the substantial duality of the idea of God. What, then, if the Saviour-God really were an entity existing as a factor within the universe, as a product of the cosmic process, and as possessing a more derivative form of existence than that of the ens realissimum? What if Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were but the three modes in which the Saviour-God exists relatively to Christian experience? If so, can this fact be in any way correlated with the three relations in which the Supreme Being may stand to any given organism in creation, namely Transcendent, Immanent, and Emergent? I will not attempt to examine this hypothesis, or to take up any attitude whatever towards it, favourable or unfavourable. I quote it only as an illustration of the way in which analysis suggests hypotheses and at the same time points to the means by which, to some extent, they can be tested. For if a consensus of the best philosophical thought were to find a group of ideas metaphysically valid; if these ideas harmoniously coalesced into the concept of a cosmic God; if the attributes of this metaphysical God were other than those of the Saviour-God of Christian experience; and if the God of Salvation nevertheless proved to be empirically and objectively real, as other constituents

of the world are empirically real, then the Marcionite hypothesis, in modernized form, would be both re-suggested and half proved by a properly executed analysis of the idea of God.

Our second example must be that central article of Christian faith which floats in the background of all the discussions in this volume—the faith that there is redemption for man through Christ. For brevity's sake I will not attempt much of an analysis of the idea of redemption, but will take it in what is at least part of its meaning: Redemption is conscious release from inward bondage through an influence apprehended as divine, resulting in the transformation of the soul and the realization of a state of inward purity, harmony, power, and joy otherwise unattainable.

The idea of Christ must be dealt with more fully. It presents itself as a complex constituted by a large number of contributory factors:—

(*a*) The idea of the historical teacher, Jesus of Nazareth.
(*b*) The idea of Jesus as the standard personality, the concrete ideal, the perfect man.
(*c*) The idea of Jesus as the revealer of God.
(*d*) The idea of Jesus as a divine, semi-divine, of virtually divine being—as Messiah, Son of God, etc.
(*e*) The idea of an intermediate, creative agency between God and the world.
(*f*) The idea of the Indwelling Christ.
(*g*) The idea of a second hypostasis of the Godhead.
(*h*) The idea of an ideal object of love and worship, whether real or imaginary.
(*i*) The idea of Jesus as the personification of an ideal, or as a symbol for all good causes.
(*j*) The idea of a Saviour and Redeemer.

There may be several others, and different persons will differ as to what constitutes a separate constituent in the Christ-idea. I should, for instance, regard the ideas of Jesus as prophet, priest and king, as risen and ascended lord, or as the good shepherd, as all comprehended under the idea of an ideal object of love and worship, whereas some others might regard them as specifically distinct ideas. Others again may regard the idea of a divine, or semi-divine being, and the idea of a secondary hypostasis of the Godhead as virtually the same. But the former, *d*, really means that a number of exalted attributes are predicated of Jesus of Nazareth, and this piling up of ideas of his greatness culminates in the conception of him as the second person of a Trinity. Here we have a synthesis of ideas *a* and *g*, a synthesis which may, or may not, be justified, but which in any case *is* a synthesis, since *g* is possible even if we suppose that Jesus never lived. As a matter of fact *g* did arise quite independently of *a*, and it is quite conceivable that *f* might have come into existence as the result of mystical experience that had no apparent connexion with any of the preceding ideas.

Let us consider this idea of a Mystic, or Indwelling, Christ a little more fully. Any metaphysical theories which may give support to it, or any exegesis which emphasizes it, gain their plausibility from the experience itself. We can therefore make the experience of the Indweller the starting-point of our thought, and could do so even on the (to be sure, absurd) assumption that Jesus of Nazareth never existed. Thus whereas factors *b*, *c*, and *d* in the Christ-idea presuppose *a*, in the sense that they could not be empirically real unless the historical Jesus was empirically real, the same is not true of the Indweller, because an indwelling Something in many souls is given as an empirical datum. The Indweller may, or may not, be one being with the Jesus of history. The identification,

if made, must be made consciously and deliberately and not assumed on the authority of Biblical texts. We will return to this question of the extent to which a synthesis of *f* with *a* is warranted presently and consider first its synthesis with *j*—in other words the hypothesis that the Indweller is the ground, or agency, of redemption (or its result). The close connexion of the possibility of mystical experience of such a kind with the problems of grace and redemption is obvious. It is obvious that *if* such a formation were in any given case developed in the soul—if a divine being took up his abode in that person's heart—a large measure of redemption would be not only possible, but inevitable. In fact the redemptive power of the Indweller is a datum of experience; the problem lies only in the practical question as to how we may come to gain the experience—how Christ may be formed within.

"Ah yes, but that is because your inward Christ is your idealized libido-object. In other words, *h* is that factor in virtue of which *j* also belongs to the Christ-complex. It is *h* which has created *f*, but a combination of *a*, *b*, and *d* would serve the purpose equally well so long as it were erected to the position of *h*. Indeed a purely imaginary *i h* would prove just as redemptive. Both the historical, the metaphysical and the mystical factors can be dispensed with so long as anyone can be brought to pour out his soul in love and devotion to anything whatever, whether real or imaginary."

Faced, as here, with a difficulty, an objection, or a new aspect of a case we must again analyse. Only now it is not an idea, but an experience, the experience of the Indweller, which calls for analysis, and then the sub-factors into which it is analysable will in their turn have to be roughly classified. We then observe at once that the Inward Christ is not only object, but still more obviously subject; he is not only the Beloved but the great Lover. This of itself is enough to dispose of the view that only

h is *j*. The inward Christ is α, a source of thoughts, feelings, sympathies, and actions altogether higher and other than those which we recognize as our own. The inward Christ is β, something in the presence of which old, evil, unconquerable tendencies melt away into nothingness. The inward Christ is γ, the healer of neuroses, as well as δ, of all manner of organic disease. The inward Christ is ϵ, the giver of enhanced personality, weight, effectiveness and competence. The inward Christ is ζ, a practical guide and control; it prompts those in whom it lives to do, or not to do, this or that; it makes them act otherwise than their own judgement would have led them to act, and always the event proves its wisdom and goodness. All this goes to show that the inward Christ is a higher centre of consciousness rather than an idea or imaginary object of interest and attraction for our natural instincts.

"A case of dissociated personality." But where, in that case, does all that love and wisdom and purity come from? Is the inward Christ a permanent potentiality latent in the soul of humanity? Is he, or it, there all the time and in all men? The inward Christ was never a part of any man's ordinary, phenomenal personality; if it is a case of dissociated personality nine-tenths of our personality must exist in transcendental fashion, never becoming phenomenal until it is disintegrated. And can one, in the light of sub-factor ϵ, reasonably speak of dissociation at all? Quite the reverse seems to be the case; our analysis seems to show that the inward Christ, whatever it is, is a principle of integration.

A further line of inquiry would be suggested by an analysis of the conditions under which the Indweller emerges. Among the facts which would then become apparent would be the historical connexion between that emergence and the person of Jesus, the teaching of Jesus, faith in Jesus, and the intimate conversations of

those who are, as it were, living the life of Jesus over again at second hand. Why so marked a dependence of man's innate capacity for redemption upon this one particular teacher?

I will not pursue the matter further. The subject of our inquiries is not Christology, but theological method, and enough has been said to illustrate the fruitfulness of an analytical treatment.

Definition

Analysis brings us to definition. A definition is a proposition setting forth the fact indicated by a term. That is as much as to say that, in theology, it is "real definitions", or definitions of things, which should be the aim and guide of thought; that propositions declaratory of the connotation of a word, or of the content of an idea, are merely incidental to the exposition of a subject, just as grammar is, whereas "real", or "factual", definitions belong to the substance of it. Even if definitions of things are not wanted in other sciences theology needs them in order to keep her to the realm of the real and away from the wilderness of words. It will make a practical difference to theology if theologians recognize that a generous use of definitions is required of them, and that the kind of definitions wanted are those which summarize the facts, or supposed facts, indicated by the words which they employ. This rule is a safeguard also against an equivocal use of terms. It is not necessary, before saying that such and such a horse won the Derby, to give a definition of the term "horse" with a view to obviating the impression that the Derby might have been won by a towel-horse. In theology, however, an equivocal use of language is a real danger, and a tacit transition in thought from one sense of a term to another may actually constitute the pivot of an argument. One might, for instance,

ask whether this can truly be said of St. Paul's thinking on the subject of the resurrection. On the face of it, it seems that it can. But St. Paul's real thought may have been that the inward death and resurrection through transformation and renewal of the soul by means of an indwelling Saviour-Spirit is the ground of the awakening of the dead to consciousness on a higher plane of existence, a proof of which was the visible manifestation of the living soul of Jesus after his death; that the question as to what sort of body the awakened dead possess is a silly one; all that we can say is that the body that is buried is not the body that shall be, and that we can observe analogies in Nature of a living creature's getting a new body after the old one dies. There is nothing equivocal in this line of thought and there is nothing unnatural in the symbolical use of the ancient term "anastasis" (Liddell and Scott quote an instance from Æschylus) to denote the whole complex fact. But on the surface it certainly appears, to anyone who does not readily feel himself into St. Paul's thought, as though his argument depended upon an equivocal use of terms, and as a matter of fact misunderstanding did arise. The free use of definition is most valuable in all such cases—when, that is to say, the symbolical nature of a writer's thought or mode of expression obscures the exact meaning of his concepts.[1]

There is a rule of logic that definitions must not contain figurative terms. The rigid insistence upon this rule would be impossible, perhaps, in theology, but it need not be wholly disregarded. A spiritual fact must not be defined solely in symbolical terms; if symbolical language

[1] The word meaning "to awaken" (*ἐγείρειν*) the dead has acquired the traditional sense of "raising", and is so translated by the revisers even when the context seems to require the literal meaning, as in St. Mark xii. 26, 27, where it is implied that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob *had been* awakened from death, although there was no suggestion of a revivifying of their bodies. Had it been the practice of evangelists to define their terms the obscurity, or falsification, might have been avoided.

is used it must be accompanied by a metaphysical definition. The rule of metaphysical definition is a double safeguard against loose picture-thinking on the one hand, and a tacit conversion of psychology into a system of naturalistic metaphysics on the other; if that is to be done let it be done openly and explicitly with all its inherent difficulties faced. If this rule is to be observed the theologians must observe it first.

The statement that, so far as possible, definition, in theology, should be factual rather than nominal must be balanced by the recognition of the value of any kind of declarations of meaning approximating to the character of definitions. It might perhaps be true to say that the use of definitions was one of the distinguishing marks between theology and devotional literature. It indicates a preference for precision rather than impression, for truth rather than for her trivial rival, beauty. Truth loves the bald, the jejune, the dry, the formal. Beauty of language is a dangerous and seductive thing which theologians should avoid. The inspiration of poetry, of style, of literary effectiveness, is psychic wine that adds a glamour and a charm to words, but it does not promote clarity of vision or sureness of step. The felt and imagined is, under its influence, mistaken for the real. The best check upon such tendencies is frequent definition. It draws a writer up and forces him to ask himself what sense there is in what he is saying.

A few exercises in definition may serve in some measure as test of the suitableness of these rules. As a first example we will take the doctrine of the Real Presence of Christ in the blessed sacrament as the subject for definition. So long as we are defining words, expounding traditional notions, or even analysing factors in a concept, we are standing apart from the actual religious life which inspires that faith and are really taking a theme of controversy as our subject. We will therefore start

from the felt presence of Christ as an actual experience. We need not analyse it or question its reality because, for present purposes, we are assuming the ground common to orthodox Protestants and to Catholics. What are the facts which lead to that reference of that presence to the consecrated elements? First there is evidently the flight from self: just at this moment I do not want to have *my* emotions, *my* sensibilities, *my* beliefs, *my* principles obtruding themselves—they are all paltry earthly things I want to get away from. So I take Christ out of this wretched little tainted me and place him in the Bread and the Wine. Their materiality guarantees their freedom from impurity, their externality, their transcendence of ourselves altogether. But the elements upon the altar, invested, by consecration, with mystic import, are not only a not-me, an untainted something which transcends both my own feelings (let us hope I have none) and the articles which constitute my earthly environment (such as the box of wafers in the vestry). They are the means whereby Christ manifested himself to the saints of old, to St. Aidan and King Alfred, to St. Thomas Aquinas and Thomas à Kempis, to Ruysbroeck and Rolle, to the Lady Julian, to St. Catherine, and St. Kate. By believing what they believed and by worshipping as they worshipped I identify myself with them and make their experience mine. The altar, the priest, the missal, the vestments, the plain-song—all are acts of the worshipper whereby he approaches the deeper act of sharing with the saints the experience of life in Christ.

Assuming that this analysis is correct, we may define the Real Presence as "the spiritual presence of Christ when placed, by an inward act, outside of the feelings of the worshipper and within the soul of the Church". Or as "that inward act whereby the spiritual presence of Christ is realized as outside of the feelings of the individual worshipper and relative to the faith of the Church".

The further clause "by means of a eucharistic service" is part of the definition that may be left understood. I do not say that this definition is necessarily a good one; I give it simply as an exercise in factual definition. It places us at once in the sphere of actualities. The doctrine may not be true; there may be no such thing as the spiritual presence of Christ; there may be no such psychic process as a placing of an inward presence here or there; the saints may have been benighted creatures; the attempt to connect up with them may endanger the main point, the presence of Christ itself; this or that evil incidental to the process may outweigh the good gained even by the successful realization, on the part of some people, of the presence of Christ. If such doubts are justified we shall have to amend the definition. But the doctrine was originally a statement as to fact, and those definitions are best which point us to facts, real or supposed.

It would not be difficult to illustrate the need of definitions by reference to the works of theologians. But I have no desire to be polemical, and the above rules may be left to speak for themselves.

CHAPTER V

INFERENCE

WE HAVE NOW to notice some of the grounds upon which religious inferences are actually drawn, with a view to an estimation of their collective weight. Nothing so definite as the rules of the syllogism or the canons of induction is possible, and a strict logical validity cannot, in theology, even be aimed at. For the logic of religious thought is permissive, not compulsive. It only states the conditions under which the intellect will permit faith to function—if it will. In addition to this intellectual permission the attitude "I am ready and willing to be convinced and to live the life which such belief requires" is necessary before religious conviction can come about. This attitude of antecedent willingness to believe is not quite the same thing as James's "will to believe", for James was emphasizing the extra-logical element of choice, or decision, inherent in the act of practical belief, whereas I am speaking of an antecedent willingness. Different alike from willingness and from the act of choice, or decision, is the determination to believe or to disbelieve. Perhaps the antecedent willingness to believe is the same thing as the complete absence of the unconscious determination not to be convinced.

More than this: there must, subject to the genuine supremacy of truth, be a desire to discover higher realms and to become an inhabitant and possessor of them. This means believing more than the inevitable minimum. For the objects of faith are extensions of the universe in dimensions not forced upon our observation either by sensation or by mathematics, and if we have no desire

for discoveries in such directions we naturally do not make them.

And even more: there must be some counter-postulate to counteract the otherwise almost inevitable postulate that the higher realm does not exist. For its own reductive purposes the scientific intellect sets up the law of parsimony, or minimum hypothesis, and the law of the exclusion of transcendental factors. These heuristic principles are methodological rules, but they tend to pass over into a conviction that what cannot be forced upon our acceptance by the methods of natural science is nonexistent, and this is tantamount to turning positivism into a postulate. In theology this assumption must be balanced by the countervailing hypothesis that the real is the rich, that the ultimate is determinate, that an unmanifested Higher exists, that it is dynamically operative, that the greater the intrinsic worth of anything the greater is the metaphysical significance of it as the revelation of a Beyond. This assumption, which we may call the affirmative hypothesis, is the tentative working postulate of theology. The necessity for it lies in the fact that unless it is made the negative assumption will, through sheer mental inertia, pass into negative dogma, and the main subject-matter which theology sets itself to investigate will be decreed to be unreal before ever the investigation begins. In so far as it is a subject for investigation it is the underlying hypothesis, in so far as it is a determinant of attitude the underlying postulate, of theology.

We now pass to the more intellectual aspect of religious inference. For this purpose we must assume the attitude of a scientific observer following the mental course of a person who is to be imagined as contemplating the phenomena of religious life, at first in others, later in himself, and drawing his inferences solely from the impressions which he receives from this source. We are concerned only with those inferences which tend to issue

in faith and conversion. For belief is not always the outcome of non-rational inferences such as early training, or impulses surging up from the unconscious, or a gradual refinement of intuitive perception, or a sense of moral need. It sometimes happens that a man who has not hitherto been a believer deliberately abandons his unbelief for reasons which seem to him to necessitate a change of view. Most ordinarily, in such cases, the new attitude is due to the impression which the religious life of some other person has made upon the former unbeliever. The religion which makes this impression is then adopted because the life in which it issues seems morally enviable. Often the respect, even the envy, may be there without any further change resulting. "If I were a religious man I should like to have a religion like Charlie Woods'." There next appears a feeling which expresses itself in the thought: "What I reverence is real", "That which has higher worth has deeper reality", and herewith we come to our first formula of religious inference: (1) *If a life which evokes reverences owe its inspiration to a creed that creed is in some sense true.* At this stage a sense of the supernatural begins to emerge. There comes an impression of a mind and will and spirit, higher, worthier, vastly bigger, more profoundly real than human nature —something which is nevertheless in, yet other than, and yet again one with, human nature—a presence, a force, a being moving through souls upon some plane, or in some dimension, which does not present itself to our observation. It is the Real, it is the True, and thou, whosoever thou art, art It. It manifests itself in ways innumerable, for it is the rightful lord of all life. But in its most specific manifestation it is true religion which has found as its object its true self. Its metaphysical reality is given as an element in the impression which it makes upon our minds. The various forms of the Ontological Argument are probably attempts to translate this

immediate impression of reality into intellectual terms. Indeed, most religious inferences seem to rest upon this immediate sense of the supernatural. In the line of thought and feeling which we are at present considering inferences are not definitely causal in character. The human soul is viewed primarily as the scene of a revelation rather than as a field in which effects are produced.

A formula of religious inference akin to the first-mentioned may be expressed thus: (2) *If a creed correspond with human nature at its best it is metaphysically true.* This statement does not, of course, contemplate a metaphysical creed which is literally and verbally infallible, but a creed which is to-day truer than the negation of it or doubt of it, whatever amendments or reformulations may hereafter be found necessary. It is not really a matter of actual metaphysical reasoning at all, but a proposition which presents itself to many religious minds as axiomatic. There is much intuitive metaphysics in the religious consciousness. Some fact in the world leaps forth and stands there for all to see, stamped with the impress of God. It seems in a special way to imply his existence and to bear his signature. Causality, conscience, life, purposiveness, saintliness, have all served as the occasions of theophanies. To-day it is the fact of personality which, more than any other, appears as a revelation of the essential nature of absolute being. How far the religious intuition starts from an idea of transcendent quality such as implies personality, and how far it springs from a conception of psychic structure such as is denoted by the term "personality" itself, is left undecided, for the idea in mind is really that of a perfect personality and the immense significance thereof.

An inference of a more causal kind is illustrated by the striking story of Martineau and the American inquirer, related by von Hügel in his *Essays and Addresses* (Second series). The formula of it runs thus: (3) *If a large number of*

individuals, having a religious creed but devoid of much secular culture, exhibit a real grip on life, and if other members of the same race, having high secular culture but devoid of religion, lack it, that creed is in some sense true. The grip on life was displayed by a certain sovereignty over circumstance, an ability to meet the changing fortunes of life with the right mental attitude appropriate to each, whereas those who were highly cultured but non-religious were, under similar circumstances, readily thrown off their balance and became neurotic or degenerate. The experience of St. Paul, "I know both how to be abased and how to abound; I have strength for all things in him that strengtheneth me", was repeated on a less striking level, and almost unconsciously, by ordinary people of little education. The inference can be expressed in a more general way: (4) *If a faith tend to make men adequate to life that faith is in some sense true.* In this instance the observer was an agnostic, more than half converted in the end by his observations, the race was German, the church the Roman, and the total length of the observations one year.

We now come to a group of inferences which imply a closer scrutiny of the agency operative in religion. That upon which attention is fixed is here not so much the value of the effect produced as the fact that there is something there which is acting in accordance with a law and nature of its own. Sometimes this seems to be definitely personal. A man once said to me: "I find that God behaves just like a person (in the ways in which he responds to prayer)." More vaguely, and from an outside point of view, it is often said that So-and-so seems to have got hold of something in his religion—i.e. the latter makes the impression of dealings with some objective fact. The principle of this inference is something like this: (5) *If religious experience display signs of interaction with an unseen environment it implies an apprehension of supernatural reality, and all ideas in which that*

experience finds expression are in some sense true. But what are those signs of interaction with a real, though unseen, environment? What are the marks of the operation of an agency functioning upon some plane other than that of Nature? The reply of the convert is that such signs are to be found in the unique, specific character of the religious experience itself; in its purposiveness as regards the individual when once the religious principle has been established in a soul; and in the order and coherence of the mental world in which henceforth the latter finds itself to be living. These impressions may be thrown into this form: (6) *If religious experience is unique, as compared with other kinds of experience, coherent, purposive, and tending towards specific effects of value, it points to the presence of a special agency and to a higher order of being.* In proportion as it exhibits this character religious experience is of weight as evidence of the unseen, and also in proportion as it consists of sequences of definite happenings. In proportion, on the other hand, as it does not the term "experience" should hardly be used; the occasional occurrence of mild emotion does not constitute experience. The formula therefore may be of some little use as a guide to the assessment of the value of what claims to be experience.

In connexion with this idea of a coherent spiritual order the formula seems to hold good: (7) *If an activity is impossible without a certain idea of the divine, and if that activity is morally binding, then that idea is true.* As examples of inferences according to this formula are the following: I cannot pray effectively for anyone without the idea of God. When, for instance, I am trying to pray the prayer of healing for a sick person and leave God out of it I can feel the prayer degenerate into an attempt at white magic, lose its being as a spiritual force, and provoke a reaction against itself in me. But prayer for others is, however undeveloped it may be, the best thing man is

capable of; it goes deeper than our powers of logical thought and effects far more than do most of our attempts to achieve something useful. Therefore my belief in God is truer than my disbelief in him. Again: When one has broken any good resolution one tends to become demoralized and incapable of complete moral recovery until one has asked pardon of God. Theoretically one can explain this, or any other, experience without reference to the supernatural. But if the idea of God is pragmatically necessary to any function sufficiently well guaranteed it can fairly be held to be the truest thing we can think. Thus again: Adoration is mentally healthful; the idea of God is necessary to adoration; therefore God exists and the religious standpoint holds good. Inferences of this type appear to be extremely common.

It may be that a certain attitude of mind, volitional and emotional, is essential for some person, not only for his mental health, but also for the apprehension of the more spiritual side of reality. It may further happen that, for him, that attitude of mind can be maintained only with the help of certain mythological ideas. The principle is then justified: (8) *If an idea, not literally true, exercise a function indispensable to thinking any given element or aspect of reality that idea is in some sense true.* Myths and mistakes may be both false and true at the same time.

All these inferences are inferences from some kind of inner experience or impressions, just as ordinary inductive inference is inference from external experience. The important fact about that experience is that it is something common, objective, supra-individual. In the same way, religion is an experience of a Will which is not the will of the individual, a spirit and temper which is not that of the individual. It is something supra-individual inasmuch as it pursues ends which are not those which the instincts prescribe to the individual, and it is something common inasmuch as it enjoins the same general

ends upon all. On the other hand, it is not anything social. The will to promote some social object which the individuals A, B, and C share in common is simply a modification of the conative tendencies of A, B, and C as individuals; they may all happen to be Englishmen, Liberals, Anglicans, and members of the firm A, B, and Co. That is something very different from the inward experience of a seemingly divine will alongside one's own and which is common, not as A, B, and C's patriotism is common, but as their experience of the weather is common. The inference then runs thus: (9) *If I find within myself a higher will which is not myself, and if others experience the same higher will as I do, that will is objectively real.* Of course the objective reality of this common higher will within cannot be taken for granted as the objective reality of the weather can be taken for granted. It will have to be proved that A's and B's divergent interpretations of the will of God are compatible with the real experience of a higher will which is the same in A as in B. It will then have to be proved that this phenomenon is not fairly explicable along the lines of a naturalistic psychology. But A actually does infer, or jump to, the idea of God because he finds a higher will within him, a will which is not his own and which he seems to share with an innumerable company of other souls. Even to the observer from without this may be apparent. William James quotes Sainte-Beuve: "Through all the different forms of communion, and all the diversity of means which help to produce this state of grace . . . it is easy to recognize that it is fundamentally one state in spirit and in fruits. Penetrate a little beneath the diversity of circumstance, and it becomes evident that in Christians of different epochs it is always one and the same." And a little later James himself, extending this generalization, declares: "There is a certain composite photograph of universal saintliness, the same in all religions, of which

the features can easily be traced." That is to say, there really is a higher inward something in the saints which is universal and objective and supra-individual in a way that nothing else is, and with which no merely social or corporate standpoint can be compared.

A discussion of the metaphysical and psychological questions to which these inferences may give rise is not here possible. All that can be done is to formulate these typical examples of religious inference and to exhibit their inherent rationality. They constitute grounds for the religious hypothesis, not the means for its verification, which must follow. And the truth to which they testify is not so much that of any particular doctrine or creed as rather a truth underlying all creeds. "All religions", said Keshab Chandra Sen, "are true."

But, so far as we can see, there is no general law or principle in accordance with which the attitude of faith arises. The religious consciousness supervenes when there is a willingness to welcome it, when there are no great intellectual obstacles in the way, and when there is a certain sensibility. Then any fact, or any line of thought, may evoke a sense of the supernatural. The sensibility depends upon psychological or spiritual causes rather than upon insight into any quasi-logical ground of induction. The rationality of religious thought depends, not upon the processes of thought accompanying the dawn of the religious consciousness, but upon the possibilities of its verification. There is no such thing as demonstrative intuition.

There are three main kinds of verification or disproof, apart from self-evidence and the "emotion of reality" which tends to accompany all forms of perception. These three are speculative argument, (receptive) experience, and applicability. By "applicability" I mean the control of experience by means of experiment—the deliberate production of effects by the invocation of supernatural

causes. The term "experience" does not usually imply any such attempt to control spiritual forces; it means "what seems to happen". In the ordinary course of the religious life certain things will tend to happen, or not to happen. These happenings may be observed and be made the basis of generalizations. By "speculative argument" I mean any line of thought which goes to show that the structure of reality implies the existence, or non-existence of God. "Experience" stands for the impressions of life taken more or less at their face-value; speculative argument tries to get beyond first impressions to a more hidden truth.

It follows that when theology is asked to exhibit some defensible system of inference this must primarily mean some defensible system of verification. But an attempt will also be wanted to catch, as it were, the religious consciousness in the act of hitting upon its great hypothesis. That is what the above examples are intended to illustrate. Their justification can be estimated only intuitively. To such a demand, therefore, as Professor Eddington's, theology can only reply, "I will submit my methods of verification to general culture for its critical scrutiny, but ask in return for fair intuition when you watch religion's leap into the Beyond."[1]

Spiritual deduction is a process of inference directly from the highest spiritual principle to some fact narrower in scope, of a nature metaphysically less ultimate, and spiritually of more derivative, less intrinsic, worth. In these respects it is the opposite of spiritual induction. A general principle is implicit in the latter, but it does not appear as the conscious starting-point of an inference; it does not serve as an actual premiss but as the ground which makes transcendental inference from particular

[1] For other instances of the transition from a contemplation of ideas of various kinds to the thought of God I may refer to an imaginary symposium in the third chapter of *The Theology of the Real*. It was not until I was correcting the proofs that I realized that it was an analysis of attitudes of my own.

facts, such as the lives of Rhinelanders, possible. Spiritual deduction, on the other hand, argues directly from the idea of God, or otherwise conceived highest principle, to particulars of a more finite character. Such inferences may have reference either to human duties and principles of action—a matter with which we are not here concerned—or they may be inferences as to God's own intentions and mode of organizing the universe drawn from his known nature and character.

A few examples may illustrate the hopelessness of an inference from the known intentions of God. The prophets of Israel based their prophecies upon the conviction that they had rightly intuited the interests, values, and purposes of Yahweih. Thus the prophet Ezekiel was convinced that it was the divine intention to reunite Israel and Judah under a Davidic king. But he was mistaken, as were most prophets, except when they foretold disasters in themselves probable. Jesus himself appears to have been at one time mistaken as to the success of his mission and the early manifestation of the kingdom of God. Whenever, in fact, we stand at some little distance from a thinker we can see at a glance the invalidity of inferences drawn from his system of values. We remain unconvinced even when his predictions come true. Lowell's faith assured him that the Federals would be the winners in the war. And sure enough, after four years of hard fighting, the big battalions and large resources did overwhelm the ill-equipped little band that stood against them. But there are few who would regard this as the demonstration of a providential world-order.

Then there are visions of the future of humanity, visions not unlike those of Micah or Isaiah, which find support in the conception of God. But they are not peculiar to theists, and they have sprung too obviously from the course of historical evolution for us to be able

to regard them as inferences from the idea of God as their source. (God as the metaphysical ground of evolution is, of course, not the same thing as the *idea* of God as the logical ground of inference as to the future course of evolution.) Even if we could, verification would be impossible.

There is one expectation and hope widely spread today which is of the nature of an inference from the known nature and character of God. It is the hope of personal immortality. "Our belief in the survival of human personality", says Bishop Barnes, "is bound up with our conception of the nature of God. If we accept Christ's view of God we cannot believe that he will allow anything of value in his universe to be destroyed; and we can confidently claim that in general the spirit of man is of such value as to be worthy of preservation." Hosea felt the same thing with regard to the kingdom of Northern Israel. An inference from the presumed character of God's system of values is not really possible, and the Bishop wisely qualified his argument by an "if". The same holds good of Höffding's principle of the Conservation of Value, apart from the idea of God. Nothing whatever can be inferred from it, and it seems to be utterly useless.

As an example of hope, rather than of deductive inference, based upon the idea of God by a truthful man who felt that he was standing in the last ditch held by faith against the assaults of naturalism, we may quote from the last sermon of Mr. Studdert-Kennedy, read after his death. "It may be that life is eternal, but that the forms of life are purely temporary. Is that how it is with men and women? Are they merely temporary forms of life? . . . There is not, and never can be, any immediate certainty about it. Not even Christ can give us immediate certainty." He hopes, but he knows that his hope may be mistaken. And, if I am judging rightly from a very

brief report,[1] there is almost a suggestion of the philosophy of As If in the principle that we should trust the intuition of Christ as though he could not have been deluded, in spite of our knowledge that that may have been the case.

If I correctly observe my own feelings I find that they do not support the Bishop's conclusion. The idea that my own particular, commonplace chain of memories, interests, appetites, and sense of self-identity is of such irreplaceable value to the Infinite that it could never bring itself to part with them is ludicrous. Nor, so far as I can see, can we posit that at least self-consciousness must survive. There may or may not be good reasons for believing in immortality; with that we are not concerned. What I urge is that it is a fallacy to argue from our own system of values, as such, to God's, and to deduce therefrom what must hereafter come to pass. That is not to say that we may not attempt to estimate cosmic values on the strength of our observation of facts. We may see in life and history a continuous struggle of Spirit to find self-realization on earth through conflict with Nature and may infer that it will continue in increasing measure as its means for self-realization develop. We may even detect a principle of integration at work and predict, now that we can see it happening, the rise of an internationalist society. But this is not spiritual deduction; it is rational inference about the observed tendencies of Spirit, based upon ordinary observation. The idea that we know God's nature and interests so well that we can draw inferences from them is another thing altogether.

There is indeed one intuition of immortality seemingly based upon the idea of God which requires notice. It is the argument of Jesus, which I suppose might be paraphrased thus: The friendships of the Eternal must be eternal; Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were the friends of

[1] *Daily Mail*, issue for April 8, 1929.

God; therefore they live for ever, and so may anyone else who becomes the friend of God. And without bringing in traditional patriarchs the same argument might be applied on the strength of a personal sense of mystical oneness with God. This in turn harmonizes with the doctrine of the Upanishads: "They who know Him become immortal." But these arguments are not, in the last resort, deductive inferences from the known nature of God. They rest upon the experience of a state which seems to have in itself the quality of eternity. Upon one's assurance of the nature of God one may base hopes that are frankly hopes; when they become actual inferences they are invalid and lose much of the spiritual quality which, as hope, they possessed. For "the known nature of God" can only mean a man's interpretation of mystical experiences, whether his own or another's. And however real that experience, the interpretation of it can only amount to the assimilation of it to his general system of ideas, whatever that may be.

Spiritual thought, we may conclude, may be justified when it proceeds from experience to the idea of God; the idea of God, once gained, may be a most valuable guide for deducing human duties; it is also of the greatest service as a ground for the deduction of possibilities—e.g. as to prayer, healing, and the like. But it is never justified as the ground of an inference as to actual happenings. When such inferences are drawn we have reason to suspect a reversion of thought from the religion of the Spirit to the standpoint of wish-fulfilling phantasy. If we are to study religion on the basis of its higher types we must not permit a secret return to the sweet sentimentalities of grade D.

On the ground of ordinary scientific inference two elements can be distinguished. First there is the formal ground of inference as such—a matter of interest to logicians only. Such formulæ as "Once true, always

true," or "The given is necessary", are not practical guides to the drawing of particular inferences about Nature; they are exercises in the formulation of the minimum implications of any sort of thinking. The doctrine of Universal Causation, on the other hand, tells us something about our object of study—Nature. An almost parallel axiom is that of Universal Evolution. Thus at the Congress of the British Association, 1929, it was argued that if it could be shown that all theories of evolution except one were false that one theory would be established, because the only remaining alternative—that of special creation—was incredible. One is tempted to wonder whether some analogous principle setting forth the general nature of Spirit may not be possible. But even if such were obtainable the result, so long as it were reached through observation of a non-ego and inferences therefrom, would only be a philosophy of Spirit—not an elucidation of the processes and validity of religious insight.

Insight is dependent upon attitude. Some general attitude of mind leads one to grasp and appreciate facts which in some way correspond with it; it determines our interests, predisposes us to emotion, and heightens our sensibility, along certain lines. Is there an attitude that tends to religious truth? Is it true that there is a "holy" attitude of which true religious insight is the function? Is it a fact that, as the gospel says, "when it, the spirit of truth, is realized it will guide you into all truth"? If there is such a potential attitude it will constitute the ground of spiritual inference. But it would be very difficult to demonstrate its existence; even those who are most led by the Spirit of God are partly subject to the errors of their age, even in matters of faith. Moreover, there is so great a danger of confusing pure religious attitude with a very human sentimentality which seems to feed upon and exploit the intuitions of religion that the formulation of

a ground of inference based upon that attitude seems hardly possible.

The use of the words "induction" and "deduction", in the absence of any recognized alternatives, is not a wanton misuse of logical terms. There really are different kinds of religious inference. What is called "deduction" is usually only an illegitimate expansion of a metaphor under the influence of feelings by no means purely religious. When, however, Rendel Harris declares that "we deduce the doctrine of Divine Guidance from the fact that we have been led" the inference is surely not deductive at all but is of the nature of a colligation of experiences. So is the remark about the personal character of God's behaviour quoted above. Martineau's infer ence (formulæ 3 and 4 above) is an instance of demonstrative induction. Formulæ 7 and 8 rest upon a pragmatist conception of truth. The ninth is a seeming datum of introspective observation. The first perhaps represents a synthesis a priori analogous to Keats' intuition that beauty is truth. In contrast to deduction all these are varying kinds of reaction to given facts. They may all be delusions or they may embody an element of transcendental insight of great epistemological significance. At any rate these differences of type should be discriminated.

CHAPTER VI

EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION

THE SIMPLEST METHOD of verification in theology will be the direct application of the logic of the natural sciences to religious beliefs. When tradition declares that under controllable circumstances *a*, *b*, *c*, experience E tends to occur the ordinary canons of induction must, from the nature of the case, be to some extent applicable. For example, the statement that temptation can be overcome through resort to prayer asserts a fact as taking place within the limits of human experience. Here the ordinary canons of inductive inference and verification can obviously be applied. Negative results may possibly be due to causes which do not operate in the same special way in Nature, such as the wisdom of God. But that will be a matter for subsequent consideration. Such possibilities do not prove the inapplicability of the canons of induction to all those factual elements in the Christian tradition which assert that something happens, or has happened, in time. That tradition quite unequivocally reports the reality of intercourse between God and man; there is action and reaction, call and response, definite particular acts of God in answer to human prayer and human need. Thus von Hügel insists that religion must always possess a nucleus of brute fact, an element of what he calls Happenedness, or Factualness, but which is more often referred to as the historical element in religion. This historical element is not to be sought only in the exceptional occurrences of the first century of our era. The historical element lies also in the history of to-day; the happenedness comes in

continually; brute facts may be expected anywhen. The Christian tradition makes historical assertions; it declares that certain events happened nineteen centuries ago; the ordinary canons of historical inquiry are therefore applicable to it. But it also asserts that certain other events habitually do happen; the ordinary canons of science are therefore no less applicable. It puts forward, for instance, the generalization that under certain specified conditions (such as the possession of faith) souls are sanctified and regenerated by the grace of God. Now regeneration is a discernible event in time, and the assertion of its occurrence must, by its very nature, come within the scope of the ordinary methods of inductive procedure. Of course it is true that the consciousness of redemption is not *wholly* composed of a knowledge of empirical, causal sequences in time, but these empirical elements do constitute an essential part of it, whatever other factors, in the way of intuitions, interpretations, valuations, and the like, may also be essential. Thus in the closely connected ideas of redemption, of regeneration, and of grace there are present judgements of the same kind as the propositions of history, of science and of common life, and subject to the same conditions of validity as these. Religious judgements are not reducible to common judgements, but when they incorporate common judgements as, for instance, in the doctrine of regeneration, that incorporated element requires critical analysis and verification by ordinary logical means.

By "the canons of induction" I simply mean "the methods employed by the natural sciences in reasoning from empirical data"—the methods of demonstrative induction whereby science seeks to establish the truth or falsity of particular generalizations. Nothing is implied as to the degree of certainty attainable by these methods nor as to how the general presuppositions with regard to the order of Nature upon which they rest are obtained. Some

sort of system of Nature, some kind of complex of interconnected uniformities, is assumed, at least as a working hypothesis, before demonstrative induction begins. In the same way the problem for this particular branch of theology—which for the present we will call Factual Theology—is to discover whether certain alleged events really do tend to happen, and, if so, under what conditions.

For that purpose all that we have to presuppose is some sort of order in the spiritual world. At this stage it is not even desirable that there should be any definite theory as to the nature of it because such theories would unduly limit our vision of possibilities; they would tend to prescribe conclusions instead of leading us to genuine discoveries. Thus it might be assumed that the same law of causation that prevails in Nature prevails also in the spiritual world. Or it might, on the other hand, be held that the world-order is of such a kind as would spring from the loving care of an omnipotent and all-wise Father who knew the needs of each and every one of his creatures. Either of these theories of cosmic order would tend unduly to narrow the outlook of investigators whose business, for the moment, was simply the discovery of particular sequences. By "Factual Theology", therefore, I do not by any means mean the transference to theology of the conclusions arrived at by science, or of the specific assumptions—e.g. as to causality—upon which its procedure rests. I simply mean the employment of such means as the Method of Agreement or the Method of Residues for what they may be worth, together with all such rules for the accurate determination of observation as science recognizes. The generalizations reached by such methods are of the nature of extended observations. It is, for instance, a common thing to hear a person say: "I have observed that whenever . . .", although the "whenever" implies a generalization. Thus what Factual

Theology does is to accumulate the raw material of a religious world-view from the standpoint of the thoughtful experient, to apply to it the methods of science, to reduce it to order, and to attempt such generalizations with regard to it as the evidence which it offers may justify.

It follows from this that within the limits of Factual Theology the apparently real *is* the real. That which appears to experience as obviously and indubitably the presence of God *is* the presence of God. Quasi-sensible objects which present themselves obviously and indubitably as devils *are* devils. When anyone says "There is a dog in the garden" we take it that the dog is a real dog; we do not reply "So you imagine; as a matter of fact, however, all that you can be really sure of is a mental state which you interpret as the memory of having just seen a dog in the garden." Natural science is built upon this identification of the apparent with the real. Where, for instance, would zoology be without it? Yet weird, non-existent beasts have sometimes been observed; I have myself been assured by two sober and healthy women that there was a bird near the house with two mouths. Epistemology may, as a subsequent study, deal with the results of Factual Theology taken as a whole, but I suggest that it is part of Metaphysical Theology, not of Factual Theology, and that these two should, so far as possible, be kept separate from one another. The principle that the apparently real shall be taken as real even when it is also apparently supernatural will also serve to distinguish Factual Theology from the Science of Religion. There is a great difference between a science like this latter which sets out to describe religion as an anthropological phenomenon and one which aims at establishing the laws of the spiritual life as found in God. Both studies may marshal the same facts, but they will make a very different use of them. Theology may fairly

claim the right which every science possesses of treating the objects which it studies as real without on that account resolving itself either into metaphysics or into the science of religion, the standpoints of which are entirely different from its own.

Can we say that Factual Theology possesses a logic peculiar to itself? Only in that it assumes a certain orderliness, coherence, and possible meaning, in spiritual experience as such. For ex hypothesi it consists of an application of the canons of induction to religious thought, so that all that is needed is that the formula declaring the orderliness of the object of study shall not be narrowed by terms which, whether explicitly or by implication, identify that object with nature as understood by the natural sciences.

As instances of results obtainable by Factual Theology I may quote the following: Prayer for the sick is of several kinds. Among others there is Petition, of which there are two varieties, the qualified and the unqualified. The one has the form "O Lord, if it be thy will, heal this person"; the other drops the "if it be thy will" and asks for the healing without qualification. Secondly, there is Spiritual Realization. This may have primary reference either to a divine agency imagined as comparatively external, or to an ideal state of well-being potentially possessed by the patient. The former finds some such expression as "The divine power is surrounding you and enfolding you; it flows into you and through you; it is renewing and restoring you both in body and soul; it is making you every whit whole." The formula of the latter is something like this: "You are most truly and really what you are in the creative thought of God. In that there is only health, strength, and well-being. Such are you now—perfectly healthy in every part, all the tissues and processes just as they ought to be. Affirm this truth as I affirm it for you." A mode of prayer somewhat

allied to this in its negative aspects as a denial before God of an evil, due to false thinking, which henceforth shall not be, is Exorcism, though here the evil is viewed not as a state but as a quasi-personal force operating as a cause of such states. A type of prayer more akin to Petition is Commendation. If the reference to God be not sufficiently sincere in the practice of Realization the latter tends to become an exercise of vicarious will-power or an attempt at a telepathic transmission of auto-suggestion. This procedure might be called Magic. It is the general rule that in the case of intercessors of not more than medium religious development Spiritual Realization is the most efficacious form of prayer. Petition seems to have the effect of setting the desired end at a distance from oneself; it is placed in the mental future and stays there. This is especially true in the case of Qualified Petition; it takes too much account of the probability of a disappointment, and this often inhibits the acceptance of the gift asked for. Magic, except in the case of genuinely devout and believing persons, is more effective than Petition. But it is not only far less efficacious than Spiritual Realization; it is liable to have bad results for the magician himself. Spiritually minded people find both Commendation and Exorcism extremely useful. Commendation or Petition, and especially Qualified Petition, should always be added to any exercise of Spiritual Realization or Exorcism in order that a right mental attitude may be preserved. For it is one of the functions of prayer to harmonize the soul with God irrespective of the fortunes which may await it, and for this purpose those forms of prayer avail most which most involve a self-surrender to the will of an all-good, personal God. The experience of prayer, as well as other cognate experiences, seem to indicate that God is impersonal (i.e. behaves as though he were impersonal) relatively to the experience of the average, more or less

religious, man, but often personal relatively to the experience of the mystic.

I have put forward these generalizations, intentionally brief and scrappy as they are, simply as examples which show that Factual Theology is a method which does yield definite results: that these results are best obtained when we adopt the standpoint of the experient and treat as objectively real what is indubitably real for him until it is contradicted by the experience of more reliable observers; and that they provide a basis for further research in a manner quite characteristic of what we regard as scientific knowledge. They show that if we take the idea of God as the ground of a higher world-order and employ it as a basis of induction much in the same way as the law of the uniformity of nature is assumed in natural science, it will work at least passably well. Sometimes it will work miraculously well. Or rather, the principle of trust in God will often work miraculously well in practice, and through observation of the resulting experiences a considerable number of empirical generalizations may be obtained. By verifying and recording, criticizing and qualifying, resolving, subsuming and synthesizing these empirical laws of the Spirit, it will surely become possible to reach a clearer understanding of the higher order of things. More and more adequate colligating concepts will suggest themselves and empirical fact will more and more displace legends about primitive Hebrew chieftains as the starting-point of religious thinking. All that is needed is a touch of logic. The actual facts are doubtless well enough known, although their systematization has not been carried far enough to enable the average seriously minded Englishman to realize that an empirical science of theology exists. All discoveries in the spiritual life are made many thousands of times over. They are made by numberless people not especially wise or good. Some-

times such observations may be introduced into sermons, addresses and devotional literature, but most often, no doubt, they remain unexpressed. When expressed they become common-land for all spirits. There is no private property in thoughts about God, no "So-and-so's law", no priority-rights or literary obligation to acknowledge indebtedness.

It is obvious that generalizations so reached constitute a certain verification or disproof of faith. They do so, not only in virtue of their factual basis, but also in virtue of the collective, universal character at which this method must aim, although based upon individual instances. There are religious writers who talk about an appeal to the experience of life as though they meant an appeal to the impressions of the individual so far as these are favourable to faith. But a logical method cannot be a purely individual; it is a means of organizing the knowledge of the race, and possesses a corporately human function. The feelings and impressions of the individual in isolation from the general experience of mankind do not amount to a verification of such sort as to impart a rational character to belief or disbelief. Most apologists will heartily agree to this; the collective experience of the Church, they will declare, should weigh more with us than our individual failures. A collective positive experience is presumed to lie behind traditional doctrine. The appeal to experience, in the mouths of such apologists, then means "the impressions of the individual in the course of decades, so far as these impressions are favourable to religion; and the presumption of favourable experience on a large scale on the part of others so far as one's own impressions are unfavourable".

I may be excused from dilating at length upon the obvious fallacy of generalization with the mental reservation that only affirmative instances shall count, and that these must necessarily be interpreted in a sense con-

firmatory of tradition. The empirical method is a logical instrument, not an apologetic device. Its primary function, to be sure, is the accurate recording of, and generalizing from, the positive aspect of religious experience; but it also serves as a means for the unmasking of our own idolatries. There can hardly be any doubt that the creed of popular tradition clashes with experience. It declares that God is an all-compassionate person who knows everything that happens on earth and could interfere if he wished to do so; that he hears every prayer but has good reasons for not sending more recognizable answers; that his relations with all mankind are social, or interpersonal, and may be sufficiently well described by means of the symbols "King", "Father", "Helper"; that man, if he so chooses, can obtain grace to enable him to live the higher life, and will be judged if he does not. If we believe such a creed as this we do so on the strength of our feelings; the overwhelming weight of experience is against it; it represents a postulate rather than anything capable of verification by inductive methods.

I admit that there are more affirmative instances (of apparent social action on the part of God) than would ordinarily be supposed by persons not in touch with devoutly religious circles. A man, as I have already remarked, once said to me—I quote his words as nearly as I can remember them, and I am sure of their substantial accuracy—"God seems to act just like an ordinary person; he does not always do the same thing, but seems to act in accordance with reasons for doing either this or that." Such testimony must be allowed its full weight. (But not more.) I admit also that naturalism is just as much a postulate as is popular deism. But our chief concern in theology must be with our own methods, and a scrupulously logical use of experience must be one of these.

Note on the Words "Religious Experience"

The phrase "religious experience" is used in a number of different senses.

1. Sometimes it merely denotes the excitation of emotional states by the idea of a religious object, although these states may be, in themselves, of quite an ordinary character. It is, however, an illegitimate stretching of terms to use the expression in this sense. Uneducated persons may often be stirred by the singing of sentimental and flowery hymns set to meretricious jingles. No doubt in some cases the feelings thus aroused are accompanied by true religious attitudes, such as the resolve to serve God more faithfully. But that is not by any means an invariable rule and, in any case, to call the feelings themselves—e.g. the maudlin emotions aroused by "Angels of Jesus, angels of light"—"religious experience" is a sheer abuse of language. Even when the emotional states are more permanent, rational, and independent of mass-suggestion, and the term "religious" would be legitimate enough—as, for instance, gratitude to God for an escape or recovery—it is still an impropriety to speak of them as "experience". What should we think of a man who talked about his "military experience", meaning thereby nothing more than feelings excited by listening to a recital of "The Charge of the Light Brigade"?

2. Sometimes the phrase is applied to supranormal, but not exclusively religious, phenomena, such as visions, provided that they are experienced in connexion with some religious occasion or object, as in the case of a vision of Our Lady. Here again it is the mental attitudes which may be associated with the experience rather than the experience itself which can fairly be called "religious".

3. Sometimes the expression indicates certain kinds of numinous or mystical feeling peculiar to religion and generically different from other kinds of feeling; or it means

impulsion to conduct of a specifically religious kind, such as was manifested, e.g., in the life of a St. Francis.

4. Sometimes the words "religious experience" imply a sequence of events the connexion between which seems to point to a spiritual order of things. In such cases the experience consists, not simply in event B, but in the fact that it followed event A. "I wanted to pray and to realize God's presence, but found myself quite unable to do either until I gave myself to the service of others; then the power came." Or again, a series (A) of accidents, coincidences, frustrations, and the like, followed by some unexpected opportunity, due perhaps to some remarkable action, gift, or offer, on the part of a stranger, may lead to a life of useful service (B). It is an essential part of such experiences that they are felt to be experiences of God's dealings with us. There are three things which, from the standpoint of the experient, press themselves upon him, as it were from without independently of any wishes or "subjective feelings" of his, namely event A, event B, and God who makes B to follow upon A. In the former of the two examples just given event B is not felt to be a "subjective" feeling—i.e. a merely personal thing significant only for the likes and dislikes of an individual—but a case of the proper functioning and well-being of a soul taking place only when the right spiritual conditions are present. Such may be called "normal" or "typical" religious experiences.

5. Sometimes religious experience consists of sequences such as the above but containing also supranormal, or numinous, or mystical, elements. That is to say, it is sometimes a combination of 2, 3, and 4.[1] The phrase "religious experience" does not itself imply any such combination. But it does imply that religious experience is an experience *of* something; namely, a spiritual world-order, or the operative presence of God.

[1] For examples see Rendel Harris, *The Guiding Hand of God*.

CHAPTER VII

METAPHYSICAL VERIFICATION

SCIENCE BEGINS with generalizations from the standpoint of pure experience, or Common-sense. It tells us about solid coloured substances which are moved by forces in space and time. Later on it becomes sophisticated and explains away all these terms, but still to some extent continues to rest upon a world in which things are what they seem.

Religion, like Common-sense, gives us a world of Appearance. It is an inner world which constitutes a real spiritual environment of the soul as an omnipresent God. And in the world of pure experience God is as real as solid coloured substances or the moon. Both God and the moon can be thought in terms of feeling, sense and energy. But for religion both are real entities. Factual theology is the formulation of the empirical laws of the spiritual world from the standpoint of religious Common-sense; the empirical laws of the spiritual world are the ways of God with men. But now reductive naturalism explains them all away by reducing them to psychological terms. We thought we were in inward contact with God. Now we are told that God is only our own excess libido which has become attached to symbols thrown up by the Unconscious; and these symbols themselves, properly understood, have reference only to ordinary mundane experiences and objects of instinctual interest. What line is theology to take in reply?

So far as the reduction makes empirical mistakes theology can meet it by a truer analysis. If for instance a writer maintains that all religion belongs essentially to

grade D he can be met with proofs of the independent reality of A, B, and C. The issue can be argued out on an empirical basis. But the case is much harder when we have to do with a writer like Jung, who does not, like Freud, reduce religious to non-religious attitudes, but who explains genuinely religious attitudes themselves in terms which, once understood, would make genuine religion impossible. It must not be postulated that Jung is wrong and religious Common-sense right. But it is in the interest of truth itself that religion should be able to state its own case in reasoned terms, and that is a question as to theological method.

The factual and empirical treatment of religion must be supplemented by a metaphysical analysis of the right kind. And the right kind of metaphysics for theology is, at least in part, a meeting of the implications of naturalism one by one as occasion may require. Theology may not rely solely and entirely upon a metaphysical system elaborated by itself in the absence of the enemy. It must follow the course of naturalistic thought and meet it point by point upon ground of the latter's own choosing. If for instance a writer like Jung[1] asserts, with Christianity, that Spirit is a psychic fact of a different and higher order than the "natural" psyche based upon the instincts, but goes on to explain it as a product of the individual, though not of the ego, theology must be prepared at once to face the issue. It must ask whether the psychologist's explanations are incompatible with the assumption that Spirit is also a world-entity—a universal something hypostatically existent and manifesting itself through the individual. Do not the facts go to prove the metaphysical reality, as well as the psychological actuality, of an immanent God?

But even in the absence of controversial occasions theology is led to metaphysics. The religious hypothesis

[1] Essay on "Spirit and Life" in his *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*.

declares that the soul of man, or at any rate the soul of the true believer, is enveloped by, or is somehow present to, a divine Spirit and Will with which it has to be reconciled and harmonized and into which it must somehow be transformed. The pursuit of this aim leads to experiences which can be observed and formulated as the empirical laws of the spiritual life. From the standpoint of pure observation the apparent is the real, so that even when those generalizations have been firmly established their truth is but empirical truth, the truth of appearance; a metaphysical analysis might, or might not, reveal a very different underlying reality. Even, therefore, in the pursuit of its own conceptions, and apart from the exigencies of controversy, theology requires a metaphysic capable of piecemeal application to the issues of the moment.

Theological metaphysics may be preparatory to, concomitant with, or consequent upon doctrine. The last, or epidogmatic metaphysics, as one may call it, presupposes dogma, which it converts into a rudimentary kind of metaphysics. The idea of God is turned into a metaphysical principle by means of attributing the creation of the world to him. No attempt is made to reach the idea of creation through independent, systematic reasoning; it comes through vague wonder as to how the world arose, through mythological traditions, and through religious devotion, which attributes supremacy in all things to God. The doctrines of Holy Scripture are taken as a basis and are elaborated in the direction of a metaphysical system. Our present inquiry is not concerned with epidogmatic metaphysics, and no further reference will be made to them. Preparatory, or prodogmatic, metaphysics is an attempt at systematic reasoning, rationally valid independently of scriptural authority, but it aims at proving that the universe is such that belief in dogma becomes reasonable. It is, for instance,

argued that the universe is based upon personality and tends to personality, and from this it is further inferred that a "personal" (i.e. social, or interpersonal) attitude towards Reality is appropriate, and this implies that God not only is a person but should be treated as a person. It is also urged that the most perfect personality will be the fullest manifestation of God; that Jesus is the standard personality, the perfect man, and is thus to be trusted as the revealer of God and of his will for man. On the strength of this preliminary clearing up of questions as to the fundamental nature of the universe the doctrines of the Church may be accepted as the highest truth. It is no part of our task to discuss such problems, and no more will be said on the subject. No criticism of prodogmatic metaphysics is suggested, except that it is not enough. All phases of theological thinking imply reference to transcendental reality and metaphysical problems emerge at every stage. These cannot be polished off once for all by means of some one general concept, such as that of personality, but must be dealt with metaphysically as they arise. This is what I mean by concomitant, or syndogmatic, metaphysics. This kind of theological metaphysics, if completed, will consist of a double procedure. First will come a series of metempirical speculations, either independent of one another or roughly systematized; secondly, an ontological critique. This latter lies beyond the range of our present inquiries; it is with the earlier stages of getting to work upon the metaphysics of spiritual truth that we are now interested.

Natural Thought, unsophisticated rationality, accounts for phenomena by supposing that behind appearance there lies the substance of things and behind changes which take place when one object is in a certain relation to another there is some agency at work whereby the objects act upon one another. So long as things reveal themselves to sense or to metrical calculation our ideas

about them are empirical. But sometimes in order to be able to think the objects of experience intelligibly we have to employ concepts of things which do not manifest themselves either to sense or to mathematics. When we think in this way we are thinking metempirically. The metempirics of biology is metabiology, the metempirics of psychology is metapsychology, and so on. As examples of metempirical ideas we might quote the ideas of force, of the unconscious, of the vital impulse, or thrust of life, and of the earth-soul. If Jung's Collective Psyche is conceived as an entity the idea of it is a metempirical concept; if merely as a function of "the lower parts" of the brain it is not. Most scientific people are ashamed to death if they are caught thinking metempirically and try to hide the fact. They call it mysticism, or metaphysics, by way of reproach. Adepts at abstract metaphysics also despise it as a crude and popular style of philosophizing. But metempirical thinking is a most useful stage in the development of most subjects of scientific thought. Above all, a metempirical treatment of religious problems is essential. Metempirical theology clarifies, rationalizes and systematizes the matter of experience and hands it on to ontology for further refinement. For this purpose it requires freedom of thought; no subject must be forbidden on the ground that it lies beyond the range of human knowledge. Theology, like the other sciences, has to make the most of its data by whatever means may be in its power, leaving its results for epistemologists and metaphysicians to comment upon afterwards as they may choose. The Apparent Transcendental is *given* in religious experience from the first, and the apparent must be accounted real until it is proved to be illusory. But it is not given as ultimate reality; it is given as something beyond Nature which exercises divine functions in relation to man. Thus at every turn religious thought is bound to be starting metempirical hares.

We require, then, some hypothesis which will account for the phenomena of religious experience, for the practical value which it possesses for life, and for the elusive way in which it evades all logical tests in spite of the impression of objectivity which it sometimes gives. Something appears to be operative, but what? The minimum assumption will be that of something resembling a secondary personality, but formed, not by the dissociation of consciousness, but in the unconscious mind of the individual, and most often never attaining to personal form at all. We may speak of groupings of unconscious psychic elements of this kind as theoid formations, or theoid centres, and may suppose them capable of acquiring a more or less personal character of their own. Religious experience is the result of an interaction taking place between the theoid centre and the self along lines of libidinal discharge. A flow of energy between these two centres is termed, if in one direction "prayer", if in the opposite direction "grace". The conscious self, or personality, is only an excerpt—only a part of a larger but still more or less individuated soul. A few potentialities out of a larger mass have been actualized; the rest remain latent and unconscious, and it is in, and from, this unactualized, hidden soul of man that theoid centres are formed. The self, ego, conscious personality, suffers from this violence done to it, this loss, this enforced narrowing down in order that it may face the exigencies of infantile life. It becomes self-centred, soulless, neurotic, diseased, or criminal. Indeed, the whole soul (or total individuality) suffers, for the conscious personality should be the organ and instrument of the soul as a whole. But when a theoid personality can be formed in the hidden depths, and pathways of libidinal discharge opened up between the two—the ego and the theoid—all the diseases of the soul are healed. It is therefore a very practical matter that we are considering, for if there

is truth in this point of view an effective psychotherapy might well be founded upon it. Indeed, such may already exist.

This hypothesis to some extent explains the religious sense of dependence upon help from realms above our common self, the experience of grace, the enhancement of personality, the phenomena of divine guidance, providence and control, the miracles of healing and of spiritual transformation, the love, the joy, the strength, and the peace. It throws light on the ideas of at-one-ment and reconciliation with God. It renders intelligible the hint, which the religious consciousness embodies, at a higher sphere of being, the true patria of the soul. It goes some way towards explaining why this homeland of the spirit resists so elusively all attempts to determine its nature and laws though seeming to possess them, and why it appears now as personal, now as impersonal, and now again as mere emotionality of a very earthly kind. It helps us to understand also the nature of religious truth, in which propositions which admit of logical treatment are mixed up with symbols, at once full of significance and devoid of any precise conceptual content, with principles, with formulations of required spiritual attitude, with profound convictions, and with flickering, shifting intuitions. Nearly all of the more obvious features of religious experience are rendered more intelligible by this hypothesis than by any other. No alternative explanation is satisfactory. The facts do not give one the impression that, in religion, the contents of the unconscious are coming up indiscriminately into consciousness. The religious process and that which takes place during psychoanalysis are very different. And the mental attitudes required in the two cases are different. If the characteristics of the higher religious experience are compared with those of any other group of phenomena the psychological difference between the two will,

I think, be manifest. Everything in the former points to the formation, in differing degrees of development and possessed of varying degrees of stability in different persons, of a personality empirically divine. Yet this view also does justice to the more negative side of experience also—the prayers that go unheard and the destinies that work out so tragically—without having to resort, in violation of all evidence, either to the excessive inscrutability of divine wisdom or to the self-engendered perversity of man's free will.

It has now to be shown that theoid experience is normal to religion, that it is biologically functional, and that it is metaphysically significant. It is normal to religion in the sense that it is part of the natural goal of the religious consciousness. For theoid consciousness is active from the standpoint of deity; God is subject rather than object. It is not only that the devotee has the idea, or feeling, that God is controlling, inspiring, speaking to him; these divine activities actually take place. Furthermore, their character is of a kind that the devotee regards as truly divine; it is what he worships that responds to him. Perhaps it would be truer to say that that which meets him in the theoid experience is the object of his own worship raised to a higher power and purer quality. Theoid experience is thus the natural goal of religion, for religion is the pursuit of God, a seeking him, a longing for communion with him. The goal of seeking is finding, and God is "found" when he is realized in consciousness and found to be responsive to man, to permeate him, interact with him, control, illuminate and inspire him. To find God is to have empirical contact with him: that is what the word "find", when used spontaneously to express religious feeling, means. And that is just what theoid experience is: it is felt communion with an actively responsive God. The value and significance of religion seem therefore, at least

prima facie, to be bound up with the validity of mystical and theoid experience.

Theoid experience is biologically functional in that it is a mechanism which the psyche has evolved as a means to its own health and well-being. (It is God that works in evolution.) Thereby the ego is enabled to regain its lost provinces, cut off from it because there was no access to them from mundane nurseries. Thereby too it finds an organ for the elimination of the evil which infects it. As Spirit struggles for the dominion of the soul it produces theoid manifestations as an instrument whereby it may the more effectively react against objectionable elements in the psyche and extrude them. The method which the Spirit follows in this its lusting against the flesh is neither that of morality nor of medicine. Morality talks of resisting, fighting, conquering, overcoming. Medicine aims at reduction of tension, at mitigating the devil, and reuniting him with the soul; it seeks to help the ego to deal more effectively with the id. But Spirit operates in the service of something beyond and higher than ego or id or moral code. Its method is that of pleading with the soul freely to give up *to God* all wishes that stand in the way of his sovereignty. A double purposiveness—a biological, in the service of the ego, and a transcendental, in that of Spirit—seems here to be exhibited.

Has this fact, has that of the religious normality of these phenomena, any bearing on the question of their metaphysical significance? What metaphysically is implied in the existence of theoid centres? There is also the practical question: How can theoid centres be developed? This is a problem for Practical Theology but it requires an answer to the former, or metaphysical, question, because an assurance of the reality of the religious object is an essential condition of religious experience. That "emotion of reality" with reference to the object of

religion is called "faith", and all the evidence assures us that the Epistle to the Hebrews is speaking truly when it says that "without confidence in the reality of God it is impossible to get into such harmony with him that experience of him becomes possible. For the necessary presupposition of that experience is belief that God exists and that there is some practical good to be gained from the effort to realize him." If we conclude that theoid phenomena are *merely* an activity of the unconscious, having no further significance, we make it impossible for ourselves to have theoid experience. If, on the other hand, we believe them to be evidence of a real and personal God our psychology will come to the aid of faith. If, as a third possibility, they are found to be marks of contact with something real and valuable but not a personal God the amount of loss and the amount of gain will depend upon a number of other conditions. But in any case the question as to the objectivity of theoid experience as the product of intercourse with a real environment, ordinarily transcendental and inaccessible, is at once a practical and a speculative one. If theoid experience is a purely subjective thing—i.e. if it merely represents a play of feeling within oneself devoid of any connexion with a spiritual reality beyond one's own soul—faith becomes impossible, and therewith the benefits of faith. Truth is, indeed, truth, and if the truth is tragic we must put up with the tragedy. But we are under no obligation to involve the world in tragedy merely for the sake of phenomenalism as a convenient working rule for science. And if we can reach rational grounds for beliefs in an objectively real object of religious experience our methods, whatever they may be, will be justified.

We pass therefore to the question as to the metaphysical implications of religious experience, and especially as to the degree of objectivity involved in the

functioning of theoid centres. These cannot be deposits from consciousness—products of what the individual has done, felt, or thought in the past—because the individual has done, felt, or thought nothing divine except under the influence of a theoid centre. They cannot be the products of theoid conduct because the latter presupposes the former. There is nothing in consciousness which could explain them. The case of diabolic centres is not analogous, for these are more or less intelligible as earthly passions which have become subterpressed[1] and dissociated; such passions are but natural instincts uncontrolled and hypertrophied through the disintegration of the personality. But whence the divine affections, the supernatural foresight and design, and the universalistic and non-instinctual character of the products of the theoid function? To call them "sublimations" is suitable only in relation to their natural history. *If*, that is to say, they can be conceived as evolved wholly within the individual soul and not imparted to it from without *the course of this* evolution may be called "sublimation". But whence the capacity for it, and whence the directing agency? If all that is presupposed is natural instinct and circumstances natural instinct cannot be *merely* natural instinct; it must also be latent divinity. And circumstances cannot be merely circumstances; they must also be providence. And latent divinity immanent in the soul will then presuppose transcendent deity existing somehow beyond and prior to it.

In the same way it is quite inadequate to point to racial inheritance as a ground of explanation for the cases under consideration. Exactly the same objections

[1] By "subterpressed" I mean what Rivers calls "suppressed", and most other psychologists "repressed", in the technical sense of the term. "Pressed under" is much better than "pressed back", but neither "suppressed" nor "repressed" is suitable for a technical meaning, and I suggest "subterpressed" or "deconsciousness".

apply to this line of explanation, if treated as sufficient, in the case of Man as in the case of this or that individual.

From the standpoint of the prevalent school of philosophy, which holds that life, mind, knowledge, spirit, spring into existence without dependence upon any transcendental ground whatever, this line of thought is out of date, although there are philosophers of repute who think otherwise. I am not personally competent to take part in the battles of the giants, and I will not attempt to deal with questions of abstract metaphysics as such. But theology, as we have seen, is bound to attempt a metaphysical treatment of the intrinsically metaphysical problems to which religion gives rise. And religion does not merely give rise to problems; it puts forward solutions. To the question as to how intrinsic value is possible religion declares that every good and perfect gift is from above and cometh down from the Father of light. In other words, the higher modes of existence and experience presuppose a transcendental ground, and this must remain the working hypothesis of theology until it is driven to abandon it in the proved interests of truth. That point is far from having yet been reached and the now fashionable doctrine of emergence from nowhere far from being established.

The issues generally in dispute are the ultimate grounds of life, mind, knowledge, and value. Pausing at these issues for a moment, although they are not our present point, we may urge that the common analogy of the appearance of new properties in chemical compounds, such as water, does not hold good. For the change of qualities from those of oxygen and hydrogen to those of water is a change of specific property only—not of differentiating attribute. It is a change which takes place within the limits of the physical order and in accordance with its character. Differences of state, redistributions of

heat, and properties reducible to such differences, are all normal to that order. And there is nothing in that order which makes it a specially remarkable thing that a substance, such as chloride of silver, should have such a structure that light should be able to affect it. There is nothing here in the alleged emergent that is inconsistent with the character of the order presupposed as its basis. Therefore even though there is always a possibility that bodies may manifest unpredictable properties when put in new situations, such as when elements enter into combination, those unpredictable properties are all of that generic kind which collectively constitute the differentiating attribute of the order, and I therefore venture to think that the instances of chemical compounds, when adduced as parallel to the emergence of differentiating attributes, are cases of false analogy.

In any case, however, this metaphysical question is not identical with the theological problem, though it is relevant to it. Theology finds, as a datum, a kind of mentality and seeming knowledge known as the religious consciousness. This implies a reference to some transcendental ground, not only because it would be inexplicable without this assumption, but still more because it involves an apparent immediate consciousness of that ground; the Beyond is here not merely inferred; it is seemingly given. So that even if the religious consciousness were possible as an incidental consequence of the increasing complexity of man's nervous system the fact that the Beyond was seemingly intuited would still remain. If then we are to ask whether the religious consciousness is explicable without reference to any transcendental ground we must take due account of its content as well as of its novelty, and part of its content is the affirmation of its own transcendental origin. From this it follows that a purely psychological treatment of religion is insufficient; almost any wild speculation is

better than nothing. For otherwise what almost invariably seems to happen is this: First an experience of the transcendental is seemingly given, and we take this fact as the subject-matter of an investigation. Next we institute a psychological examination of the phenomena, and, on the strength of the fact that we are talking psychology and not metaphysics, we adopt, as the methodological rule of natural science, the principle of the exclusion of the transcendental. Finally, having thus got a body of phenomenalist explanations from natural science, principally psychology, we convert our science back into metaphysics wholesale by treating it as though it were an ultimate analysis of reality and by prohibiting, as an intellectual impropriety, all questions which cannot be dealt with as problems for natural science. The fallacy of naturalism has long ago been shown up by philosophers of the last quarter of the last century and by their followers in this. I do not profess to be competent to discuss abstract metaphysics. Unless one has command of far greater knowledge and ability than I possess one had better refrain. But the rule that theologians should work out the metempirical implications of their own language is another matter. If the resulting speculations are reasonable inferences, as the best immediately practicable synthesis of religious and cultural points of view, they will deserve at least a passing consideration.

Erda, the daughter of God, sleeps. For every brightly shining star and every planet is a daughter of God, asleep. But though they sleep yet they are full of bursting energy and life. Some of them, and among them Erda, our Mother, are bearers of children, and of her children some also sleep, but some are now awake. Though sleeping herself, she has awakened them in order that they may help her in her work. For Erda is not simply there; she has a function to fulfil as a member of the great world-organism, the universe. Erda is the earth-

soul, differentiated out of the universal world-soul through union with this planet. The world-soul, whether regarded unitively or as the aggregate of innumerable star-souls, has its function to fulfil for God. God is the highest mode of all existence. All live unto him; all are functional for ends which his being and nature prescribe. Erda, therefore, is not an ultimate fact for our thought. She is a means to God's ends and is rightly intelligible only when viewed in her double relation as the ground or source of all terrestrial life, on the one hand, and as the daughter and servant of God on the other. She is God in modified form, God's world-creating function specialized for this planet, a particular level, or system, within the complex being of God. But asleep, unconscious.

We assume the existence of the earth-soul on various grounds. Apart from religion, and apart from all special reasons, there is the argument from analogy with living beings, the argument from the impossibility of life's having sprung up from nowhere—it must have had some source and ground—and the argument from the communal character of all life. What appears to us so many separate living creatures can equally well be viewed as so many nuclei, or centres, functioning for a common, unitary life. We arbitrarily separate these centres from the general tissue of life to which they belong. We call them "individuals" and the surrounding tissue "environment". But this is but the result of our perspective as individuals. Freed from the prejudice which takes the individual alone as real, and viewing silent Nature's breathing life as a unitary whole, we can almost directly perceive that the earth is a living creature. Among special reasons for believing in the existence of an earth-soul are the following. First, a medium is required to render intelligible the action of mind upon mind, especially in cases of telepathy. We have every bit as much right to assume the existence of such a medium as physics has to

postulate an æther for analogous reasons. Secondly, certain cases of immediate knowledge—those of clairvoyance and cryptæsthesia (i.e. of conscious and unconscious perception independently of both sensation and telepathy) being the most remarkable—seem to require the assumption of a medium of perception which is something more than a mere medium. They suggest the view that the medium of knowledge is a world-wide (i.e. earth-wide) mind present to every fact on this earth,[1] and that the individual percipient in such cases is in some way enabled to gain access to that knowledge. The same inference could be drawn from other, though perhaps less striking kinds of mental events. A negative fact which bears out the same conclusion is the complete failure of persons possessed of supranormal channels of information, such as crystal-gazers or spiritistic mediums, to obtain knowledge of any facts other than terrestrial. Alleged information regarding other planets or the next world seems to be of a purely imaginary character. Whatever the source of supranormal knowledge, it is something to which every fact on earth is open, but nothing which is not, and has never been, on earth. There is further in favour of belief in an earth-soul the fact that a fair number of modern scientists and philosophers, at any rate in Germany, have accepted this view.[2]

[1] The most striking instance of cryptæsthesia of which I am aware was contained in Sir William Barrett's last paper read before the Society for Psychical Research shortly before his death. He told us of a lady he knew who was quite ignorant of science, but who, in the form of alleged spiritistic communications, reproduced a number of pages from a book on the chemistry of diamonds published by Sir William Crookes in America. Several pages of chemical formulæ of a most advanced and recondite character, one or two incidents not recorded elsewhere, and an American spelling, were correctly reproduced. So far as Sir William Barrett could find out, no copies of the book, of which he himself had known nothing until he accidentally came across a copy in America, has been brought to this country. No one questioned the honesty of this lady or of her inability by normal means to reproduce Sir William Crookes's specialist knowledge, even if she had wished to do so.

[2] See Paulsen's *Introduction to Philosophy* for examples. Paulsen himself argues in its favour.

But it is the bearing of the theory upon religion which most interests us here: the earth-soul hypothesis makes the phenomena of religion more intelligible. In religion we approach the theory, not as a substitute for belief in God, but as a guess at the particular way in which we are related to God and on the strength of which we can come into closer contact with him. From the religious point of view the theory of the earth-soul has three great merits. It provides a support for imagination in the place of the lost world-saga; it supplies an element of objectivity which to some extent enables us to conceive of God as an existent standing in relation to ourselves; and it corresponds well with some of the most living elements in religious experience.

First, then, as to the aid which the conception of an earth-soul gives to the religious imagination. We are often now assured, and rightly, that we can know God, not through this or that isolated faculty, but through the response of our whole nature and personality. There must be no side of our life, no faculty of our minds, which is not enlisted in this unitary response. And conversely, just as all parts of our nature must co-operate in his service, so must all our faculties find their satisfaction in him. Among our mental functions are all those which express themselves in science and in systems of philosophy, such as that power of constructive imagination which gives us our power to conceive of possible relations between things and so to frame hypotheses. Without something to exercise the metaphysical imagination therefore religion does not meet all the needs of our souls. There may be many who, for various reasons, do not feel this. It may be that they belong to a different psychological type which is not so dependent upon these functions. Or it may be that their powers of reason and imagination have been absorbed by interests other than those of philosophy. It may, again, be that their minds

are ununified, so that science, philosophy, religion, and daily life all go on as so many separate departments independently of one another. In a similar case are the irreligious—i.e. those who have no desire for religion and would like to abolish it. They are glad enough to leave religion with an absurd cosmology simply because it is a discredit to religion. And so there are various kinds of people who for one reason or another are content that the religious imagination should remain tied to the cosmology of a thousand years ago—not to the world-view of the few real thinkers of those days, like Erigena, but to that of the general run of folk at that time, with a world-saga instead of a philosophy and with a crudely individual God. But these people are no longer normal; the average educated man's religious imagination requires a new cosmology for the harmonizing of his religion and his secular thought, and, in general, for the picturing of a world with God in it. Here the hypothesis of the earth-soul helps us. The earth is a more imaginable thing than the universe. If we can see terrestrial things in God and God in them we can take the rest of the universe on trust. Earth touches us closely on every side. If God is in it he is at our very doors.

In the next place, the theory of the earth-soul in its religious form helps us to conceive of the religious object as objectively there, hypostatically existent and real. The psychology of religion sets before us a number of subjective processes. Everything it tells us of is something in our own minds, something sprung from our individual life-stories and produced by the workings of our brains and viscera. For psychology God is an idea, an emotional state, or something of the kind. So, it is true, is everything else. But in the case of other things we supplement our psychology by points of view from which we regard them as real entities standing in all sorts of interesting relations with ourselves. In the same way a metaphysical

conception of God immanent in an earth-soul gives us something which is not a merely subjective phenomenon. God has become an entity again; in the form of the earth-soul he is once more a not-ourselves with which we may interact, as well as being our common deeper self. A purely psychological treatment of religion is extremely easy. However one-sided our view may be, we shall find some facts to bear it out. So God becomes an illusion, a supreme psychological value, an emotional experience, a sense of libido behaving in this way or that. In the doctrine of the earth-soul we get beyond the narrowing limitations of a purely psychological standpoint. It forms the starting-point for a return to the category of Substance and a rediscovery of the ens realissimum. So gained, the idea of transcendental reality is no longer a barren abstraction but one rich with a content seen to correspond, in some way, with that of man's religious experience and vision.

The third service rendered by this theory to the cause of religion is the light which it throws upon the vision of God as a higher possibility in man and in the world-order. "There is a higher realm of being to which we can rise, through directing our thoughts and raising our hearts to God, in which we discover all the inspired prophecies fulfilled. In this higher realm we see the Divine order perfectly expressed. . . . When we get behind our willing and thinking and false, distorted imagination we find perfect harmony, perfect beauty." "There is much, very much, that, while I cannot give it, you can take. No heaven can come to us unless our hearts find rest in it to-day. Take heaven! No peace lies in the future which is not hidden in this present little instant. Take peace! The gloom of the world is but a shadow. Behind it, yet within our reach, is joy. There is radiance and glory in the darkness, could we but see; and to see we have only to look. . . . Life is so full of meaning and of purpose, so full of beauty beneath its covering that you will find

earth but cloaks your heaven. Courage, then, to claim it that is all!"[1]

The sense of a Christ buried in the soul of man—true self which has never yet become actual but which should yet by inherent right be the regulative principle o the soul—this widespread conviction is grounded upon this experience of a higher realm within. We naturally ask ourselves what kind of existence this higher realm can have. We can conceive of it only as a level of mentality latent in man and having for its object an ideal world-order. This ideal object seems to be formal in character and dependent upon experience before it can pass into an actual programme. But in its formal character and in its correlation with a certain spirit and attitude of mind it exists a priori, antecedent to experience, and inexplicable as the product of experience.

But in what mind is this will to the ideal, this imagining of a higher order, to be found? In the mind of the individual only in so far as he partakes of a deeper, more comprehensive mind. Ultimately that mind is God. But not directly and immediately. We seem to be able to distinguish five mental levels—consciousness, the individual unconscious, the mind of the race, the earth-soul, and God. Consciousness is of the present moment; the unconscious, individual and racial, is of the past; the earth-soul is the mind of latency and of the future. The Kingdom of Heaven is within us, for it is a thought and ideal of the earth-soul. The indwelling Saviour is within us, for he is a personality belonging to the earth-soul in virtue of her divine origin. He was latent in her from the foundation of the world, but became a hypostasis, the evidence suggests, only nineteen hundred years ago. The earth-soul theory enables us to think of the agency of salvation at once as a latent principle immanent in soul

[1] From the letter of a friar to a countess dated Christmas Eve, 1513. Quoted in the *Science of Thought Review* (Chichester), July 1928.

and as a transcendental entity, or hypostasis, which has acquired more and more substantive individuality—perhaps even personality—in process of time through interaction with humanity. It may thus be regarded as at once a product of evolution and as the ultimate ground of theoid experience, and of all grace.

I leave it at this inconsistency—the view that the Soteer, Hoshyant, or Indwelling Saviour-god, is (as an object of experience and not merely as an idea) a gradual product of evolution, on the one hand, and that it, or he, suddenly became manifest and effectively hypostatic nineteen hundred years ago, on the other. The former alternative is easier to think; the latter corresponds better with the evidence. I leave it at this real or seeming inconsistency, and refrain from discussing the question as to how far "The Father", the first prosopon of the Saviour-god relatively to the Christian consciousness, can be identified with the Ultimate Reality of metaphysics, as well as many other issues which suggest themselves, because my object is not to expound the theory of the earth-soul, but simply to allude to it in illustration of the metaphysical treatment of theological problems. I have urged that an imaginable world-view is required in place of the old Christian world-saga; that, for theology, metaphysics should consist of a double process of metempirical inference followed, not preceded, by a strict ontological critique; that the starting-point for metempirical thought should be religious, and especially, theoid, experience; that this leads up to the conception of the religious object as grounded in the earth-soul; that inferences of a still more transcendental character are legitimate, but that it is better to stop at this level of analysis before hurrying on to talk about Ultimate Reality; that the metempirical implications of all phases of religious experience, in both its positive and its negative instances, should be investigated independently as

they arise ("syndogmatically") and then, if possible correlated with one another by means of some suitable hypothesis (such as that of the earth-soul); that this method is epistemologically legitimate; that the veto of transcendental thought is simply a heuristic principle for natural science; that it is intimately connected with the principles of minimum significance, of backward reference (i.e. causality), and of the priority of the part over the whole, and that it is an absurdity for theology, which is based upon exactly the opposite principles, to acknowledge it.

The true logical standpoint of metaphysical theology, therefore, is not identical with that of pure, or abstract, metaphysics, nor with that of the supplement to the natural sciences usually called naturalism. The logical form of all knowledge is, as we noted at the commencement of our inquiry,[1] partially dependent upon its subject-matter, and the transference to a special subject-matter of methods whose validity has been established only in other fields of thought involves a begging of the question. Consequent modifications of scientific procedure were encountered in earlier chapters. So here, in the sphere of metaphysical theology, a due regard for the specialities of religion—its transcendental reference and other characteristics noted above—must contribute to questions of method. Our initial standpoint must be that of Apparency, I mean, the "Common-sense" doctrine of Reid, as set forth by Martineau (*A Study of Religion*, Pref., pp. x–xiii), but with the reservation that it is to be taken only provisionally pending any results which an ontological treatment may arrive at. The further development of metaphysical theology in this chapter must be taken as a study of the lines of thought imposed by matter upon form.

[1] P. 17.

CHAPTER VIII

PRACTICAL VERIFICATION

NEARLY ALL human activities, whether sacred or secular, are pursued, at least in part, for the sake of ends beyond themselves. This does not imply that in any given case they may not be carried on solely on account of their intrinsic interest. Science, philosophy, and theology can all alike be studied simply for the sake of truth, and without regard to practical utility; music, poetry, worship may be the outcome of tendencies which have no thought of an end beyond their own expression. But it is nevertheless true that, in however secondary a place, religion is also concerned with the attainment of human ends. Indeed, it is only in conjunction with human ends that the service of God is possible. The end may be the safety, the health, or the daily bread of the worshipper himself or of others. It may be the realization of a certain state of mind, whether ethically conceived or not. It may be something of wider, social character. But in any case there is something to be gained or achieved which religion keeps before the mind of the believer—something the pursuit of which is part of the religion in question. It is therefore true to say that religion is always concerned with the attainment of human ends and accordingly possesses an instrumental character, in spite of the fact that when it reaches a sufficient degree of purity and intensity this instrumental aspect as a means to ends beyond itself sinks into a secondary place.

Corresponding to this practical, or instrumental, aspect of religion there will be a branch of theology which thinks in terms of ends and means. The gospel is

itself an answer to a practical question, "What must I do to inherit the Kingdom of God?" And in the same way Hinduism centres round the practical question "How can man win salvation (moksha)?" A practical problem is thus given for theology from the very first; if it loses sight of it it loses sight of its own raison d'être.

But there is also another reason for a practical treatment of theological problems, a reason especially closely connected with the logic of theology. Scientific method requires not merely empirical, but, wherever this is possible, experimental verification. This is afforded by the very existence of a practical, or applied, science. There cannot be such a thing as a science of applied illusions. The proof that the idea of flying is not an idle dream is the fact that there is an applied science of aeronautics. A practical science is one that affords the means of the control of Nature, and the actual control so gained is a verification of the science. In the same way a control of spiritual experience would imply the reality both of Spirit itself and of our understanding of it.

The doctrine which chiefly concerns us here is the doctrine of grace. This doctrine assures us that there is a transcendental source of power available under certain conditions for certain purposes, the principal of which is the regeneration of character and disposition. If these conditions can be determined more precisely through experiment so as to convert a general human capacity for redemption into a practical possibility for any given man the truth of the general idea would be sufficiently proved. The first step would be the proof that a regenerative agency really existed; the second would be the more precise determination of its character and laws; the third, experimental demonstration that it was available and controllable; the fourth, the interpretation of this agency as the grace of God.

Three main possibilities confront us. The first is the

possibility that energy, insight, mental attitudes, may all, as it were, be telepathically transferred to the individual mind from the all-enveloping mind and will of God. The individual is able, through faith, prayer, moral conduct, and perseverance, to predispose himself to receive this grace. But the actual transference, or gift, is an act of God, an act which manifests his essentially gracious attitude towards man. The value of the idea of God, under these circumstances, lies primarily in its use as a means to approach a real, existent God. Contact with him once established, grace comes from a God objectively real; it is not simply a pretty name for the beneficial influence of the *idea* of him.

One must sadly confess that this view is incompatible with experience, and that the value of it, as a beneficial illusion, to the few is outweighed by the loss it involves for many more—the loss of opportunity incurred by a diversion of attention from the practicable to the illusory; the consequent failure to make the most of life; the disappointment and sadness; sometimes the neurosis. Even if the gain to the comparative few who still fall under the charm of the beautiful illusion (of a self-donation of God to man to make the soul fit for communion with himself) were greater than the loss to those who seek in vain, we should still have no logical right to entertain it, because the attempt to verify it breaks down in nine cases out of ten and the benefits in the tenth may be due, not to God, but to the idea of God.

The second possibility is that the individual mind is a relatively closed, single system, but that training, habit, auto-suggestion, psychoanalysis, yoga, re-education, or the like, may, in some cases, effect a certain readjustment of psychic forces. If help seems to come from religion it comes, not from some transcendental source of good, but from the idea of it in our own minds. A suitable idea of God may promote all sorts of desirable qualities, modes

of behaviour, institutions, policies, and the like, and so may symbolize the possibility and desirableness of such things. But as soon as it is discovered that God acts only as a regulative idea in our heads the symbol ceases to function. We might, indeed, still entertain a theistic world-view, but it would be a purely speculative affair. But there could be no more religion. Intercourse with God, divine help, grace, or action of any kind in relation to man would be untenable ideas. God might perhaps exist, but he would not be gracious, or approachable, or responsive in any way. And just as, upon the assumption of this psychology, the leading concepts of traditional religion become untenable, so must a practical technique based upon it be impossible. And conversely, if a technique of practical theology is impossible, the natural conclusion to draw is that the mind is a virtually closed system conditioned solely by its natural environment. Traditional religion will be half disproved. The curious thing is that, so far as I know, all Christian psychologists accept this naturalistic psychology, although they may supplement it by doctrines of grace, communion, regeneration, and so on, which are incompatible with it. I hope I may be unintentionally caricaturing the majority of theologians when I say that they accept both the first and the second possibility, calling the one "dogma", the other "the psychology of religion"; and making no attempt to solve the self-contradiction.

The third possibility is that there is some transcendental factor in mind which operates under certain conditions as though it were God. There may be two distinct mental systems in man, one dominant, the other recessive. The dominant, or normal, system is the subject-matter of natural psychology. The latent system, or divinity, is not a refined, or highly moralized, form of the normal, natural, or lower system, but a distinct mental order and, as such, transcendental to the dominant system. It is as

though there were two groups of instincts, intuitions, and emotional and conative tendencies. They are usually called, in the language of religion, Nature and Grace, Nature and Supernature, Nature and Spirit, or the Flesh and the Spirit. The two systems compete for the possession of the ego, with its leading functions of consciousness, intellect, and control of the body. Whichever system can attract to itself most lil[1] wins the ego. The higher system rarely wins decisively, and such terms as "instincts" cannot be used in connexion with it except in an analogical sense. But it is real and can be made the basis of a practical technique, when once its laws have become sufficiently known. Conversely, the possibility of a practical technique based upon this view will amount to a verification of it. God, according to this view, may exist (*a*) as a wholly transcendent Being incapable of social intercourse with man, and (*b*) as a latent element in the universe emergent as Spirit. As Spirit emerges God becomes God relatively to us. Meanwhile the spiritual has to be treated as though it were God, although, since in most of us it does not control the ego, it does not itself behave in a personal way.

What, then, can be tested by means under man's control is not so much the general idea of religion as some more specialized theory, such as the doctrine that God stands in social relations with men. If this theory seems to be refuted by practical experience a modified hypothesis, such as the third alternative above mentioned, can be put forward. But the aim must be to bring this also to the test. A hypothesis which can neither be verified nor disproved is, if not exactly "illegitimate" in Practical Theology, at least weak.

All this belongs to the sphere of controllable verification, and a special branch of empirical theology (here called Practical Theology) is required for the study of it.

[1] See p. 55.

Its first principle, as already explained, will be the eudæmonistic standpoint. Not pure, disinterested, religious feeling, but the spiritual welfare of humanity will be paramount for it. It may not plead, as does religion, "Seek first the maintenance of faith and devotion" (except in so far as this has already rationally been shown to be sound as a means to the desired ends). Pragmatic, practical, or applied theology is, in this sense, as the study of the means towards a given end, utilitarian, or eudæmonistic. The second general principle governing such a study will be dependence upon empirical verification, and the third, which follows from the second, the principle of terrestrial criteria. By their fruits here on earth the truth of all practical doctrines shall be known. Applied Theology can take no account of what may be in the life to come, if there be a life to come. Its fourth general principle will be due regard for the psychological possibilities of particular cases.

Not at all in a spirit of cheap derision, but in order to show that there is a place for a critical treatment of the practical problems of religion, I will quote, by way of contrast, what one might call the Pastoral Device. This consists in offering, in the name of religion, the greatest of prizes, salvation; it can be had for the asking, if asked for in faith; faith, prayer, and sacraments will enable the believer to overcome all difficulties, for there are boundless stores of grace and strength promised to those who seek them aright. When the event fails to justify the promise recourse is had to insisting that the sufferer has, of his own free will, failed to perform some psychological impossibility which was made a condition of receiving the divine gift. "Ah, but you need more faith, more love, more humility." "You must give your heart to God; as long as you cling to self you cannot receive God's gifts." "You cannot expect to reap your reward if you will not persevere." "God has given you free will; you must

exercise it and not expect to receive salvation mechanically." Now in spite of all their truth there is something unsatisfying in these considerations. Taken collectively, as a standing explanation of the tragic failure of religion to fulfil expectations, they almost amount to evasion. They thus bear witness to the need for a critical study of the question why religion so often fails to work in actual practice.

The fact is that the clergy of all denominations are generally too devoted to Institutionalism. Institutionalism is the habit of making the success of institutions one's main object of interest—parish, congregation, choir, clubs, meetings, denomination, become the chief objects of devotion. A system of beliefs may be made an institution, and ministers of religion, so far as they are institutionalists, will be more concerned with saving the face of their doctrines rather than with the welfare and happiness of those to whom they preach. So long as they can say to those fallen by the way "It was your own fault" they seem to be satisfied. No amount of devotion to this or that institution makes a man psychologically an institutionalist in this sense of the word. But as soon as an institution ceases to be *primarily* a means towards ends and becomes primarily an end in itself we have institutionalism. One then comes to subordinate the welfare of individual human beings to the maintenance of the institution. It is not only ministers of religion who are apt to be institutionalists; most doctors, for instance, are blindly and passionately devoted to the institution of vaccination; patriotism is another form of ardent institutionalism. But to a lesser, though very perceptible extent, the clergy also tend to institutionalism. Is it not, then, very desirable that we should have a branch of pragmatic theology organized for practical research and free from institutional bias? With a view to the maintenance of this honest, pragmatic standpoint is there not

reason in the four initial principles above laid down: individualistic pragmatism, empirical verification, this-world reference, and regard for real possibilities? This last is one of such obvious importance that as soon as, by an effort, we discard our institutionalist bias it becomes insistent. Let us suppose that it is psychologically impossible for most middle-aged people to throw themselves into the mental attitude of loving and trustful little children, psychologically impossible for them to make an inward act of comprehensive acceptance of what are metaphorically called "the promises of God", and psychologically impossible for them to persist in fruitless and wearisome devotions for half a century, what then? Do we not need an unbiassed study of the kind, I have described to consider such difficulties?

The first conclusion which such a study will probably reach is the insufficiency of moral effort, of prayers, of sacraments, and of belief in God to enable a soul to take the Crucial Step towards True Religion. The law of Habit, the principle that practice makes perfect, and the like, proceeds from without to within, from act to character, from behaviour to disposition. It is a law of progress upon a level already in principle attained; it does not truly describe the transition from a wrong attitude of mind to a right one, a transition from one mental plane to another, an entry into a new spiritual realm. Where the inward coast is sufficiently clear, where the will is firm and the inward bondage not great, this principle has great value and truth. But when the psyche is organized upon unsatisfactory lines, when the will is in bondage and obstructed, dependence upon moral resolution and prayer is not enough. It is a policy of building up reaction-formations through the cultivation of small improvements here and new rules of life there. Such efforts seldom last long; they are up against hidden forces which thwart them. The primary aim must be, not

reformation, but transformation, conversion, rebirth; not gradual improvement through practice, but a new heart, a new direction of the libido. "Make the tree good if you want the fruit to be good." Perseverance in pruning a crab-apple-tree will not make it bear sweet apples. All this is well enough known; it is only the evasive function, if one may so call it, of the common over-emphasis upon the law of habit that makes it worth mentioning here.

Taking it then for granted that the desired end is conversion to a state of True Religion, we will now proceed to a rough classification of various types of conversion with a view to seeing whether any rules of practical theology can be based upon them.

The most remarkable instances of transformation are those which are recorded in the biographies of the mystics.

A second class is constituted by cases of spontaneous conversion not involving any pronounced degree of mystical character.

A third type is provided in the phenomena of revivalism or of religious conditions approximating to those of revivalism.

Fourthly come changes of character apparently due to the prayers of others.

Fifthly, there may be cases of self-won, or self-sought, change of heart.

These five types may thus be classified as: Spontaneous and mystical; spontaneous, but not mystical; consciously induced; subconsciously induced; and self-induced. These terms have reference to one another only —not to divine grace, which may be assumed as a constant factor in all cases alike. Thus "self-induced", in this terminology, means "without the help of others", or "without much active help from others"—not "independently of the grace of God". The difference between

the second and the fifth type lies in the relatively involuntary character of the former. In that, the great change may, indeed, have been preluded by strivings of various kinds, but these are themselves the products of an involuntary urge. In the fifth type we are supposing this involuntary inward urge to be absent. A man becomes rationally convinced that he needs conversion and tries to gain it. The principal question which we shall have to consider is whether this fifth type represents a real possibility of humanity or not. Is it of any use for a man to hope to win a new heart? Should his aim be to take such steps as he thinks may enable him to experience conversion, or should he rather say, with Bishop Blougram:

> My business is not to remake myself,
> But make the absolute best of what God made.

I feel tempted to discuss the psychology of the two spontaneous types of conversion, but the practical bearing of such a discussion would be very similar to those suggested by cases of induced conversion, so that we may proceed at once to consider these. The most pronounced form of consciously induced conversion is presented by instances of revivalism. Revivalism is simply concentrated and intensified appeal to reason, conscience, emotion, and imagination, under circumstances in which crowd psychology is likely to be operative and suggestion effective. The leading ideas of the classical revivalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries constituted such an appeal. We were all frightfully sinful, and obviously someone had to get a most awful punishment; in fact, nothing else would meet the case but the everlasting damnation of us all in hell; and then the wonderful way out of the difficulty! All this was an appeal to consciousness as a whole, including reason. There is no sharp line to be drawn between revivalism and the ordinary ministrations of religion as regards details, but there is a great

difference between the two as regards general principle. The ordinary ministrations of religion are there to promote spiritual *growth* by providing an environment, an atmosphere, a body of ideas, and moderate stimuli suitable to the needs of souls regarded as living spiritual organisms. Missions, revivals, and special services or meetings of a revivalist type aim, not at promoting gradual growth, but at effecting a radical change, at a breaking up of the old psychic organization and a forcing on, virtually by spiritual violence, of an entirely new development.

The attempt to induce conversion in others by conscious means—that is to say, through the written or spoken word, or through practices, sacraments, and the like, associated therewith—thus consists of a double process. First comes the laying of the foundations, the fostering of the formation of an inward basis, or disposition, for future religion. Later on comes the special appeal. That appeal need not necessarily be of the old-fashioned revivalist type; indeed there are good reasons, from a practical point of view, why it should not be so; and chiefly because the old-fashioned theology, which was so essential a part of the old revivalism, will not grow in modern soil. But the general method of a co-ordination of slow growth-fostering with later special appeal holds good. From this general rule several corollaries might be deduced, and among them the following:

Teach your child a religion for adults. Not, of course, expressed in technical terms such as "justification", "Trinity", and the like, but in any natural English which may help to make the idea of God live. But let the sense be big, liberating, purifying, illuminating. Above all, let the sense, as it emerges many years later into full consciousness, *then* appear big, liberating, purifying, illuminating, and wonderful. Let the child acquire a religion which will not be killed by subsequent education and

which he will not in after years look back upon as childish. If a boy's or girl's religion is exceptionally vigorous it may conceivably readjust itself as knowledge increases. I very much doubt whether this is normal. It is my impression that it is comparatively rarely that religion is sufficiently fluid and yet active to adapt itself spontaneously to advancing knowledge and maturing interests. Normally the religion of childhood remains, weakened and encrusted with ideas of various kinds inconsistent with it, but otherwise unchanged. Ordinarily a religion substantially identical with that of childhood remains the only vital religion possible for us. If that religion impresses us as crude and cramping, uninteresting, flat, or shallow, we have usually only the choice between the frank abandonment of religion and a pretence that our religious opinions are real religion. They are not. Our real religion has long since died of shame at the sight of its own childishness. Anything approaching anthropomorphism is particularly bad for children. Their imaginations will exaggerate the anthropomorphism and make them think of God in such a paltry way that their later, adult personality will never be able to react heartily to the idea of God at all. Deism—the mechanical view of a purely external God standing in commonplace social and moral relationship with man—is bad for children. The more easily they can take to the picture of "a little bon Dieu made of plaster of Paris in a pink or blue robe" the worse for them a few years later. The principle of Small Profits Quick Returns in the religious education of a child is almost criminal.

So true is it that anthropomorphic religious teaching is dangerous for children that I question whether the idea of God as the loving Father of us all is a right educational creed with a view to the later development of True Religion. Let a child be taught that God is love

and that people can become children of God as something very wonderful and desirable. Let them hear the New Testament read, with its reference to the Fatherhood of God. But that will be enough. For a general impression of God a teacher will do better to rely upon the best passages in the Upanishads. And the less the child "understands" the better, for to understand here means to fit God into the categories of an infantile mind. Having once got in he will never get out, and will consequently not be available in later life as an object of worship.

Transformation of nature is not possible without great religion, and great religion is not possible without great capacity for religion. Religion requires a psychic organ, basis, or predisposition—something which is not itself religion but which religion presupposes. The development of this inward deposit, and the cashing of it in the form of a childish religion, may be alternatives incompatible with one another. The mental picture of God sitting on a chair (a royal throne is a grand sort of chair) must surely do more harm than good; the idea of the Good Shepherd may associate religion with a sentimentality later on felt to be sickly—it will very, very seldom arouse anything like what the word "love" should mean. I think that innumerable adults will own that their capacity for religion has, to all seeming, seriously been impaired through the fixation of such religious feeling as they once possessed upon an imagery felt to be cramping but from which it cannot escape.

I do not think it is inconsistent with this deprecation of anthropomorphism for the young if I go on to urge, as a further practical corollary, that the religion taught to a child should be Christianity. Why is it that Christianity has so much more power to transform character than other religions possess? It is because the idea of such a

transformation is part of the religion itself. Christianity has taken over the ethical content of the most ethical of the non-Christian religions; it has both raised it to a higher level and added new elements requisite for an ideal religion through the teaching, personality and life of Jesus, in whom the perfect harmony and union of God and man is intuited in terms, not of abstractions, but of life; and finally, through the concepts of the Spirit and of the Indwelling Christ, it has brought the ethical force of Christianity into the form of a continuous, empirically verifiable experience operating through a literature, through a traditionally transmitted attitude of mind, through a communal life, through sacraments, through churches and institutions. The spirit and character of all these is a mixture of the ethical with the super-ethical. Its ethics are primarily the ethics of transfiguration, transformation, rebirth, operating through that which the common ethics of the age acknowledges as obligatory and right. When therefore the inner life of Christians becomes sufficiently energized it tends to produce a thorough transformation of nature. A purely moral religion would be one which expressed itself exclusively in the fulfilment of civic duties, domestic virtues, and other elements of currently accepted civilization. Real transformation of soul lies as completely beyond the possibilities of such a religion as it does beyond that of a comparatively non-ethical religion. Confucius can but moralize and admonish; Krishna can but intoxicate the unregenerate emotions. Christ alone can transform the soul and purify the heart. If we think that the capacity for spiritual rejuvenation is worth preserving we must preserve its organ and instrument, the Christian religion. We may look at the matter from a purely cultural, non-religious point of view, and yet think that the possibility of soul-rejuvenescence and regeneration is of such value for the civilization of the future that that civilization should be

kept in some real sense Christian. It is much easier to promote enlightenment and self-criticism among Christians than to implant in a non-religious civilization the capacity for what would then be a sheerly magical autometamorphosis.

All this, however, has to do with preparation for future change, whether spontaneous or induced, rather than with the actual induction of such change. Given the case of a man who needs and desires redemption (or at least fully assents to the idea of it and would like to desire it)—what can the ministrations of religion do for him? What can his own efforts effect? The answer of experience is, I think, "Very little". If a sufficiently developed predispositon to change has not been formed in him in very early years, then, neither suddenly nor gradually, neither by his own efforts or reading nor by the ordinary ministrations of religion nor by an Ethical, Oriental, or other substitute for the ordinary ministrations of religion, can a change of heart be won. Regeneration can neither be self-induced nor can it be induced by the exhortations of others. In other words, if no such predisposition exists—and apparently it seldom does—little or no grace of God is given in response either to the prayer and efforts of the individual or to the public ministrations of the Church on his behalf. His prayers for forgiveness, his longing for grace, his hope of attainment, his renewed resolutions—these things may obviate a degeneration otherwise inevitable for him. But they will lead to no transfiguration, no redemption. It is the assumption of conventional homiletics that they will. When it is said that man's will is free; that strength to overcome will be given in answer to prayer; that man can, if he will, accept the offer of salvation; that man does but need faith and perseverance and in due season the new heart will be given him: when this is said it is implied that a self-won rebirth of the normal adult is

psychologically possible, and indeed, under the right conditions, certain. It is understood that the term "self-induced" does not exclude such general social influence as that of church-going, or the reading of suitable books. What it does exclude is the supposition that some other person must be the primary agent, or vehicle, of transformation. That however is what I wish to urge: A normal adult can very rarely be saved except through the right kind of prayers and conversations of some other person. Sometimes a young man may be found who has made the great act of inward self-surrender without any great degree of intimate assistance from without. But this is very seldom possible, and is probably never possible at all for the middle-aged. In ninety-nine cases out of every hundred an adult is dependent, for any great change of heart, upon the active spiritual help of some other person, and that spiritual help must consist primarily of the prayer of realization, intensely offered. Spiritual conversation is also wanted. For this purpose books are useless. It is only the impact of A's personality upon B which can awaken the latter to newness of life. Without A, or some other person, God is helpless. It is a delusion to suppose that B's own prayers will evoke divine grace, or that B's own efforts will lead to the regeneration of his soul. It is possible that B may build up such reaction-formations as to achieve a certain improvement in conduct, and that may be all that society is interested in. So long as B behaves himself his failure to realize his highest possibilities will distress neither the Church nor the police. But the subject of our present inquiry is transformation and nothing short of it. We may think of psychoanalysis, which also aims at a reconstitution of the personality. In both cases individual help is essential, and the religious method can no more dispense with the spiritual helper than psychoanalysis can dispense with the psychoanalyst. B's prayers, B's medita-

tions, B's attendance at mass, B's rules of life, B's resolutions, contrition, and renewed resolutions, are all to the good in support of A's efforts, but the efficient cause of B's change of heart will be what A is doing for him. It is B's part to co-operate, to respond to the better feelings and higher impulses as they manifest themselves. But for a long time he will need the active help of A.

The mistake of supposing that the grace of God will always be given in answer to faith, prayer, and sustained effort is usually due to an ignoring of the fact, which we have already noticed, that God is personal in his relations with men only on the higher levels of spiritual experience. Relatively to the ordinary man God is impersonal. There are higher potentialities in the background of man's soul, but until a certain level of religious development has come about it is useless to treat them as a person who will behave like a person. When once the level of True Religion has somehow come about it is not only possible but necessary to treat God as a person. He will then treat us as persons, but not before. Experience teaches us that this is true, and since it is true it should be taken into account in all questions regarding the healing of the soul and the attainment of salvation. Relatively to the redeemed, it is true, God is a loving Father, to be loved and trusted with the love and trustfulness of a child. But relatively to the as yet unredeemed God is an impersonal potentiality whom no petitions can reach.

Through the lack of any good term to describe the nature of the personal redemptive help which one human being can give another I have spoken of the resulting change as "subconsciously induced". I am thinking of any mental act on the part of one person, A, which influences the mind of another person, B, otherwise than through the ordinary channels of sense. The mental act in question almost always is, or includes, prayer for B.

A's prayer may, for all that we have the right to take for granted, act either directly or indirectly upon B's mind. In the former case it may be imagined as a telepathic transference of thought-content from mind to mind, or as an attunement of B's general attitude of mind to A's, or as a stimulation of latent possibilities in B by means of some otherwise unknown mental action popularly called "vibrations", or by means of some etheric, psiac, or other sub-material means which could perhaps rather more literally be so described, or by all such means together. In this case—that of a direct action of prayer—we should have to think of God in this connexion as a supra-individual mental structure in virtue of which such things can happen. He might be more, but that, or something like it, is what he would be relatively to intercessory prayer. If, on the other hand, we think of the influence of A upon B as indirect we may either suppose that A's prayer influences God to act upon B, much in the same way that a human person will do as requested by someone else, or that it actuates, and gives direction to, some impersonal, transcendental entity and impels it to act upon B. Such an entity would seem to possess structure and character, but not energy, for which it would be dependent upon human prayer. From the standpoint of Practical Theology it is not necessary to decide which of these theories is right; if one interpretation of the facts strikes one as improbable some other can be assumed as a working hypothesis, or one can dispense with interpretations altogether. For the purposes of a practical treatment the one important thing is to discover how A can render spiritual help to B, for the aim of Practical Theology is "not knowing, but doing". Whatever explanation of the efficacy of A's prayers we may accept, that efficacy does not depend upon any conscious reflex in the mind of B. I have therefore called it "subconscious induction". But similar processes may

accompany conversations of a sufficiently earnest kind. Here, although the ordinary channels of consciousness are employed, the effect seems to follow not so much from the things said as from the mental attitude of self-consecration, of the struggle to resist the inclination to give the effort up, and of compassion for the sufferer on the part of A, and from the prayer that will, perhaps almost unconsciously, accompany the struggle—the "mental fight".

The principal occasion for spiritual action is provided by cases of sickness. At any rate it is in connexion with the best kinds of spiritual healing that soul-transformation nowadays chiefly occurs. Physical illness is much easier to deal with in this way than moral or libidinal defects, and any movement for spirit-healing that may arise would do well to start as a special development of the spiritual healing of bodily sickness, just as the spiritual healing of mental cases has done. There is, indeed, nothing so remarkable in the modern religious world as the reappearance on a large scale of miracles of healing. At a convention held last year I listened to testimonies to healings of all manner of kinds, and noticed that cases of the healing of cancer were especially common, tuberculosis and eye-troubles coming, I think, next. How frequently one may meet with first-hand evidence for such miracles depends, of course, chiefly on the circles in which one moves. These healings are effected through the agency of another person, and they tend to be accompanied by changes of mentality more or less marked and sometimes amounting to complete transformation. Both physical and spiritual blessings are sought, but the necessity for a will to use the gifts of health in the service of God is emphasized, and a general attitude of laying greater value upon the spiritual than upon the purely physical blessings. But indeed the blessings of physical health are not recognized as *purely*

physical; they are physical manifestations of a right order within. And although in the great majority of cases it seems that the healing comes, yet, in some, the effect is wholly spiritual. In fact, it sometimes seems to be in just those cases in which the spiritual transformation is most wonderful that the physical healing remains absent, as though all the energy involved had gone into producing spiritual results. (This is merely an impression derived from a few cases and may not hold good as a generalization.)

I cite these facts, as briefly as possible, in order to show that the psycho-physical condition of a sufferer can be affected through the action of another person, either quite unknown to the sufferer himself, or where the latter merely knows that someone is praying for him, or when the appeal to his consciousness was directed mainly to securing a right religious attitude in him, while the actual cure, or transformation, was brought about in him by the healer. Here then is a group of facts in which spiritual transformation is actually taking place through human agency, and indeed in such a way as to impress the lesson that God needs human helpers or mediators of his grace. I believe that these facts should be normative for our conception of redemption.

The problem of a practicable and reliable road to the higher consciousness is the crucial one for religion. I have spent far more time in the consideration of it than over all the rest of this book put together, and I ought to confess that the meagre results obtained amount substantially to failure. One may analyse the psychology of this process and of that, of moral advance here, of sin there. But it all ends in a mere talk and argument about it and about until we reach a knowledge that gives a real control of inner experience. The conclusion of the whole matter must always be a "This do, and thou shalt live". It must be the task of theology to make this "this"

rationally intelligible, illuminating, convincing; to reduce it to scientific form and to link the formulation of it up with *Individual* psychology and with metaphysics. Can these things be done? Does any man understand the secret of redemption?

I am not forgetting the many and valuable books which have been written as guides to the spiritual life. But the putting of them into practice presupposes a measure of sensibility and impulsion that is not usually forthcoming, even in the case of people who would so gladly experience it. From the standpoint of a practical science, as from that of the logical need for verification for spiritual inferences, a more generally accessible starting-point must be assumed. It is this self-critical, sobered standpoint which will distinguish a scientific theology from the more heartening expositions of the prophet and the seer.

CHAPTER IX

THEOLOGY WITHOUT A GOD

NOW LET US suppose that an inquirer has come to the conclusion that no God exists; can theology be of service to him any longer? It can, for by enabling him to understand what religion is, what is its practical value, and what differentiates it from all other interests, theology may be a guide to man in his search for a substitute for worship. I am not referring to anything which may be put forward as an alternative to religion altogether, but to what professes to be still religion, only of an enlightened kind. The point of logic here is the modifiability of the meaning of terms. One must beware of applying the phraseology of religion to cultural interests which are, indeed, excellent in themselves but are simply not religion because they lack its specific nature, its differentiating qualities, its own distinctive influence upon the human personality. It is as though someone were to argue that the true horse of the future will be a small tailless rodent. Such a statement would not be more intrinsically meaningless than views such as those set forth, for example, by Professor Sellars in his *Religion Coming of Age*. Professor Sellars declares: "The natural place to look to-day for the prophets of the coming religion is the domain of sensitive thought. . . . Now it is very interesting to note the increase of naturalistic humanism in religious thinking. . . . The heart of religion is concern for human values. . . . Philosophy is in a fair way to link up human values with reality. How, you will ask, can it do this? By regarding values as the expressions of the interests and knowledge of human beings, as pro-

jections of their desires and demands upon things. In valuing we are on the inside of that part of reality which we call a human being. Here man is an agent adjusting himself to the things and persons around him and interpreting them in terms of his feelings, desires, plans, knowledge. The value of things is what they mean in this concrete way as connected up with his life as a going concern. . . . That is the spiritual which appeals to man as significant. . . . All things of good repute are spiritual. . . . Art, science, statesmanship, are activities of immense import. . . . It is always well to mix intelligence in such affairs and work out a position happiest for everybody concerned. . . . Can the new perspective offer a substitute for prayer? Many have suggested self-communion, meditation, reflexion. I myself find music, poetry, and a quiet walk into the country effective for that gathering together of oneself that is good for one at times. Those who are more dependent upon the reinforcement which social groups give to the individual will probably find help . . . in public meetings where enthusiasm reigns." Professor Sellars then introduces a few quotations from other writers, the most definite of which gives, as examples of religious problems, "Relations between parents and children, the economic status of women, the causes of criminality", and the like. His final paragraph commences with the words, "Let me assure my readers that this is intended as a very constructive book." What it actually does is to illustrate most pitifully what a poverty-stricken thing his new religion is. I have not omitted a single remark of Professor Sellars' own which seems to me to carry his idea one step forward.

We are assuming, for the purposes of the present argument, that no God exists. It is also agreed that economic and international problems are suitable subjects for religious treatment. It does not follow that if you simply drop the idea of God you will still have economics

as a religious subject. You will not, for it is the idea of God which turns such matters into subjects of religion. Passing over the individual aspect of religion, we might say that religion is the ideal summary of all right social attitudes. But the fact remains that it is only in so far as it is connected with the idea of a real God that this ideal summary becomes effective, or even remains existent. The individual social attitudes may persist, but that peculiar enhancement which is due to their being subsumed under a comprehensive ideal attitude must disappear if that more refined and generalized attitude itself depends upon conditions (such as faith in Christ) no longer realized.

The same considerations apply to the religious functions of art. Is it not evident that so far as, for instance, music evokes religious feeling it is due to the fact that the latter exists independently of it, that music, and especially music of a certain kind, has been employed to express religion, and that a certain analogy of feeling connects that kind of music with religion? But all this presupposes a religious something which is not music. To speak of art, politics, and science as being in themselves religious activities is empty rhetoric, based upon lack of observation. Professor Sellars seems to agree with those by whom religion, even at its best, is identified with a weak-minded longing for heavenly cosseting and comforts hereafter. It must be admitted that the popularizers of religion, sentimental hymn-writers, and emotional preachers have provided material for this impression. But it seems extraordinary that this view should be accepted by a professor of philosophy, and that he should at the same time put forward art and economics as suitable satisfactions for this craving.

All depends on the maintenance of specific character. Factual and analytical theology, surely, should be able to show what as an actual fact religion is. Religion is flow

of hormic energy along the lines described in the Church Catechism as "my duty towards God", supplemented by that system of practical morality which we conceive to be in accordance with God's nature and purpose. To be religious at all—indeed, to be a specific entity at all—that flow of hormic energy, or libido, must retain its specific character, or at least something approximating thereto. If it be postulated that God does not exist some psychic structure will be required to fulfil the functions hitherto carried out by the idea of God. It will, in fact, be the function of this psychic structure to direct the energy, by a process of supraversion, away from its instinctual basis and upwards towards an ideal which does not itself rest upon a purely instinctual foundation. The great problem of practical theology will then be the conceiving, testing, and cultivation of this inward mechanism of self-regulation and self-sublimation in the interest of an ideal somehow felt and imagined as supracultural or transcendental. The various forms of prayer and adoration will have to be investigated as means for developing and directing spiritual force, and the conditions upon which they are dependent impartially examined. Moral theology will have to struggle for a system of values not so much derived from human life as prescribed to human life by some cosmic end for which human life itself is functional and instrumental. Metaphysical theology will be called in to find what justification this, the religious attitude, can find in the structure of reality, once the idea of God is dead.

Theology will still be the science of the higher consciousness, the study of the laws of spiritual, as distinguishable from cultural, life. There must be a science, or systematic study, of the higher, or supernatural, level of consciousness, because it exists. Whether there be a God or not, there is such a thing as Spirit—a special mental system with laws and tendencies of its own, the validity

of which must be examined. It is discovered chiefly through contrast with the things with which it is likely to be confused. It is not art, nor morality, nor social interests, nor science, nor philosophy, nor susceptibility to literary effect. It works through all these, but it is not constituted by them. It is something other, yet most intimately interwoven with them; it is antagonistic and yet akin to them; it co-operates with them, yet seeks to subdue them. It is a new insight which can illuminate only when the old wisdom is abandoned. It is a new system of instincts which can function only when the instincts of nature are, not suppressed, but freely surrendered. It is a new conative trend which makes for the universal, and is non-biological and non-individualistic. It is this specific thing that we have to learn, first to discriminate and then to study. Nor, as regards value, can the supremacy of "life" over Spirit be postulated, as Jung, at the end of his essay on this subject (in his *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*) seems to imply. We cannot know that there are no higher cosmic ends which are served by the subordination of "life" to Spirit, even to the detriment of the former. Prejudgements of this kind are mere assertions.

The following remarks[1] briefly summarize an attempt to preserve the essence of real religion within the limits of naturalism along other lines than those adhered to by Professor Sellars. Whereas the latter scheme may be said to consist in this, that to such cultural interests as art and social progress it proposes to add a little sentimentalizing about them, or at best a sort of General Introduction to Social and Æsthetic Interests, and to call this religion, the said attempt seeks to get beyond this standpoint to something more specifically religious, but to do so on the basis of scientific knowledge, and especially of psychology. Its interest therefore centres upon ideas

[1] Cf. Rahn, *Science and the Religious Life*.

derived from the sphere of supernaturalism, such as that of spiritual regeneration, but it rests upon the methods of science rather than upon those of supernaturalist theology. It runs as follows:—

The well-being of man, physiological, mental, and social, depends primarily upon the maintenance of right mental attitude. Mental attitude controls the endocrinal, libidinal, and energic situation of the individual. All vital and emotional processes, all dispositions and tendencies, are very largely the products of attitudes and sets, while each specific attitude is itself rooted in a more general and comprehensive frame of mind. If we proceed to analyse that more general, controlling attitude presupposed by the ideal well-being of the human personality under social conditions we find that its principal components consist of such factors as a conviction of the reality of spiritual values, hopefulness, universal good will, confidence, absence of resentment, freedom from fear, anxiety, and strife, and the like. We may thus, through control of attitude, look forward to the evolution of a transformed, transfigured humanity.

Now all this is simply Christianity in secular language. These specific attitudes are just faith, hope, charity, trust in God, forgivingness, peace, and so on. To say that they are rooted in a more general and comprehensive attitude is but to call them the fruits of the Spirit. And to declare that man's well-being depends upon a right mental attitude, and that a right mental attitude is just such an attitude as this, is almost equivalent to the confession that salvation is brought to man by Christ so far as we by faith are "in him" and walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit. Redemption, transformation, new creation, are terms descriptive of the results of thus coming under the control of the Christ-attitude. These words have a religious and mystical flavour, but "reconstruction of the personality" would say the same thing in

language agreeable to naturalism. The specific nature of the Christian attitude becomes clearer when it is compared with its chief rivals in this country. The seemingly most widespread of these—that of disillusionment—tends to a depression of vitality and to neurotic conditions. A simple faith in what a new economic order will effect may lead to yet more disillusionment. And an acceptance of a universe recognized as soulless, such as Mr. Bertrand Russell recommends, has its weaknesses. It almost suggests an intellectual masochism indicative, perhaps, of an overcompensation for a subconscious horror of death; it comes very near to a positive revelling in the thought of human insignificance, impotence, and mortality that strikes one as rather morbid; a taking sides with the thought of death rather than of that of life, of values which, in their ultimate analysis, are mean rather than exalted, seems unbiological; in ordinary natures this attitude, if assumed at all, would be liable to become a mere pose and affectation; while in so far as these dangers are avoided it would amount to no more than a mere lack of sensibility or of any definite attitude at all. None of these attitudes provides a very satisfactory system of control, whether for the individual or for cultural evolution.

We may now make use of the principle of "as-if". The logical value of this standpoint lies in the fact that it permits a maximum description of appearance to be accompanied by a minimum of interpretation. It enables us to accept dogmas, not as metaphysical truths, but as descriptions of experience and as prescriptions of right attitude.

From the standpoint, then, of Christian experience it is *as though* the ego, or normal conscious self, found itself face to face with a higher being. The ego apprehends the latent presence of an Absolutely Good Attitude as though it were a person of an immeasurably higher

order standing over against the ego's own instinctually determined attitudes. It cognizes that Transcendental Person, or Purusha, as it is often called in the early verse Upanishads, by means of its—the ego's—own reactions to it, and it finds that the Absolutely Good Being, thus grasped, responds in proportion as the ego adopts a right attitude towards it. The general pattern of right reaction to the transcendental, absolutely right attitude, with a view to establishing its control, is set forth, analytically in various summaries, pictorially in the myth. (Doctrine seems to stand half-way between myth and analysis.) The myth is thus a prescription of attitudes and reactions, with a view to the higher experience.[1]

This inward something which appears to us as God is apprehended through the category, or thought-form, of personality, or anthropomorphism. I do not mean that this is the only category employed by religious feeling to envisage its object, but it must not be wholly lacking. The operation of this category is necessary to the actualization of the higher emotions, the release of which is one of the main functions of religion. If the higher emotions are not stored up in religion, and rendered accessible through religion, it may be found that they are not adequately available for life. The coming social order, in which good is looked for from satisfactory arrangements rather than from the old-time virtues of personal benevolence and loyalty, may well co-operate with naturalism to bring about a constriction of the emotions, which, in the presence of a felt personal and social need for them, may

[1] For example: Out of heaven he made thee to hear his voice, that he might instruct thee: and upon earth he made thee to see his great fire; and thou heardest his words out of the midst of the fire. And because he loved thy fathers, therefore he chose their seed after them, and brought thee out with his presence, with his great power, out of Egypt. . . . Know therefore and lay it to thine heart, that the Lord he is God in heaven above and upon earth beneath: there is none else. And thou shalt keep his statutes, and his commandments, which I command thee this day, that it may go well with thee" (Deut. iv. 36, 37, 39, 40).

convert the New Era—the messianic age so widely believed in to-day—into hell. Who can be *grateful* to a rudimentary psychic capacity as such—especially when it will not work? Who can lift up his heart to it and sing Te Deums to it? Who can believe in it, reverence it, and love it with all his mind, with all his soul, and with all his strength?

A would-be religion, therefore, which keeps within the limits of naturalism lacks the essential character of religion. It is incompatible with the whole disposition of religion and not only with theistic theory. Is the disposition separable from the theory?

Let us glance back once more at religion as an actual, given fact.

The religious consciousness appears as a trend mentally to create an object of thought called God, and to feel and behave towards it in a certain way. In its purest, most natural, form it seems to contain a personal and impersonal factor, each of which may assume a more concrete or a more abstract character. Hence four main types of religious thought and feeling—the concrete personal, the abstract personal, the concrete impersonal, and the abstract impersonal, according as one or other of these sub-trends tends to predominate. (I am not speaking of metaphysical theories, but of religious feeling and symbolization.)

The concrete personal type imagines God after the analogy of a person standing in some particular kind of social relationship with other persons—e.g. as Monarch or as Father. Our whole attitude towards him is then very largely determined by the symbol itself, and the whole group of social interests and traditions from which the metaphor is derived is lifted bodily into religion. The resulting metaphysical theory is often called "deism".

The idea of God developed under the influence of the

abstract-personal mode of religious feeling is not, as in the former case, derived from some social relationship in human society, but from some quality, and these qualities are mainly of personal, human, origin, such as love, goodness, mind, spirit. But a certain sense of qualitive transcendence accompanies every term thus applied to him, and this gives an anti-anthropomorphic turn to terms based upon human nature. If, for instance, God is to be called good, then no man may so be called, for there is none who owns divine attributes but One—that is, God.

In so far as the concrete-impersonal element in religious feeling predominates it is the earth itself which provides the core of the symbol whereby God is apprehended. The thought of the earth is expanded into that of "This All", the whole universe. God is the One who includes all existing things as parts of himself, and yet exists as a unitary Being over and above them all. The trend towards pantheism, like that towards deism, subsists as a factor in, rather than as an alternative to, theistic feeling.

There is a second form of impersonal devotional feeling which turns away from all concrete things and thinks of God as something amorphously unearthly, surrounding and penetrating the soul in unimaginable ways. He is an Ocean, a Mystic Sea, a Well of Being, an Abyss. "Thou art my deep, still, resting sea", sings George Macdonald.

It is not mere theories, or "reason", which make the deism of the churches so stifling and destructive of religious emotion; it is the suppressed pantheistic element in religion in revolt. But that personal factor, usually so overdone, seems, on the evidence, to be essential to religion as *Higher Control Attitude*.

Let us leave the ambiguous word "religion", for the moment, out of the discussion. Then we can discriminate

two things: (*a*) a group of actions or attitudes of some very general kind, describable in such and such a way; and (*b*) a tendency to react to some object (e.g. the universe or the idea of a king) in such a way as to transfigure it and transform it into God, and then make it the occasion for such further reactions as adoration and self-oblation. The real problem turns on (*b*), whether one calls it "religion"—the natural name for it—or anything else. It is (*b*) that is the given fact; the various formulations of (*a*) are merely attempts to make (*b*) seem intelligible by bringing it under this or that more general point of view. It is not the function of this book to discuss these matters in detail. They have, however, this much relevance here, that the problem of a substitute for religion as we know it can profitably be undertaken only after an analysis of that quality wherein the specific essence of religion actually consists.

I am not arguing that naturalism is false or Christianity true. I am only trying, with reference to a particular context, to insist upon the old logical rule that the meaning of terms must be kept constant, and that that meaning must be determined by facts. If mankind decides to discard religion in favour of rationalism it will do so by an act of choice that is no concern of the logician's. But if, with Professor Sellars, we are speaking constructively of *religion*; with Mr. Russell, of a free man's *worship*; with Dr. Jung, of the specific nature of Spirit; with Mr. Rahn, of the higher potentialities of humanity realized through the control of attitude: then we are bound by the force of our own terminology to what it implies. And that seems to be more than those writers are prepared to recognize.

The specific nature of religion is inseparably bound up with that of religious knowledge, and as to this the evidence of the religious consciousness is definite: That

which, analysed or cross-examined, remains the silence of eternity can be known personally when it is interpreted by love. That is to say: *a personal relationship of the most perfect and intimate kind is essential to the penetration and interpretation of the universe*. Then it will reveal itself. When the Christ-attitude is realized, its correlate, the Father-attitude of the Absolute, manifests itself in consciousness and experience. Even if that which thus manifests itself be describable as a product of our own libidinal development, it does not follow that that product is not an organ of a universal Spirit. It is a false alternative which insists that either the religious or the psychological view must be false. There is no suggestion that the religious life has no natural history describable by science. The suggestion is that natural processes sometimes result in a vision of certain aspects of Reality to which we are normally insensitive and unresponsive. And an essential factor in those processes is the vitality of the category of personality as an organ both for the realization of truth and for the acquisition of adequate psycho-physical control.

Thus, logically, the term "personality", as applied to transcendental Reality, only means "the attribute of being apprehensible through personal relationship". It asserts a possibility and indicates an approach; it is not an analytical psychology of the Absolute. The aspect of Reality thus revealed through a specific, personal attitude, but otherwise unknowable, is its sacred aspect. What kind of things men have felt to be sacred has varied; the personally helpful, the socially serviceable, the good and moral, the mysterious and uncanny, the overwhelming and sublime, the kind and loving—all these impressions have mediated personal reactions to that which is beyond thought. Underlying all questions as to the significance of these reactions is the more fundamental issue as to the possibility of thus discovering whether the universe does

indeed possess a Hidden Aspect in virtue of which it is truly God. Until a more thorough attempt has been made to adapt our rules of thinking to the peculiar requirements of this search all our proposed substitutes for religion—religion in its old sense of personal realization of, and relationship with, the hidden, sacred, supernatural aspect of Reality—are at least premature.

APPENDIX

THE THEOLOGY OF THE REAL

INTRODUCTION

I HOPE THAT this book may fairly be described as a contribution to the study of objectivity in theology.

I have endeavoured to gain objectivity in my starting-point by a preliminary setting aside of doctrines which rest solely upon an emotional and subjectivist basis. Theology must be a branch of reality-thinking, not of phantasy-thinking. Nor is objectivity to be gained by placing the collective idiosyncrasies and subjectivism of Churches in place of those of the individual. The appeal to the authority of the Church is generally but an appeal to the organized phantasies of a group. A Church can represent objectivity only when its methods of thought are objective.

On the other hand no objectivity can be reached by evading the point at issue—the validity of the religious standpoint. This is evaded when the question as to the reality of intercourse between God and man is shirked.

What is needed is not the substitution of science for faith in the sphere of religion, but the substitution of scientific for unscientific methods in theology.

The objectivity at which theology has to aim is of several distinct kinds. Each of these can be tested separately. The first of these is that objectivity which characterizes both natural science and practical life. It consists in the determination of thought by causal inferences drawn independently of feeling. The passional element which so largely sways practical life and which is far from being inoperative in natural science need not disturb us because it does not constitute the whole basis either of common life or of science; in addition to the influence of prejudice there is amply sufficient reality-thinking to give

objectivity both to science and to practical life, and that objectivity consists of logical inferences based upon the principle of uniform causation. What, in its ultimate analysis, causality is does not here concern us. It is in any case something upon the basis of which objectivity is possible. We may call this "practical and scientific objectivity". Is it possible for theology?

It is a tendency, I think a vice, of many theological writers to leap from crude traditionalism to critical metaphysics without paying any regard whatever to the demands of even the most elementary practical and scientific objectivity such as even a schoolchild could appreciate. Every child knows that there are reasons for supposing that the world is round, reasons which hold good for everyone, and which it can itself to some extent understand. Here, then, is a definite issue for theology; does practical and scientific objectivity hold good within its sphere at all?

If it does, we hereby assert the causal agency of God, of the Supernatural, of Spirit. And if we may define a miracle as an event which implies spiritual causation the scientific objectivity of theology implies an established tendency, under requisite conditions, for miracles to happen. The use of this unpopular and ambiguous word need not be pressed. But it must be borne in mind that the causality into which we are to inquire in this branch of our subject is not a metaphysical causality which expresses itself in natural law as such, but the particular causal connexion between a phenomenal antecedent (such as a prayer or prayers) and a phenomenal consequent (such as improvement in health or character).

We ought not to permit ourselves to be deterred by the expectation of failure to establish the truth of any such causation, for we are not mere advocates or apologists, and failure itself may become an elucidation of truth, albeit not the truth which we should wish.

The next kind of objectivity is perceptual or æsthetic. It is not a question of inference, but of the reliableness of these or those impressions. If the aspects of the spiritual world, as reported by religious persons, are sufficiently coherent a certain general character will emerge and the impressions of one person can be checked by those of another. The process is

in some respects analogous to the discovery of the uniformity of Nature. The religious experiences of one person can be compared with those of another, and all can then be synthesized, or colligated, by means of the right concept to express them all. It will thus be true of the spiritual world, as of the natural, that, in Mill's language, "we make experience its own test". So far as such attempts succeed our vision of God acquires objective character; so far as they break down (and there is no reason to suspect that we have been led astray by the associations, or other defects, of our terminology) there is reason to doubt the objective reality of the religious object.

Ethical objectivity is to be sought in taking adequate account of the concrete facts of experience and of psychological law. The tendency of ecclesiastical ethics has been towards an emphasis upon the aspirations of saintliness supplemented by a practical accommodation to the moral standards of worldly convention. In this accommodation it is not the higher ideals of secularism from which ecclesiasticism has borrowed, but from the more uninspired traditions of respectability. The resulting contradictions within the sphere of moral principle itself led to great unreality. Within the sphere of social ethics a healthy tendency towards self-criticism has recently become more marked, but systematic ethical study is still greatly needed.

The objectivity of metaphysical theology consists in its coherence with the particular facts of natural science and common experience. Formulas like the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, though they are sometimes called metaphysical, are not really metaphysical at all inasmuch as they are the outcome, not of the attempts of the intellect to understand the universe, but of purely devotional interests. When the idea of God can be shown to illuminate any class of facts, other than those of a distinctively religious character, a certain objectivity, or partial independence of its emotional basis, can be claimed for it, and the more numerous and varied the classes of facts which it can illuminate the greater its objectivity.

In following out these four lines of thought—the practical and scientific (Chap. II), the mystical (Chap. III), the ethical

(Chap. IV), and the metaphysical (Chap. V)—some endeavour will be made to avoid deserting the point of view of the particular discussion in progress. Thus when we discuss below certain points of medical theology the principle of proof through verifiable causation must be kept steadfastly in view, and we must be content with a treatment of the subject which is emotionally unsatisfying. In perceptual theology, on the other hand, we must not turn aside more than is necessary to discuss psychological origins, since the particular kind of objectivity of which we shall then be in search is not dependent upon them.

These remarks are designed, not as a summary of the contents of the book, but as an indication of an underlying theme —the pursuit of objectivity in theology—common to all the varied discussions dealt with in its pages. What particular problems are discussed can be seen from the table of contents. They have been selected as representing the religious interests of the present day in circles more or less estranged from official Christendom. And if one or two of my conclusions appear to orthodox critics to be deserving of extreme malediction, I would beg them to consider the limitations which an attempt at objective method necessarily imposes. Wrong conclusions are less serious than wrong methods.

SPECIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER ON MORAL THEOLOGY

A SENSE OF the authority and supreme intrinsic worth of Spirit underlies all Christian ethics. But it is unprofitable to dilate upon this, or any other ethical subject, in the abstract; ethics should be studied in the concrete. In concrete ethics there is not one sole moral standard, but several, and especially the following: Right personal development; right relationship to other individuals as such; right relationship to the social organism; right relationship to God, or Spirit in itself. These standards have to be applied in accordance with the

sacramental principle. A sacrament is an outward and visible means to an inward and spiritual grace—i.e. it is such a use of Nature (e.g. the acquisitive or the sexual instinct) that the ends of Spirit are thereby promoted. The question must therefore be pressed with reference to every traditional rule of conduct whether it really does serve its purpose. This question can be studied only in connexion with an impartial examination of actual concrete facts, and this leads on to the principle of relativity in ethics. For the idiosyncrasy, or special make-up, and the particular stage of development reached by particular persons is one of the determinants of what is right for them. And we cannot make assumptions as to what is normal, or as to what sort of cases constitute no more than a negligible minority, until we have studied actual cases on an extensive scale. Neglect of these considerations leads to moral verbalism, a certain mock-spirituality which cloaks with phrases of morality and even of saintliness a situation which is far from spiritual.

In so far as a fair-minded study of the concrete facts leads us to the conclusion that a moral law or sacred institution does not really serve the higher ends which it professes to serve, but rather hinders them, the principle enunciated by Jesus holds good: "Sacred laws were made for man, not man for sacred laws. Man, therefore, is sovereign over law." New wine-skins are then required.

I have appended this outline of the main argument of the chapter on Moral Theology lest hasty readers should gather a superficial impression from the discussion of certain details in it and should attribute to me a point of view which I would entirely repudiate.

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CHAPTER HEADINGS

Introduction.	The principle of objectivity in theology.
Chapter I.	The present situation. The Saga of Salvation.
Chapter II.	The causation of particulars. The phenomena of healing and regeneration as evidence for "piecemeal supernaturalism."
Chapter III.	Religious Experience. God, Grace, Providence, and Judgement as empirical fact.
Chapter IV.	The relation of Given Fact to moral principle in Christian Ethics. Studied in connexion with personal, social, and sexual problems.
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